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ABSTRACT
My hypothesis is that the intersections of music and politics are not adequately 
addressed in professional music education as it is currently conceived and that the tools 
of critical theory and critical pedagogy and the goal of developing critical consciousness 
address this gap. My objective is to show the necessity to situate ourselves and our work 
in relation to political, economic, personal and communal locations.
This thesis is a conceptual study and draws on the literatures of philosophy of 
music education (i.e., B. Reimer; D. Elliott, T. Regelski and E. Jorgensen) and critical 
theory/critical pedagogy (e.g., Paulo Freire). I argue that critical consciousness enables 
us to consider political aspects of materiality, ideology, and power, thus affecting our 
understandings of ourselves as musicians, suggesting changes to our practices, and 
contributing to our capacity to participate as citizens in a democracy. In conclusion, I 
offer a series of recommendations, pointing to extant work that could contribute to a 
music program that has developing critical consciousness as a goal.
IV
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
“But what could be cruder than a human being who is limited to a narrow idea o f 
knowledge and practice and has the naiveté o f a child in most other areas? This 
is one o f the elements that accounts for our clinical state o f  unconsciousness. ”
John Ralston Saul*
Hilary to Jackie: “You don Y know anything apart from the cello. I  don Y know 
anything apart from the flute. We 're babies, Jacks. ”
Dialogue from Film: “Hilary and Jackie”^
The above quotations, from a book by scholar John Ralston Saul and a popular 
movie about cellist Jacqueline DuPrès, point to a problem with specialist education that 
can leave graduates unprepared to grapple with questions beyond narrow limits. My aim 
in this thesis is to examine potentially narrow limits in the specialized field of education 
for professional musicians. Specifically, I investigate the possibility that studies of 
critical consciousness might usefully inform and broaden both the subjects and the 
manner in which professional musicians are taught.
This thesis has grown out of two sources. The first is my own experience of 
cognitive dissonance where my goals and aspirations as a professional musician have 
been in conflict with my growing understanding of myself as a politically located 
individual. The second is the literature of critical pedagogy^—a literature I encountered 
during a Philosophy of Education course—that offers a means of analyzing and possibly 
resolving that cognitive dissonance.
* Saul, J. (1995). The unconscious civilization. Concord, ON: Anasi Press, p. 15 
 ^Copyright: Alliance Vivafilm 1999
 ^In particular, hooks, b. (1994). Teaching to transgress. Education as the practice 
offreedom. New York: Routledge and Freire, P. (1990/1970). Pedagogy o f the oppressed. 
New York: Continuum.
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My project originates with the claims that there are many instances where 
politics and music intersect; my education as a professional musician did little to prepare 
me to address these situations adequately. In my experience, questions regarding 
corporate or government funding, questions about cultural appropriation or anti-racist 
repertoire, or questions about whether the arts should be subsidized as a part of the 
“public commons”"* can rip the heart out of music organizations and performers.
My music degree prepared me primarily to replicate culture within the context of 
a professional symphony orchestra and traditional small ensemble; there was little sense 
that, as a producer of culture, I would have important artistic, ethical and practical 
decisions to make in my future career. My assumption, as a student, was that music in 
general, and western classical music in particular, transcended the day-to-day and had no 
relationship to political issues. I no longer believe this to be the case. My project thus 
begins from the position that separating music and politics is problematic. Contrary to 
the conventional perception that music education is apolitical or neutral, I believe that 
keeping music studies separate from political considerations is a political choice. I also 
argue that, educationally, it is an unnecessarily constrained and constraining choice.
"* “Commons are any sets of resources that a community recognizes as being 
accessible to any member of that community. The nature of commons is different in 
different communities, but they often include cultural resources and natural resources.... 
The most widespread instance of a common is the public right-of-way, a.k.a. public 
roads. ...resources "owned" equally by every member of the community, even though the 
community recognizes that only a limited number of members may use the resource at 
any given time.” {Commons. Retrieved 7/7/04, from Wordiq; 
http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Commons.)
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The nature of the study is conceptual. The initial problem is to determine 
whether the current philosophical formulations of the character and justification of music 
education are adequate to ground educational studies that would prepare professional 
musicians to deal effectively with the political dimensions of their work. I address this 
question in three steps: first I draw upon the philosophy of music education literature to 
generate a set of themes and key tensions that will serve as a baseline account of current 
philosophical foundations. Second, I identify a significant set of political dynamics 
relevant to the work of professional musicians. Here, I draw upon my experiences across 
a range of activities associated with professional music practice. Finally, I compare these 
two accounts and show that, with some exceptions, the philosophy of music education 
literature does not address effectively the political dimensions of professional music 
practice that I have found to be problematic.
The second problem involves studying the critical theory and critical pedagogy 
literature to identify an approach that might reasonably be expected to address the 
political dimensions of professional music practice. This problem is actually set up 
through a comparison of two different interpretations of the term “praxis”. The first 
interpretation is based on an Aristotelian account of modes of thinking-doing. This 
version of praxis appears in the philosophy of music education work of both David Elliott 
and Thomas Regelski. The second, contrasting version, is based on a Freirean account, 
Marxist in origin, that characterizes praxis as a transformative kind of thinking-doing. 
This comparison then serves as a bridge to the account of critical consciousness that I 
develop based on a review of the literature of critical theory and critical pedagogy.
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I do not endeavour to make claims about particular music programs or 
institutions in this study. Nor do I attempt to find solutions for specific political/musical 
problems. Rather, my goal is to make the case analytically that developing critical 
consciousness is important for musicians on several levels—personal, professional and 
societal.
This thesis is addressed to those who teach and study in Professional 
Conservatory of Music Programs, Professional Colleges and University Faculties of 
Music. By narrowing my discussion to this group of people, I am not implying that there 
are not other routes to becoming a professional musician, that “professional” implies 
musical merits unavailable to non-professionals, or that the “musics” studied in these 
contexts define what counts as musical culture. I address my thesis to those who work 
within these educational settings because these institutions offer full-time study of several 
branches of professional musical life. Thus, these institutions occupy a central place in 
our society where the raison d ’etre for our being, and the relationships in which we will 
engage as professionals in the field of music can, and I argue, should, be subjected to 
thorough analysis as a part of our preparation to enter the field.
The literature of philosophy of music education is a rich source of discussion on 
the nature of music and music education. In order to establish the major themes of this 
field, I review selected works of four major, contemporary writers: Bennett Reimer, 
David J. Elliott, Thomas A. Regelski and Estelle R. Jorgensen. Each of these writers 
argues for the importance of having a sound and defensible “philosophy” to guide one’s 
practice as a music educator. In my view, the argument for the importance of 
“philosophy,” that is, for having a critical understanding of “why we do what we do,”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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applies equally well to other music professionals such as performers, composers and 
musicologists.
The literature of philosophy of music education raises many issues of relevance to
all music professionals—not the least being the relevance of pedagogical practices to our
own music studies. Amongst the issues considered by these writers are: the nature of
music, whether music represents a particular form of knowledge, how musicianship is
best developed, how to define the nature of creativity and how this is best developed,
what music offers to human beings as individuals and in relationship to others, and what
extra-musical expressions of culture are relevant to the understanding of different musics.
The literature of critical pedagogy, on the other hand, offers a conceptualization
of education, including a critique of various discourses, in which individuals learn to
situate themselves by an analysis of socio/political relations as seen through the lens of
historical materialism^. Education is conceived as a “practice of freedom”  ^based upon a
dialectical and dialogical approach to knowledge. The following passage, from the 1987
“dialogue-book” by Paulo Freire and Ira Shor, both describes and exemplifies some of
the principles and rationales of this approach:
Paulo The methods of dialogical education draw us into the intimacy of the 
society, the raison d ’etre of every object of study. Through critical dialogue 
about a text or a moment of society, we try to reveal it, unveil it, see its reasons 
for being like it is, the political and historical context of the material. This for me 
is an act of knowing, not a mere transfer-of-knowledge or a mere technique for
 ^See Chapter Three for a definition of “historical materialism.”
 ^See Shaull, Richard in introduction to Freire, P. (1970/1990). Pedagogy o f the 
oppressed. New York: Continuum, p. 15; hooks, b. (1994). Teaching to transgress. 
Education as the practice o f freedom. New York: Routledge, p. 30; Shor, I., & Freire, P. 
(1987). A Pedagogy for liberation. South Hadley, MA: Bergin & Garvey.
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learning the alphabet. The liberating course ‘illuminates’ reality in the context 
of developing serious intellectual work.
Ira I like that idea, Paulo, to ‘illuminate’ reality. And I also agree that 
liberating education is not a manual of clever techniques, but is rather a critical 
perspective on school and society, learning for social transformation.
Paulo Besides being an act of knowing, education is also a political act. That 
is why no pedagogy is neutral.
Ira They all have a form and a content that relate to power in society, that 
construct one kind of society or another, and they all have social relations in the 
classroom that confirm or challenge domination. (Shor & Freire, 1987, p. 13)
Shor and Freire refer, here, to a number of issues. They suggest it is important to
situate ourselves as engaged’ learners and teachers within social, political and historical
contexts and that the creation of knowledge is on-going and is better facilitated by a
dialogical approach to pedagogy rather than transference of knowledge from teacher to
learner. Education, they claim, is not neutral because it relates to the structures of value
and power in a society. Classroom dynamics can challenge or reinforce accepted social
relations. Thus, where social relations can be shown to be oppressive, social change can
be advocated as a valid educational goal. By implication, they also reject the
compartmentalization of knowledge — the practice of teaching subjects as isolated from
social context as critiqued by Saul in the opening passage of this chapter.
Two further concepts important to the idea of education as the “practice of
freedom” are “conscientization” and “praxis”. Conscientization (conscientizaçâo), or
critical consciousness, a notion made prominent by Paulo Freire, “refers to learning to
’ See also hooks, b. (1994). Teaching to transgress. Education as the practice o f  
freedom. New York, London: Routledge, for a discussion of “engaged pedagogy” and 
Vaugeois, L., Epp. (1996, April). Classroom Dynamics and Feminist Pedagogy: Engaged 
Learning. Applying Research to the Classroom., 14, ^(Valuing Diversity), 26-30.
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perceive social, political, and economic contradictions and to take action against the 
oppressive elements of reality” (Freire, P., 1990/1970, p. 19, FN: translator’s note). 
“Praxis” is defined as “action and reflection upon the world in order to change it” (Freire, 
1990/1970, p. 36; hooks, 1994, p. 14). Freire argues that achieving “conscientization” is 
a primary goal of education. It is the process that one undertakes to become aware of 
historical, political and social relations. “Praxis” is the necessary integration of theory 
and action. Theory, in itself, does nothing to change reality; however, action taken 
without adequate theorizing is equally ineffective in bringing about positive social 
change; inadequately theorized actions risk fanatic and destructive consequences (Freire, 
P., 1990/1970, p. 19). Thus, the term praxis reminds us that action must always be 
informed by theory and theory must always review and anticipate action. Both 
“conscientization” and “praxis” are central to critical pedagogy as developed by Freire 
and Shor, amongst others. Music education philosophers David Elliott and Thomas 
Regelski also use the term “praxis;” however, their use of praxis is based upon an 
Aristotelian definition of the term and differs significantly from the way it is used by 
critical theorists. This difference becomes pivotal to my argument for the development of 
a form of critical consciousness that is attentive to politics.
I first read the literature of critical pedagogy in the context of general education 
but began to wonder if this literature might also have something to offer to the education 
of professional musicians. What I had been seeking was an approach to music education 
that encouraged musicians to make connections between the work we do and the society 
in which we live. I wanted an approach that would provide the analytical tools necessary 
to make informed decisions about the intersections of politics and music, that is, I wanted
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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to see my musical work in relation to my political, economic, personal and communal 
locations. I began to conjecture that developing critical consciousness would allow 
musicians to contextualize their work beyond the demand to re-produce culture. Further,
I postulated that developing critical consciousness might allow musicians to grow beyond 
the limitations of a specialist education — a limitation that Saul notes as potentially 
restricting our capacities to act responsibly as citizens.
With the literature of philosophy of music education as one primary source of 
study and the literature of critical pedagogy as the second, my thesis will focus on two 
questions: Does the current philosophy of education literature address the intersection of 
music and politics that I have found to be problematic for professional musicians? And, 
is developing critical consciousness important to the education of professional musicians? 
My study is grounded on three assumptions: 1) that learning about the nature and value of 
music is important to music education; 2) that the intersection of politics and music 
matters and 3) that professional musicians must be able to address the issues that emerge 
from this intersection. For the purposes of analysis, I have identified five aspects of a 
musician’s life where music and politics meet. I identify these aspects in terms of roles 
musicians experience as their careers and their lives progress. As they are lived, these 
roles are not mutually exclusive; however, for my purposes it is useful to address the 
elements they introduce separately. These roles are: wage earner, artist, member of a 
community, teacher and cultural producer. “Wage earner” refers to one who earns their 
livelihood through musical work. “Artist” refers to one who strives to express personal 
creativity through a chosen medium. In this category, I examine creativity and self- 
image. “Member of a community” refers to our locations within social and political
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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forms of organization. “Teacher,” for the purposes of my thesis, refers to one who 
teaches within a university or conservatory setting—in classrooms or one-on-one as 
instrumental teachers. Finally, “Cultural producer” refers to one who contributes to 
artistic events that take place in public settings, such as performances and classes 
intended to be shared by people other than the producers involved. I have summarized 
these roles in chart form below:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Role or Aspect: Definition for the purpose of this thesis:
Musicians as: 
"Wage Earners"
Those who earn their livlihood through musical work.
Musicians as: "Artists" Those who strive to express personal creativity through a 
chosen medium.
Musicians as: 
"Members of 
Communities"
Our locations within social and political forms of 
organization.
Musicians as: 
"Teachers"
Those who teach within a university or conservatory 
setting-in classrooms or as one-on-one instrumental 
teachers.
Musicians as: "Cultural 
Producers"
Those who contribute to artistic events that take place in 
public settings, such as performances and classes 
intended to be shared by people other than the producers 
involved.
Figure 1: 
Five aspects of a musician's life where music and politics meet.
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These roles help to illustrate the connection between political circumstances 
and ways we actually live our lives as musicians. For example, as “wage earners”, we 
face the difficulty of defending the value of classical music as a public expenditure.
Many musicians find themselves participating in lobbying efforts to gamer and maintain 
public support. At stake is our material survival — at least within the context of existing 
institutions; however, our rationales are often based on little more than self interest and a 
gut instinct that what we do “is important”. Even where musicians are part of 
organisations formed expressly to advocate for better contracts and more favorable tax 
laws, lobbying efforts are not necessarily understood in terms of broad political and 
social issues. We often don’t recognize ourselves as sharing common circumstances with 
other unemployed workers or people on social assistance, although we are dependent 
upon government (public) support. As cultural producers, elassical musicians are 
accused of carrying the banner for the music of “dead white men.” This role, or 
designation, is generally not examined during formal music studies. Should public 
funding go towards maintaining this particular tradition of music-making if it reflects 
values at odds with some contemporary values? The debate over public funding is one 
example of political circumstances intersecting the way we live our lives as professional 
musicians.
Philosophy of music education literature introduces us to factors that affect the 
ways we understand the nature and value of music and music education. Considering 
these factors is essential to the development of professional musicians; however, I argue 
that contemporary music education practice is limited by a preoccupation with what I call 
a view from the “inside”. Developing critical consciousness requires that we examine
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the structures of society and consider our roles, as musicians, within that larger 
context—what I refer to as the view from the “outside”. By attending to an alternative 
tradition of praxis, my project reframes how music and music education are related to 
society. I argue that this view of praxis, and the attendant requirement to develop critical 
consciousness, affects our understandings of ourselves as musicians, suggests changes to 
our practices, and contributes to our capacity to participate, in a meaningful way, as 
citizens in a democracy.
The thesis is organized into five chapters. Following this introduction. Chapter 
Two presents a largely exegetical analysis of the work of the four writers mentioned 
previously; Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen. As much as possible my account 
reflects the priorities and objectives of each author as outlined above.
In Chapter Three I stay with the philosophy of music education literature and 
examine the work of Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen. This examination is 
conducted in light of the five roles that frame my analysis of the intersection of music and 
politics (wage earner, artist, member of communities, teacher and artist).
Chapter Four has three parts. In Part One, I focus particular attention on the 
concept of “praxis” contrasting the Aristotelian definition used by philosophy of music 
education writers, Elliott and Regelski, with the tradition and use of the term based on the 
work of Karl Marx and developed by educators such as Paulo Freire, Ira Shor, and bell 
hooks. The contrasting analysis of praxis becomes a critical point of departure for my 
project. It is by arguing in favour of paying attention to the latter, currently neglected, 
line of thinking about praxis that I lay the groundwork for including critical 
consciousness as an element of music education. In Part Two, I discuss the meaning of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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critical consciousness according to Paulo Freire, Ira Shor, bell hooks, Maxine Greene 
and other philosophers who write within the field of critical pedagogy. I look to these 
writers for an understanding of critical consciousness in relation to pedagogical principles 
and practices. Key concepts include; the development of critical consciousness 
(conscientization), problematization, use of a dialogical method and the relationship of 
education to the political. I close this section with a summary of the gaps between the 
issues raised in the literature of critical pedagogy and those raised in the philosophy of 
music education literature. In Part Three of Chapter Four, I offer weak, moderate and 
strong formulations of arguments in favour of integrating critical consciousness into 
general education practices.
Finally, in Chapter Five I present a set of conclusions that reviews the course of 
the arguments leading up to the advocacy of studies of critical consciousness. I bring 
forward examples of political dynamics of professional music practice that can be 
addressed via the tools of critical consciousness, problematization, and a dialogic 
pedagogy to look at these examples as they affect musicians’ roles as cultural producers, 
wage earners, artists, members of communities, teachers and cultural producers. In this 
chapter, I also offer some limited references to literature by musicians* who write fi*om 
within the disciplines of musicology, sociology and cultural criticism. Much of this latter 
work addresses political and cultural implications of various musical practices that could 
contribute greatly to a pedagogical program that has developing critical consciousness as 
a goal.
* Susan McClary, Lucy Green, Christopher Small and John Shepherd, amongst
others.
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Finally, I review the weak, moderate and strong arguments in favour of critical 
consciousness studies, this time in the context of music education, and offer a series of 
limited recommendations for future study.
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CHAPTER TWO:
PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC EDUCATION: A BRIEF SURVEY
Although the field of the Philosophy of Music Education does not have a long
history in North America—it dates back little more than thirty^ years—it is a rich source
of discussion on the nature of music and principles of music pedagogy. Significantly,
most of this literature is directed towards those who will become school music teachers or
those who prepare them for this profession. The education of music teachers is generally
assumed to be quite different from that required by performers, musicologists and
composers; however, while there are particular subject areas that pertain to each division,
I believe that having an understanding of the nature of music and the nature of music
education is significant for all branches of the profession. Bennett Reimer directs his
comments in the following passages towards future music educators; however, they apply
equally well to all future music professionals.
The need for a philosophy exists at both the collective and individual levels. First, 
the profession as a whole needs a set of beliefs which can serve to guide the 
efforts of the group. The impact the profession can make on society depends in 
large degree on the quality of the profession’s understanding of what it has to 
offer which might be of value to society. (Reimer, 1989, p. 3)
It is essential for the development of a sense of self-identity and self-respect that 
college students be given the opportunity to think seriously about their reasons for 
professional being. (Reimer, 1989, p. 5)
Each of the writers discussed in this chapter argues in favour of the significance 
of understanding “why we do what we do” and what the music profession has to 
contribute to society. In addition, each writer argues that “how” one is taught should
 ^Bennett Reimer’s A philosophy o f music education, first published in 1970 is 
considered the first formal work in North America devoted to the philosophy of music 
education.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
16
reflect the same values as “what” one is taught. In other words, one’s philosophy of 
music should reflect one’s philosophy of music education and vise versa. Likewise, it is 
important that “what and how” one is taught to be a performer or composer or 
musicologist reflects philosophical values one has identified as “of value to society.”
The literature of Philosophy of Music Education is thus an excellent starting place in any 
discussion about what philosophical and pedagogical principles should guide educational 
practices for all students at professional music schools.
In this chapter I map out major issues as identified by four philosophers of music 
education: Bennett Reimer, David J. Elliott, Thomas A. Regelski and Estelle R.
Jorgensen. I discuss these writers in the chronological order of their major works.
Bennett Reimer
Bennett Reimer published the first edition of his book A Philosophy o f Music 
Education in 1970, with a second edition appearing in 1989***. Reimer describes the 
nature of music via the aesthetic tradition**, and uses his analysis to establish what he
*** A third edition of Reimer’s book, A Philosophy o f Music Education.
Advancing the Vision was published in 2003. I have not included material from this 
edition as this portion of my thesis was completed prior to the book’s availability. As my 
analysis functions primarily as a foil to introduce the need for developing critical 
consciousness I believe I can let my original analysis stand; however, I direct the reader 
to Reimer’s 2003 publication. The new edition is substantially revised and includes 
responses to David Elliott and other critics of his work, discussions on the influence of 
post-modernism and much new thought on the nature of music and music education.
** Reimer cites Susanne Langer and Leonard Meyer amongst others as key 
sources of the aesthetic tradition. His references include: Langer, Susanne K. (1957). 
Problems o f art. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Langer, Suzanne K. (1942). 
Philosophy in a new key. New York: Mentor Books. Meyer, Leonard B. (1956). Emotion 
and meaning in music. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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considers to be central to music education. His principal arguments are that music and 
the arts exist in order to express human subjectivity; that music must be experienced as 
sound to be understood as music; that “meaning” in a piece of music resides only in terms 
of its musical elements; and, that human subjectivity (or human feeling) can be educated 
through experiencing and deepening one’s appreciation of art.
The function of art, according to Reimer, is to educate our feelings. Art serves to 
“clarifr, organize, broaden, deepen, concentrate, refine, sensitize, [and] discipline” our 
feelings” (Reimer, 1989, p. 32, author’s emphasis). “Creating art and experiencing art 
deepen our subjectivity” (Reimer, 1989, p. 36, author’s emphasis). A person who 
composes music is “at once embodying his [i'zc] ^ ’understanding about the nature of 
feeling and exploring new possibilities of feeling” (Reimer, 1989, p. 66). A person who 
performs music works with the expressive qualities of the materials of sound, explores 
and discovers the “expressive potentials in the yet-to-be-finished work of art, and [brings] 
those potentials to fruition in the performance of it” (Reimer, 1989 p. 65). A person who 
listens to music “shares the artist’s subjectivity captured in the work’s expressive 
qualities and explores new possibilities of feeling opened to him by the work’s 
exploratory nature” (Reimer, 1989 p. 67, author’s emphasis).
Works of art must be “experienced” to be understood. Reasoning based upon the 
use of concepts is not sufficient for explaining the process of perceiving and experiencing 
music. A concept is “always about the phenomenon. It does not constitute the
*’ Reimer uses male and female pronouns interchangeably throughout his text. 
My practice will be to cite author’s pronoun references verbatim while alternating them 
in my own text.
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phenomenon itself or the internal experience of the phenomenon” (Reimer, 1989, p.
83). He explains;
Concepts always and forever yield knowledge about (ab, Latin = “away from”). 
They never yield knowledge of. Works of art yield knowledge of. The experience 
they exist to provide is of the immediate, singular, unnamed, dynamic interplay of 
structured forces embodied in their elements. In the experience of them we are 
engaged in a process of affective/perceptual structuring. Such an experience is 
not “about” anything. It is “o f’ a particular occurrence yielded by a particular 
expressive form at a particular moment in time. (Reimer, 1989, p. 83-84)
Reimer argues that music and the arts have a “special cognitive status” and that
“the authentic, essential ways they [the arts] involve people in intelligent, reasoned,
mindful experiences ...yield powerful forms of knowledge of their outer and inner
worlds” (Reimer, 1989, p. 80). This distinction between the modes of acquiring
knowledge in other disciplines and the “perceptual structuring” particular to arts learning
is central to Reimer’s argument for the need to include music and arts education as
separate areas of study for all students distinct from any other non-artistic forms of
education. The rationale for this imperative is that aesthetic learning develops a unique
form of human intelligence that allows us to experience human subjectivity in its
limitless forms. In Reimer’s words, “music and the other arts are a basic way that
humans know themselves and their world; they are a basic mode of cognition” (Reimer,
1989, p. 11).
Reimer uses the word “aesthetic” to describe the nature of the experience one has 
when engaging with a work of art. To clarify his own position, Reimer presents 
Formalist and Referentialist positions to show what he does not mean by aesthetic 
experience. The formalist position is that art refers only to itself: “Artistic events, such 
as sounds in music, mean only themselves: the meaning is completely and essentially
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different from anything in the world which is non-musical” (Clive Bell in Reimer,
1989, p. 23). For Referentialists, an art work’s meaning resides in the “ideas, emotions,
attitudes, events” which the art work “reminds” one of or “tells about” (Reimer, 1989, p.
17). This viewpoint fovmd its most extreme expression in Socialist Realism. The
alternative position that Reimer argues in favour of is called “Absolute Expressionism.”
Absolute Expressionism “insists that meaning and value are internal: they are functions
of the artistic qualities themselves and how they are organized” (Reimer, 1989, p. 27).
Reimer acknowledges that external referents have a function in some kinds of music
(music with text, for example) but maintains that such references are “always
transformed and transcended by the internal artistic form” (Reimer, 1989, p. 27). He
uses the term “aesthetic” to describe the particular cognitive process that is only available
to us through artistic experience.
The arts offer meaningful, cognitive experiences unavailable in any other
way Such experiences are necessary for all people if their essential humanness
is to be realized. (Reimer, 1989, p. 28)
Learning about different musical styles is an important pre-requisite to being able
to respond to the pieces of music. Styles are like the “rules of a game;” they tell us what
the tendencies and expectations are of any particular sphere of music.
For sounds to have tendencies—to arouse expectations that certain things are 
likely to happen—and for musical tendencies to be manipulated in expressive 
ways by deviations, delays, resolutions, repetitions, uncertainties, and so on, a 
context must exist which provides people with a commonly accepted sphere of 
musical probabilities. Such a sphere of probabilities, in which a recognizable 
degree of predictability exists, is called a “style.” When melody, rhythm, 
harmony, tone color, texture, and form are used in characteristic ways so that 
some unity of expectation is possible on the part of the perceiver, a style is in 
operation, providing the basic set of agreed-upon “likelihoods” for musical 
sharing to be built upon. (Reimer, 1989, p. 132)
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Reimer argues that art is to be experienced on its own terms without reference
to non-musical signifiers^^ as in the passage that follows:
The expressiveness of an art work is contained in its artistic qualities rather than 
being pointed to in something outside of itself. ...The work does not communicate 
something—it embodies artistic qualities that can be experienced by someone 
who is aware of them and feels their expressive potential. (Reimer, 1989, p. 91)
Further,
Aesthetic experience is not a means toward nonaesthetic experience and serves 
no utilitarian purpose. It is experience for the sake of the experience in and of 
itself....For an experience to be intrinsic it must be removed from practical, 
utilitarian concerns, so that it can be enjoyed for itself. In this sense aesthetic 
experience is “disinterested”—not lacking in interest but lacking in concern about 
pragmatic outcomes. (Reimer, 1989, p. 103)
Reimer does not intend this distancing from utilitarian aims to make art separate
from life, however. On the contrary, he sees artistic experiences as being at the core of
life’s most meaningful experiences:
Art is not esoteric or rarified or removed from life, but is a basic means for 
making contact with life. The particular way one makes such contact through art 
is by aesthetically experiencing it.” (Reimer, 1989, p. 102)
The “value” of “the art of music” is in its ability to broaden our capacity to feel.
By broadening this capacity, music can help us achieve larger social goals. Reimer
quotes Dewey in the following passage about the socializing value of the arts.
The power of art to cut through the surface of life and to give a sense of life’s 
depths makes art our most effective tool for deepening the experiences of people 
into their shared nature. “In the end, works of art are the only media of complete 
and unhindered communication [sharing] between man and man that can occur in 
a world full of gulfs and walls that limit community of experience. This sharing
“Musical” signifiers, according to Reimer, include melody, rhythm, harmony, 
tone color, texture, and form. “Non-musical” signifiers could include such factors as 
biographical details of the composer’s life and the social context in which the work was 
created.
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is, in essence, socializing, for it allows people to know—through actual 
experiencing rather than through preachments—about the common sentient 
condition of humans.... It is “inside” art that we find our deepest sense of 
community, as we feel deeply and empathize with others who also feel. (Dewey 
as quoted in Reimer, 1989, p. 68.)
To enhance this capacity, Reimer suggests that students study music from cultures
different from their own so that they can experience and appreciate life as subjectively
experienced by others.
The reason the world does not have just one style of music is that each culture has 
its special shading of affective experience of the world. Music—and all art—is 
the most powerful way to explore and experience the specificity of how life is felt 
by each group sharing a communal subjective identity.
We are instructed, by the diversity of ethnic music styles, that human 
feeling is universally existent but is also expressed uniquely by each culture. That 
is precisely the social lesson our children must learn through their musical 
education; that all human beings share the basic condition of subjective awareness 
and that each culture experiences this awareness with a special character.
(Reimer, 1989, p. 145)
Reimer places creativity at the centre of musical experiences and also at the centre 
of his pedagogical vision*"^ . Creativity can be found in simple musical constructions as 
well as complex ones, and it can occur in student work as well as the work of experienced 
composers. He describes musical creativity as engaging with the materials of music: 
exploring the possibilities of those materials, discovering the potentialities for 
expressiveness within those materials and organizing them in such a way as to create 
feelingful experiences.
In Reimer’s 1996 response paper, he describes his view on creativity as a 
“continuum of abilities,” reiterating his conviction that fostering creativity is vitally 
important to music education. Reimer, B. (1996). David Elliott's "new" philosophy of 
music education: Music for performers only. Bulletin o f the Council for Research in 
Music Education, 128, 59-89.
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The growth process which is the essential characteristic of artistic creation is a 
process of exploration. It is a searching out and discovering of 
expressiveness. The exploration into feeling takes place through an 
exploration of the expressive possibilities of the medium in which the 
artist is working. There is no way for an artist to explore the realm of 
feeling except through exploring the feelingful qualities of things—words, 
sounds, colors, shapes, movements, acts. Artistic creation explores and 
forms the feelingful qualities of a particular medium. (Reimer, 1989, p. 59)
Reimer reiterates this in the following passage;
Music education should help people share as fully as possible in the created 
expressive qualities of pieces of music, so they can experience the explorations 
and discoveries of feeling captured in those pieces. Music education should also 
involve people in the creation of music to the fullest extent possible, to experience 
their own explorations and discoveries of feeling through the act of creation. 
(Reimer, 1989, p. 69)
For Reimer, developing one’s individual creativity is a central tenet. Three levels 
of creativity should be explored and encouraged in every music education program. 
Reimer cites the most important of these as “listening.”
Listening is its own act of creation. The listener’s “perception and musical 
reaction are brought to bear in such a way that he is, in a real sense, creating along with 
the music (Reimer, 1989, p. 129). Reimer considers listening to be the most important 
element of music education because “the major interaction most people will have with 
music is as listeners. (Reimer, 1989, p. 71)
The second way that Reimer suggests that people “experience music creatively is 
through composing” (Reimer, 1989, p. 71). Reimer considers the teaching of 
composition an important pedagogical goal that has, thus far, not been well integrated 
into school music programs.
The third way that music students can explore their own creativity is through 
performance. Here Reimer cautions that performance classes can sometimes result in
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students learning technical proficiency without ever becoming engaged in making their
own artistic decisions.
To understand that there is a big difference between making the correct sounds 
and being involved in an act of creation, to employ the methodologies for making 
that truth come alive in the real experiences of our students, and to be guided by 
that goal—the goal of creative music making rather than that of competitive 
musical dexterity—remain among our most pressing needs as a profession. 
(Reimer, 1989, p. 72)
Reimer writes at length ahout potential problems of performance programs and
cautions against programs that produce highly skilled players trained more as “artisans”
than “artists” because they have had no involvement in artistic creation and artistic
decision-making per se (Reimer, 1989, p. 69). In performance programs, because so
much time is spent on large ensemble work, students may not have sufficient room to
“contribute their own creative decisions as opposed to the unifying decisions made by the
conductor, whose job it is to mould a coherent performance that is true to the piece itself’
(Reimer, 1989, p. 71). Therefore it is important that performance programs create
opportunities for students to develop their creative decision-making skills as performers.
In discussing “how” music should be taught, Reimer recommends an experiential
approach and cautions against concentrating “on details at the expense of experiencing
the actual music” (Reimer, 1989, p. 54). The teacher should
.. .help students become progressively more sensitive to the elements of music 
which contain the conditions which can yield experiences of feeling. These 
elements—the musical qualities of melody, harmony, rhythm, tone color, texture, 
form—are objective; they are identifiable, nameable, capable of being 
manipulated, created, discussed, isolated, reinserted into context. There is nothing 
mystical about musical events and how they give rise to a sense of significance. 
(Reimer, 1989, p. 54)
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The “good” music educator must be careful not to place him/ or herself
between the student and the work of music that is there to be experienced and perceived
by each individual student. Nevertheless, good listening is not passive and therefore can
be heightened through pedagogical strategies.
A constant interaction between conception about expressive qualities of music, 
and perception of those qualities, should pervade every aspect of musical study. 
(Reimer, 1989, p. 117).
The teacher must constantly balance the need to bring musical concepts to the attention of
students while facilitating opportunities for students to actually experience the music
itself.
In music, perceiving and reacting (aesthetically experiencing) occurs through 
listening. One need not compose in order to experience music. One need not 
perform in order to experience music. But one carmot experience it without 
listening. (Reimer, 1989, p. 168)
As stated earlier, Reimer recommends that the music studied represent different
musical genres from many parts of the world. The music studied should also be of good
quality; however, quality is not measured by genre but by how well a piece of music
succeeds in capturing a sense of human feeling.
Every good work of art, no matter when it was made and no matter how it was 
made, is good because its artistic qualities succeed in capturing a sense of human 
feeling. (Reimer, 1989, p. 51)
“Art, and artists, in the populist view, must be judged for excellence relatively to 
what they are creating” (Reimer, 1989, p. 112). Reimer eschews elitist^ ^  attitudes that 
would impose a hierarchy of values.
In his preface, Reimer explains that the term “aesthetic” is mistakenly 
interpreted to refer only to elitist conceptions of music: “Still another difficulty with the 
term is that it suggests to some people a focus on art for art’s sake or music for music’s
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Elitism is deadening to culture because it is unable to enjoy the great variety of 
life’s good things. It is pernicious, of course, when it claims that access to culture 
should be limited according to social class, race, financial status, and so on, a 
position untenable in a democracy. (Reimer, 1989, p. 112).
Reimer describes the criteria for determining what should be studied below:
First, the musical compositions chosen for study, at all levels and in all aspects of 
the program, should be rich with expressive potential. Not every piece of music 
will be or need be at the masterpiece level of musical excellence and profundity; 
such pieces will always be exceptional. But every piece to be experienced should 
be marked by the qualities that testify to the presence of genuine musical 
creativity; craftsmanship in its construction, sensitivity to its expressive impact, 
imagination in its freshness, authenticity to its own musical demands and to the 
style of which it is an example. These qualities of excellence exist in the simplest 
idea as well as the most complex compositions, and in every period of music and 
every style of music” (Reimer, 1989, p. 70).
Reimer recommends a thoughtful and reflective approach to music education. His 
view that music is not related to anything but itself, however, results in a caution that sets 
definite limits to the type of discourse that takes place in music classrooms. Reimer 
believes that teachers must avoid engaging students in long discussions over nonmusical 
issues. He argues that the historical and social contexts in which music is created are 
only relevant in terms of recognizing particular musical styles in strictly musical terms. 
Reimer argues that teaching about nonmusical elements forces the “experience of music 
to be nonmusical, and, even more importantly, teaches people that nonmusical responses 
to music are appropriate and desirable” (Reimer, 1989, p. 124, author’s emphasis). 
According to Reimer, this nonmusical approach to teaching about music is an ''antimusic 
education” and becomes a “serious obstacle to the development of an important
sake, which seems to mean that art or music are then unrelated to the everyday lives that 
we as human beings actually live. Further, such an esoteric or elitist view could certainly 
not be relevant for the “common people,” whose involvements with art are earthy and 
freewheeling.” (Reimer, 1989, p. xii)
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component—the aesthetic component—of people’s lives” (Reimer, 1989, p. 124, 
author’s emphasis). In Reimer’s view, all the arts should be “approached as expressive 
forms, perceived as expressive forms, responded to as expressive forms, judged as 
expressive forms, taught as expressive forms.” (Reimer, 1989, p. 119).
To summarize and to facilitate comparison vith other theorists, I present key 
themes of Reimer’s philosophy in chart form in Figure 1.
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Reimer
General Philosophical Approaches
Aesthetic philosophy of music and music education. Recommends reflective practices.
Music as knowledge fits into the liberal humanist tradition of education. Aristotelian 
concepts are used to support his viewpoints.
Music education fulfills humanist ideals.
What is the nature of music?
Musical works are "expressive forms;" Historical and social contexts do not affect the 
meaning of musical works. Music refers only to itself. It is not "about" anything.
Does music represent a particular form of knowledge?
Music represents a unique form of knowledge (perceptual structuring) that educates human 
“feeling”— a form of knowledge with intrinsic value. All arts should be approached as 
expressive forms.
How is musicianship best developed?
A variety of pedagogical approaches is recommended. All arts are to be approached, 
perceived, responded to, judged and taught as "expressive forms."
Listening is the most important way to experience and learn about music because the 
listener is "creating along with the music."
Becoming a successful performer should not be seen as the be-all and end-all of music.
Music education should include exposure to the music of many different cultures. An 
experiential approach is recommended. Comparison of the expressive qualities of the 
music of different cultures can lead to an appreciation that all human beings share the 
basic condition of subjective awareness.
What is the nature of creativity and how is this hest developed?
Developing creativity should be an important part of music education. A continuum of 
creativity exists that all can access.
What does music offer to human beings as individuals and in relationship to
others?
It is "inside" art that we find our deepest sense of community, as we feel deeply and 
empathize with others who also feel” (p. 68).__________________________________________
________________________ How is music evaluated?________________
Music is successful when it succeeds in expressing human subjectivity-when it is 
"feelingful." The role of the teacher is to bring about a greater awareness of the expressive 
qualities of the musical elements in operation.
Figure 2: Key Themes of Reimer
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David J. Elliott
Elliott published Music Matters^^ in 1995 as an alternative to models developed
by Bennett Reimer and other aesthetic music philosophers. Like Reimer, Elliott believes
that “the nature of music education depends on the nature of music” and “the significance
of music education depends on the significance of music in human life” (Elliott, 1995, p.
12). Elliott, too, wants to “encourage teachers to think philosophically as a regular part
of their daily efforts” (Elliott, 1995, p. 12). He disagrees profoundly, however, with
Reimer's analysis of the nature of music and the nature of music education. Elliott’s
principal arguments are that music is something that people “do” (i.e., music works are
not “objects”), that music is fundamentally multicultural in nature, and that music
represents a unique form of knowledge described as “praxis” (Elliott, 1995, p. 33)^’.
Elliott begins his argument with a discussion of historical reasons for the
development of aesthetic philosophy and traces it to economic developments and a
perceived need by composers and theorists to create a concept of instrumental music as a
“nonfunctional, commodity-based art.”
The work concept of music not only provided musicians with a theoretical 
equivalent to the tangible and highly valued objects of painting and sculpture, it 
served to conceal music’s social and performative aspeets by diverting attention 
away from musical processes to musical outcomes conceived as autonomous 
objects. In these ways, music gained a place among the commodity-based fine arts. 
(Elliott, 1995, p. 25)
Elliott, D. J. (1995). Music matters. A new philosophy o f music education. 
Toronto; Oxford University Press.
Later in this thesis I focus, strategically, on “praxis” as a means of contrasting 
the focus of critical consciousness made available in each of these music educators’ 
thought. Here, however, I refer to it more simply as one of the themes emphasized in 
Elliott’s work.
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Elliott explains that 19*** century theorists elevated instrumental music, as opposed
to music with text, to the highest status “because its sonic materials transcended all
worldly matters” (Elliott, 1995, p. 25).
Instrumental sounds were recast as the purest of aesthetic qualities because they 
seemed to lack any connection with the ordinary world. (Elliott, 1995, p. 25)
Composers were also conceived “as divinely inspired by being geniuses whose
creations exist in an ideal world that performers strive to enter by being faithful to a
work’s written score.” (Elliott, 1995, p. 25)
These principles of ideal permanence and separability from the world were 
reinforced by the notion of aesthetic perception, a code of listening that 
obliged nineteenth-century audiences to cooperate with musicians in 
stripping musical sotmds of their social and practical links with the world 
for the purpose of entering the quasi-religious realm of aesthetic 
experience. (Elliott, 1994, p. 25)
Elliott argues that, in contrast to aesthetic theories of musie^*, music is intimately 
tied to its cultural and historical tradition. Where aesthetic theorists argue that works of 
music should be appreciated and understood for their intrinsic musical qualities (e.g., 
Reimer, 1989, p. 103)^ ,^ Elliott argues that the social and historical context of music- 
making activities is part of the “nature” of music per se. He writes:
In reporting Elliott’s claims 1 do not mean to endorse them. In my view, 
Elliott’s representation of Reimer, as a representative of the aesthetic tradition, is not 
always accurate. He presents an either/or formulation that has resulted in a polarization 
of viewpoints on music education.
“For an experience to be intrinsic it must be removed from practical, utilitarian 
concerns” (Reimer, 1989, p. 103). In this instance, Reimer’s account is very similar to 
that made by Aristotle regarding the difference between praxis (intrinsic value) and 
poesis (instrumental value). This is noteworthy. Elliott argues that his formulation of a 
“praxial philosophy” is diametrically opposed to the aesthetic philosophy of Reimer;
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Every auditory aspect of a musical work is inexorably tied to some artistic- 
musical-historical tradition. Hence, there is nothing innoeent, self-contained, 
neutral, or ordinary about the sound patterns of musical works or the processes of 
listening for musical sound patterns. (Elliott, 1995, p. 91)
A musical practice is not something that operates autonomously in a culture; it 
constitutes and is constituted by culture and ideology. (Elliott, 1995, p. 212)
Continuing his critique of the aesthetic viewpoint, Elliot states that “[mjusic is not
simply a collection of products or objects. Fundamentally, music is something that
people do” (Elliott, 1995, p. 39, author’s emphasis). Music is a form of “intentional”
human activity that refers to far more than any possible collection of “esteemed works”
(Elliott, 1995, p. 39) or “feelings.” In Elliott’s terms, rather than being an entry-point to
feelings or human subjectivity, music is a kind of “doing-action” that is a
multidimensional form of thinking, fundamentally multicultural in nature and
intrinsically connected to the various conditions of its production (Elliott, 1995, p. 14 & p.
207). He concludes that it is not possible to understand or evaluate a piece of music
based purely on its expressive qualities as suggested by Reimer (Reimer, 1989, p. 54).
On the contrary, one must explore the full cultural context of a musical practice in order
to appreciate an individual work. In Elliott’s words;
Underlying each musical practice is a shared body of beliefs, concepts, and 
principles for eonstructing and listening for musical patterns in eertain ways. As a 
result, musical works are never a matter of purely sonic information 
alone. ...Stated another way, every musical performance of a musical work 
evinces culture-specific and practice-based norms of musical artistry. (Elliott, 
1995, p. 89)
Historically, Elliott’s contribution to the Philosophy of Music Education comes 
after a long period of government cutbacks to arts education programs. He argues that
however, like Reimer, he builds his arguments on the Aristotelian differentiation of these 
two terms.
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the cutbacks are, in part, the result of flawed arguments about the nature and value of 
music and he offers
.. .new reasons to believe that music is one of the most consequential, dynamic, 
and practical pursuits in the human repertoire and, therefore, fundamental to the 
full development of the individual and the collective self. (Elliott, 1995: vii)
Elliott’s view of the “fundamental” nature of music is that it is a form of
knowledge, different and separate fi-om other types of reasoning. “Music—as a unique
form of thinking and knowing—deserves a central place in the education of all people”
(Elliott, 1995, p. 14).
Stated another way, artistic music making and intelligent music listening involve 
a multidimensional, relational, coherent, generative, open, and educable form of 
knowing called musicianship. (Elliott, 1995, p. 70)
Bennett Reimer also considers the perception of music to be a unique form of
knowledge—one that gives us insight into human subjectivity (Reimer, 1989, p. 11);
however, Elliott’s definition of this musical form of knowledge includes “human action”
and social practice.”
Musical experiences depend on culturally and contextually determined 
understandings, both tacit and verbal. The deep absorption and personal 
integration that musicers and listeners tend to experience while musicing and/or 
listening result from cognizing musical performances in relation to personal and 
practice-specific understandings and beliefs. Musical experiences only seem 
immediate. In fact, context-dependent forms of thinking and knowing arbitrate all 
human interactions with the physical events we call musical works. (Elliott, 1995, 
p. 125)^
“Let us refer to musical doers as musicers, to musical doing as musicing, and to 
the musical “something done” as music in the sense of performances, improvisations, and 
other kinds of audible musical achievements... .1 shall most often use musicing in the 
collective sense to mean all five forms of music making: performing, improvising, 
composing, arranging, and conducting.” (Elliott, 1995, p. 40)
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Elliott also challenges the use of the term “aesthetic” to describe musical
characteristics that he says are better defined as “artistic qualities.”
MUSIC is the human endeavor of making and listening for musical sounds that 
are culturally rooted and practice-specific and, therefore, artistic through and 
through. Accordingly, musical works are not rightly conceived as aesthetic 
objects. Musical works are not aesthetic in nature, and they are not physical 
objects. (Elliott, 1995: 91)
By redefining musical characteristics as artistic, Elliott is emphasizing the 
relationship between musical works and the context of their production. These include 
the relationships “between musical patterns and matters of a religious, moral, social, 
cultural, historical, political, practical, or otherwise non-structural nature” (Elliott, 1995, 
p. 31). Described as “artistic”, rather than “aesthetic,” each level of performing, creating 
and listening is identified as a form of intentional human activity, rooted in cultural 
practice. Where aesthetic theorists argue that “all music everywhere—all music across 
all cultures—ought to be listened to in the same narrow way” (Elliott, 1995, p. 33), Elliott 
argues that most music in most parts of the world is not intended to be experienced in this 
way. Rather, music is grounded in the context of broader cultural practices. On this 
basis, Elliott argues that music “ought to be understood in relation to the meanings and 
values evidenced in actual music making and music listening in specific cultural 
contexts” (Elliott, 1995, p. 14).
Early in his text, Elliott introduces the term “praxis” to describe the nature of 
music-making and music learning. In contrast to Reimer’s foundational premise that 
aesthetic experience is “the education of human feeling,” Elliott argues that the descriptor
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“feeling”^’ is not sufficiently unique to describe the sense in which one perceives a
work of music; there is nothing unique about the way that music may or may not allow
one to experience the world of feeling^ .^ Elliott calls his philosophy a “praxial
philosophy” of music in order to
.. .highlight the importance it places on music as a particular form of action that is 
purposeftil and situated and, therefore, revealing of one’s self and one’s 
relationship with others in a community. The term praxial emphasizes that music 
ought to be understood in relation to the meanings and values evidenced in actual 
music making and music listening in specific cultural contexts.” (Elliott, 1995, 
p.l4)
He bases his use of the word “praxis,” as a kind of “doing-action,” on the works 
of Aristotle.
I recommend praxis to summarize the essential nature of music making and 
musicianship.... Aristotle used praxis to mean informed and deliberative "doing- 
action" in which doers (as ethical practitioners) are not merely concerned with 
completing tasks correctly (techné), but action committed to achieving goals 
(telos) in relation to standards, traditions, images, and purposes (eidos) viewed as 
Ideals that are themselves open to renewal, reformulation, and improvement. In 
praxis (and in knowledgeable music making as I have attempted to describe it), 
the feedback that arises from one's reflections is used to improve one's expertise 
and to refine (or redefine) the goals that guide one's making and doing. (Elliott, 
1995, p. 69)
All of this takes place within the realm of performance. Elliott uses praxis to 
describe the nature of musical knowledge, the process of reflection that is the foundation 
of musical knowledge, and the relationships that exist amongst the various aspects of 
music learning/understanding. The reflective process that is inherent to praxis is used to
21 Note that Reimer emphasizes the word “feeling” rather than “feelings.’
^  “Why would anyone want or need insight into the general forms of feeling? 
There is nothing to distinguish these general forms firom any number of natural and 
artificial patterns....” (Elliott, 1995, p. 37)
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improve one’s expertise as a musician. For Elliott, “situatedness” refers to locating 
oneself within musical traditions, including the social context of each tradition^^.
Based on the idea that music is a form of “doing-action,” Elliott argues that all 
music students, whether in general or performance programs, should learn music by 
“musicing,” that is, by actively performing, improvising, arranging, composing and 
conducting music. Listening to music and learning to listen well to music, is part of all 
forms of “musicing,” but listening is not sufficient, on its own, to help students develop 
true musical understanding or musicianship. Elliott’s view stands once more in direct 
opposition to Bennett Reimer’s assertion of the centrality of listening. Elliott writes:
Musicing is an important term.... [It] reminds us that performing and 
improvising through singing and playing instruments lies at the heart of MUSIC 
as a diverse human practice. As the philosopher Nicholas Woltersdorf insists,
“the basic reality of music is not works nor the composition of work but music 
making.” (Elliott, 1995, p. 49)
If true learning is achieved only by “doing” music then evaluation of a person’s 
level of musical understanding can only be assessed by evaluating their level of music 
making—be it as a performer, conductor, composer, or arranger. “Evaluation is based on 
a student’s ability to replicate, through practical music making, the values inherent in any 
particular musical tradition” (Elliott, 1995, p. 75)^ "^ . In order to be successful, students 
must achieve goals “in relation to standards, traditions, images, and purposes (eidos)
“Situatedness” has a different meaning in the context of critical theory and 
critical pedagogy. This difference is explored in Chapter Four.
Note the contrast between Reimer’s view that creative decision-making should 
be central to music education and Elliott’s view that “replicating.. .the values inherent in 
any particular musical tradition” is of prime importance.
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viewed as Ideals that are themselves open to renewal, reformulation, and
improvement” (Elliott, 1995, p. 69)^ .^
The content of music education courses should be based upon the understanding
that music is multicultural in essence: “If MUSIC consists in a diversity of music
cultures, then MUSIC is inherently multicultural. And if MUSIC is inherently
multicultural, then music education ought to be multicultural in essence” (Elliott, 1995, p.
207). A multicultural music education consists of exploring different musical cultures by
learning and applying different beliefs and practices through actual music making.
Through the process of risk-taking in which students learn to situate themselves in
relation to others, Elliott also believes that humanistic goals can be achieved.
Venturing forth to live the artistic and cultural-ideological meanings of an 
unfamiliar music culture provides students with an important growth opportunity 
that only active musical risk taking can provide: the opportunity to know one’s 
self (musical and otherwise) and the relationship of one’s self to others. Musical 
risk taking (and the temporary disorientation that may follow) activates self- 
examination and the personal reconstruction of one’s relationships, assumptions, 
and preferences. Such musical confrontations enable students to develop the 
disposition to consider that what may seem natural, common, and universal to 
them is not. (Elliott, 1995, p. 209)
Elliott prescribes “induction” as the pedagogical method best suited for 
introducing students to different musics. “The educational process is one of inducting 
students into the way of life of a music culture; of engaging students in a living encounter 
with the knowings, beliefs, and values of a Music” (Elliott, 1995, p. 206). Elliott 
suggests that “the music educator’s role is principally one of mentoring, coaching and 
modeling for music students conceived as apprentice musical practitioners” (Elliott, 1995,
The closest Elliott gets to defining these standards is to draw upon “expert 
“opinion, that is, those people acknowledged by other practitioners of a specific musical 
genre to be expert in their field.
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p. 75). Ideally, experts from different musical cultures are available to mentor, coach 
and model different musical practices, and Elliott recommends that the private lessons 
and ensemble work that characterize traditional performance training should be offered to 
all music students within a variety of cultural contexts. This is to achieve both musical 
and social results:
The induction of students into different music cultures may be one of the most 
powerful ways to achieve a larger educational goal: preparing children to work 
effectively and tolerantly with others to solve shared community problems.
(Elliott, 1995, p. 293)
Reflecting upon the meanings embedded in different cultures and identifying 
one’s relationship to these cultures leads students to understand underlying musical and 
cultural beliefs and ethnocentric attitudes. Reflective practices are an important part of a 
praxial approach to music education. Immersion into different cultures leads not only to 
self-reflection but to an acceptance of difference—a goal of humanistic education (Elliott, 
1995, p. 293).
Elliott emphasizes performance repeatedly as the entry point to all musical studies.
MUSIC is a performing art. Each and every aspect of a musical work that we 
listen for is always the result of an individual or collective interpretation and 
performance of a composer’s musical design, or an improvised design, or a 
performer’s rendition of a remembered design. (Elliott, 1995, p. 91)
Musical works are performances, physical events that are intentionally generated 
by the knowledgeable actions (overt and covert) of interrelated human agents 
(composers, arrangers, performers, improvisers, conductors) to be intentionally 
conceived as such by other knowledgeable agents (musicers and/or listeners). 
(Elliott, 1995, p. 172)
All musical activity ultimately leads to the engagement with actual musical sounds.
Music is not the rendering of fixed musical objects or “works.” Put in the context of
Elliott’s description of praxis, musicing affects and is affected by traditional and
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contemporary cultural values and practices. Other musicians, listeners, critics, and the 
time and place of a performance, have an effect on the meaning and shape of each 
particular performance/cultural event. Both musical practices and music education 
function “powerfully as culture.” “A musical practice is not something that operates 
autonomously in a culture; it constitutes and is constituted by culture and ideology” 
(Elliott, 1995, p. 212). Performance thus reflects and creates culture. In addition to 
structural features of music, the relationships “between musical patterns and matters of a 
religious, moral, social, cultural, historical, political, practical, or otherwise nonstructural 
nature” are a part of the significance of every performance (Elliott, 1995, p. 31). While 
music is a performing art, however, it is also a “participatory art” in which “people join 
together in the communal and ritual actions of listening, watching, and participating 
empathetically as music makers bring forth unique musical events and experiences” 
(Elliott, 1995, p. 102). Thus, an audience member does not simply listen to a musical 
work; he or she is a part of a musical event.
On the subject of “creativity,” Elliott disagrees strongly with his former mentor, 
Bennett Reimer, by arguing that creativity cannot exist without first developing a 
competent level of musicianship.^® In Elliott’s view, a musical expression can be
This notion parallels that of R.S. Peters view on the need to receive all the 
accumulated wisdom pertaining to a subject area before venturing to contribute to or 
critique that field.
It is to have an awareness differentiated in accordance with the eanons implicit in 
all these inherited traditions. 'Education' marks out the processes by means of 
which the individual is initiated into them. (Peters, 1965, p. 103)
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considered creative only in the context of an entire musical tradition. The “continuum
of possibilities” proposed by Reimer (Reimer, 1996, p. 84 as cited in Elliott, 1997, p. 27)
is a “subjective notion of creativity” that “loses all meaning.” Elliott suggests that
creativity and musicianship should be taught concurrently by targeting students’ attention,
progressive problem solving, problem finding, musical generating and selecting,
opportunity finding, and musical promise detecting (Elliott, 1997, p. 26 and Elliott, 1995,
p. 234). Without placing music activities in the larger context of a musical tradition,
Elliott does not believe that student work can be considered creative. Creativity, as well
as value judgments on the quality of a musical effort can be made only in relation to
existing musical traditions.
Elliott, like Bennett Reimer, believes that music education can fulfill larger social
objectives. Though they disagree on how this takes place, they both argue that music
education can fulfill the goals of a “humanist” education.
To conclude, music education is not a neutral enterprise. Music curricula can and 
do function socially and culturally in powerful ways. With this in mind, I suggest 
that the implementation of a praxial philosophy of MUSIC education through 
reflective musical practicums offers the opportunity to develop students' musical 
understandings relative to the personhood of those who actually "live" various 
music cultures. In other words, by implementing a praxial philosophy of MUSIC 
education, teachers have a reasonable way of achieving the goals of humanistic 
education. (Elliott, 1995, p. 293)^’
In the concluding passages of Music Matters, Elliott reiterates his belief that “self­
growth, self-knowledge, music enjoyment, flow, and happiness” are intrinsic to the
The procedures of a discipline can only be mastered by an exploration of 
its established content under the guidance of one who has already been initiated. 
(Peters, 1965 p. 104)
For Reimer’s comments on this theme see Reimer, 1989, pp. 28-29.
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nature of music—that is, music is, in fact, intrinsically “good.” ‘"MUSIC education is a 
unique and major source o f several fundamental life values” (Elliott, 1995, p. 308, 
author’s italics).
In conclusion, Elliott distinguishes his philosophy of music education from that of 
Bennett Reimer in several areas; however, they also share a number of assumptions— 
particularly about the validity of a humanist approach to education.^^ In Figure 2 ,1 lay 
out the fundamental ideas of Reimer and Elliott in chart form for comparison.
Maria Spychinger examines both writers in light of their shared assumptions 
and apparent differences and places them at different points on the same semiotic circle 
suggesting that the differences between the two approaches are not as profound as Elliott 
asserts in his arguments. See: Spychinger, M. B. (1997). Aesthetic and praxial 
philosophies of music education compared: A semiotic consideration. Philosophy o f 
Music Education Review, 5(1), 33-41.
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Reimer Elliott
General Philoso )hical Approaches
Aesthetic philosophy of music and music 
education. Recommends reflective 
practices.
Praxial philosophy of music and music 
education. Defined in opposition to aesthetic 
philosophy. Recommends reflective practices 
defined as "praxis."
Music as knowledge fits into the liberal 
humanist tradition of education. Aristotelian 
concepts are used to support his viewpoints.
Music as a unique form of knowledge fits into 
the liberal humanist tradition of education. 
Aristotelian concepts are used to support his 
viewpoints.
Music education fulfills humanist ideals. Music education fulfills humanist ideals.
What is the nature of music?
Musical works are "expressive forms;" 
Historical and social contexts do not affect 
tfie meaning of musical works. Music refers 
only to itself. It is not "about" anything.
Musical works are not "objects." Music is a 
form of “doing-action.” The meaning of musical 
works is embedded in social and historical 
contexts; the meaning of music is also created 
through all the elements present at any given 
performance.______________________________
Does music represent a particular form of knowledge?
Music represents a unique form of 
knowledge (perceptual structuring) that 
educates human “feeling”— a form of 
knowledge with intrinsic value. All arts 
should be approached as expressive forms.
Music represents a unique form of knowledge, 
called “praxis” that represents a kind of doing- 
action— a form of knowledge with intrinsic 
value. The meaning is in the performance 
itself.
How is musicianship best developed?
A variety of pedagogical approaches is 
recommended. All arts are to be 
approached, perceived, responded to, 
judged and taught as "expressive forms."
Induction is the best way to learn musical 
practices. One is initiated into the standards 
and traditions of different musics under the 
guidance of one who has already mastered 
these traditions.
Listening is the most important way to 
experience and learn about music because 
the listener is "creating along with the 
music."
Performance, (in the broadest sense) is the 
most important way to develop musical 
knowledge.
Becoming a successful performer should not 
be seen as the be-all and end-all of music.
Music is fundamentally a "performing" art.
Music education should include exposure to 
the music of many different cultures. An 
experiential approach is recommended. 
Comparison of the expressive qualities of the 
music of different cultures can lead to an 
appreciation that all human beings share the 
basic condition of subjective awareness.
Music education should include induction into 
the music of different cultures. Music is “by 
nature” multicultural, thus studying a multiplicity 
of musics is essential to grasping the inherent 
qualities of music.
Figure 3a: Key Themes of Reimer, Elliott...
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What is the nature of creativity and how is this best developed?
Developing creativity should be an important 
part of music education. A continuum of 
creativity exists that all can access.
Developing creativity should be an important 
part of music education; however, few will 
experience genuine creativity. Creativity is only 
a meaningful concept in the context of the full 
tradition of a musical practice.
What does music offer to human beings as individuals and in relationship to
others?
It is “inside” art that we find our deepest 
sense of community, as we feel deeply and 
empathize with others who also feel” (p. 68).
“Immersion into different cultures leads not only 
to self-reflection but to an acceptance of 
difference— a goal of humanistic education” (p. 
293). “Induction of students into different 
musical cultures may be one of the most 
powerful ways to achieve a larger educational 
goal: preparing children to work effectively and 
tolerantly with others to solve shared 
community problems” (p.293).
How is music evaluated?
Music is successful when it succeeds in 
expressing human subjectivity-when it is 
"feelingful." The role of the teacher is to 
deepen a student's capacity to experience 
the events taking place in a piece of music. 
Teachers, however, should not put their 
opinions between a person's experience of 
listening and the music itself. Their role is to 
bring about a greater awareness of the 
musical elements in operation.
Music is successful when it meets the 
standards and traditions particular to specific 
genres. Expert's specific to each musical 
genre are best able to assess musical quality. 
"Creativity," seen as a unique contribution in 
the context of a tradition adds value to a 
musical event.
Figure 3b: Key Themes of Reimer, Elliott
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Thomas Regelski
Thomas Regelski is interested in the forms of music making that take place in
formal and informal, amateur and professional settings. He does not emphasize music
education practices that will achieve a professional performance standard; rather, his
emphasis is on the role that music education can have in “getting ordinary people into
action musically” (Regelski, 1997, p. 45). Regelski has written a number of papers^^ on a
“praxial approach” to music education. I draw upon these papers to give an overview of
his philosophical premises and recommendations for music educators.
Like Elliott, Regelski wishes to create an alternative to the aesthetic philosophy of
music and music education. He refers to a growing “volume of critical thinking” that
uses a concept of “praxis” or “praxial view” that is evolving as a “corrective” to
“institutionalized aesthetic ideology” (Regelski, 1997, p. 43). The intent of his work is to
begin to establish the parameters of a praxial approach to music and music education.
Regelski’s basic premise is that
Music is “a doing” guided by a phronesis for “right results” in human terms [that 
is] far more basic and ultimately far more significant than the psychologism, 
romanticism and elitism of aesthetic philosophies of music and music education. 
(Regelski, 1997, p. 43)^°
Regelski, T. A. (1994/1995, Winter). Action research and critical theory: 
Empowering music teachers to professionalize Praxis. Council for Research in Music 
Education. Bulletin, 123, 61-89; Regelski, T. A. (1997). Prolegomenon to a praxial 
philosophy of music and music education. Canadian Music Educator, 38(3), 43-51; 
Regelski, T. A. (1998b). Schooling for musical praxis. Canadian Music Educator, 40(\), 
32-43; Regelski, T. A. (1998a). The Aristotelian bases of praxis for music and music 
education as praxis. Philosophy o f Music Education Review, 6(1), 22-59.
“Phronesis was a term used by Aristotle in Nicomachean ethics to describe 
‘practical wisdom’ or the ability to act on what one knows are [sic] good for 
man....Phronesis has a lot to do with choosing the ends one should accomplish. It is
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Aesthetic philosophies fail to account for the “important ubiquity of music in human life”
(Regelski, 1997, p. 45). Music, he says, has many different forms and functions that
cannot be understood according to the notion of “musical works” as discreet objects.
Like Elliott, Regelski traces his ideas about music as a form of “doing” to an
Aristotelian articulation of praxis. Elliott’s arguments focus on establishing the nature of
music as a form of knowledge; however, Regelski’s arguments emphasize “the
significance of music in human life.” He introduces two concepts to help define the roles
that music fulfills. The first of these is that all music is “functional”.
In a praxial view, all music is “functional” in particular social or 
individual praxis but the pragmatic benefits of that praxis are never strictly 
musical. They are always partly existential in contributing to the actions of 
human beings Being human. Even when highly practiced technical levels 
of performance are involved, and where musical process-values are 
primary among the “goods” served, musical praxis—for all involved, 
composer, performer, and audience alike—is never “purely” musical.
There is always a larger social, existential, intellectual or some other 
human “good” served that music is ‘instrumental’ (in the pragmatic sense) 
in bringing to Be, and in ways unique to the musical praxis. (Regelski,
1997,p .45)
The notion of functionality conflicts with the aesthetic value system in which 
“musical works” are seen as autonomous creations, separate from social and practical 
issues of production^ \  In contrast, Regelski defines all musical practices, at least in part, 
according to the functions that they serve at any given time.
practical wisdom to know what goals one should seek.” Source: Definition of Phronesis. 
Retrieved August 19,2004, from http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Phronesis.
Regelski’s use of the term “functional” can be confusing as it could suggest 
instrumental rather than intrinsic values. I believe, however, that Regelski intends the 
word to refer to the “right results” defined by the concept of “phronesis.” He is thus in
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Regelski’s second defining concept is that of “right results” and “goods” or 
“goodness.”
Certainly training in musicianship and the practiced perfection of 
production techniques are necessary to any musical praxis, but they are not 
sufficient to understanding, realizing or accounting for its “goods.”
Technique and musicianship vary considerably according to the musical 
ends in question—the musical “goods” sought—and their suitability is 
determined only in reflection upon such ends. The incredible variety of 
“goods” served by music throughout human history clearly points to the 
existence of a phronesis of “right results” that guide any musical praxis 
and that are thus the key to any praxial account of music. (Regelski, 1997, 
p. 44).
This notion of ‘goods’ and ‘right results’ comes from the Aristotelian concept of 
phronesis, an ethical ‘injunction’ concerned with “consideration of the ‘goods’ of human 
Conduct in terms of desirable ends and goals—the ‘right results’—for clients and 
constituencies” (Regelski, 1997, p. 44). The development of musical knowledge per se is 
one of the goals of music education, but this goal is accompanied by the ethical mandate 
of phronesis where the focus is upon what music is “good for” in terms of getting “right 
results” for “particular situations” (Regelski, 1997, p. 44). There is no one ideal rendition 
of a work of music. “Right results” are contingent upon particular situations. Virtuosity, 
while relevant to specific performance contexts, is not the only, or the most important, 
“right result” in music. Within amateur settings, he argues, the value of the music- 
making experience to the participants is paramount (Regelski, 1998b, p. 35).
Regarding the relationship between music, as sound events, and social context, 
Regelski argues, like Elliott, that music cannot be separated from its social context and 
experienced as an abstract object.
agreement with Elliott’s use of “praxis” as a term that refers to the intrinsic value of 
music. The meaning of “intrinsic” values is discussed at length in Chapter Four.
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Thus what is called “music” (i.e., “music itself’), as though it is isolated from 
the originating and shaping social context, conditions and meanings, is always 
and everywhere a multi-faceted alliance of social meanings and personal ‘goods’ 
that come into praxis as or through sound.” (Regelski, 1998ba, p. 42)
Regelski is also in agreement with Elliott on the multicultural essence of music.
Both writers begin by acknowledging that a definition of what music is must reflect that
there are many different musical traditions with many different fimctions. “The
abundance of musics is central to the study of the “humanities” and to any understanding
of what music “is” or “is good for” (Regelski, 1997, p. 44). Where the two writers differ
is in the role ascribed to learning about different cultures. For Elliott, immersing students
in a foreign musical culture meets the goals of personal growth as well as the larger
humanist goal of creating broad-minded citizens. The success of musical learning is
measured in how well specific musical/cultural traditions are rendered by practitioners
who have been “inducted” into these practices. Regelski, however, is explicit in
broadening the notion of “value” or success to include amateur forms of music-making as
well as forms not usually considered “good music” by formally trained musicians, such
as music for weddings, military occasions, dances, etc. Regelski does not refer to
“induction” or a necessity to become engaged in the study of different musical cultures;
rather, he is interested in the breadth of musical culture in order to understand what music
is good for in different contexts. For Regelski, it is the “ubiquity” of music that ensures
its central importance in human experience. His arguments are not about acquiring
meaning and significance through developing a deep understanding of other cultures;
rather, he is interested in using music education to make music accessible to “ordinary”
people (Dissanayake as cited in Regelski, 1997, p. 44).
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A praxial philosophy of music will focus on the role of music “in action” for 
ordinary people as a key means by which life is well-lived and “made special” 
(Dissanayake as cited in Regelski, 1997, p. 44)
[Music] is a primary avenue for Becoming more fully alive or enlivened by the 
fullness life has to offer beyond merely surviving. (Regelski, 1997, p. 45)
The Being and Becoming involved with musical practice—its “making special” of 
human time and events—is unique and available in no other manner, and each 
event will be unique in the “good time” resulting from its own praxis. (Regelski, 
1997, p. 45)
As a result of his emphasis on music “in action,” Regelski claims that music is to
be valued and understood, not according to the disinterested and abstract principles of
aesthetic philosophy, nor according to “great performances,” as posited by Elliott, but
according to the suitability of results in any given situation, with “suitability” as a much
broader concept than technically excellent performance. Like Elliott, Regelski suggests
that music is best experienced by doing; however, he does not agree that performance is
the only way to develop listening skills.
There is no doubt that performing can inform listening in a variety of ways. But 
to hold that performance is the proper or best education for listening—or that 
developing such selective attention to process-qualities through performance is 
therefore good or necessary for intelligent or rewarding listening—simply does 
not follow. (Regelski, 1997, p. 47)
Regarding pedagogy, Regelski looks at Aristotelian notions of praxis, techne and 
theoria (amongst others) in order to establish the nature of musical learning. According 
to Regelski, Theoria “implies speculative knowledge studied, arranged, and contemplated 
for its own sake as a source of both awe and enlightenment” (Regelski, 1998, p. 23). 
Techne “implies a technological or technicist knowledge and a technology of manual 
techniques ‘practiced’ through ‘hands-on’ learning by technicians or craftspeople” 
(Regelski, 1998a, p. 25, author’s emphasis). Praxis, however.
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... involves the kind of cognitive activity (dianoia) that has been associated 
with the “reflection-in-action” of “the reflective practitioner” (Schon 1993), 
namely the kind of intellect, analysis, criticism, deliberation and observation that 
dutifully reflects on the suitability of results. In this regard, praxis was seen as 
guided by the ethical injunction to get proper or “right results” for particular 
situations. (Regelski, 1997, p. 44)
Praxis requires a critical and rational knowledge of both the means and ends
needed to bring about ‘right results’ for people.
[Pjraxis is governed by the kind of ‘doing’ called phronesis—an ethical 
knowledge of and for achieving ‘right results’ judged in terms of actual benefits 
for one’s self or for others. Thus, praxis is centrally concerned with the critical 
and rational knowledge of both means and ends needed to bring about ‘right 
results’ for/7eqp/e....Praxis [...] involves judgments concerning the ‘goodness’ of 
such goals and ends in the first place. (Regelski, 1998, p. 28)
The ‘right results’ being served by music at any given time can only be assessed by
determining the “situatedness” of each musical event.
Situatedness takes the specific human context and purposes for which music is 
produced into specific consideration as a part of musical understanding and 
valuing. Situatedness, then, governs the “goods” sought as the “right results.” It 
is the direct antithesis of what aestheticians have traditionally argued to be the 
transcendental and disinterested qualities of music. (Regelski, 1997, p. 44)
Theoria, techne and praxis represent three distinctly different kinds of knowledge 
with music best described as a form of praxis. Praxis is not a static form of knowledge 
and has the further characteristic that failures of praxis cannot be undone. “A poor result 
of an attempt at praxis becomes a new condition of any subsequent attempt to improve 
the praxis in question” (Regelski, 1998a, p. 28). When a craftsperson produces an ill- 
made product it can be thrown away; however, “the ethical dimension of praxis—its 
human element—puts a very strong emphasis on standards of care and excellence” 
(Regelski, 1998, p. 28). Regelski uses the example of the medical doctor who 
misdiagnoses a patient. It is not just a question of re-doing the diagnosis because now the
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patient is even more ill as a result of the false diagnosis. Thus, Regelski argues that a 
poor attempt at praxis generates new conditions that may have long-term negative 
consequences.
A further point made by Regelski is that ‘good’ or ‘right results’ are not
reproducible. Decisions about ‘good’ or ‘right results’ must continually be made anew.
Because what is ‘good’ varies considerably from one person or human situation to 
another and over history, the ‘right results’ in each case require separate 
determination. There are, in other words, no singular or ‘standard’ instances of 
praxial results. The ‘standards’ involved are ‘standards of care,’ ethical matters 
involving phronesis, not the standardized techniques, practices, or outcomes of 
techne and poesis. (Regelski, 1998a, p. 28
Thus we see that a primary aim of Regelski is to introduce a kind of reflection that asks
that the purpose and effect of any musical activity be deeply considered before any
musical action is undertaken^^. He describes an epistemology of praxis in the following
passage:
The action or agency of praxis thus entails the kind of knowledge required (a) to 
make the ‘practical judgments’ needed to discern and then to conform action to 
rational ‘right results’ (i.e., phronesis), (b) to guide the actions taken as they 
unfold (i.e., action feedback), and (c) to evaluate the ‘goodness’ of results in 
terms of the individual or group served (i.e. learning feedback). And ‘right 
action,’ in turn, amounts to successful or ‘good results’ as judged in terms of
Regelski distinguishes praxis from techne and poesis, another indication that he 
intends his use of the term “functional,” found in earlier passages, to support the notion 
of the “intrinsic” value of music. Regelski does use techne to refer to aspects of teaching, 
e.g., “certain basic strategies, tactics, and the like” to establish useful classroom routines 
(Regelski, 1998a, p. 45).
This is reminiscent of Bennett Reimer’s caution that performance students take 
the time to reflect upon the purpose of their activities, beyond achieving technical skill or 
social acknowledgment (Reimer, 1989, p.72). The difference is that Reimer sees musical 
works as “expressive forms” to be experienced independent of external references. 
Regelski argues that music is, in itself, an activity shaped by context.
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particular situations and individuals according to their important differences. 
(Regelski, 1998a, p. 28-29)
In contrast to Elliott’s descriptions of musical learning as a unique kind of 
knowledge with standards set through traditions of practice, such standards are not 
necessarily the measure of “right results.” The requirements to recognize functionality 
and to take account of what music is “good” for, point to the need to educate reflective 
practitioners with “the kind of intellect, criticism, deliberation and observation that 
dutifully reflects on the suitability of results” (Regelski, 1997, p. 44). To understand the 
value and function of any given musical event, one must be able to situate oneself relative 
to the question of “right results” in a particular instance.
Situatedness, then, governs the “goods” sought as the “right 
results.” It is the direct antithesis of what aestheticians have traditionally 
argued to be the transcendental and disinterested qualities of music...
And, in contradistinction to aesthetic claims made for the disinterestedness 
of music, the praxial view understands the value of music as centrally 
conditioned by its relation to life and the specific conditions of its use.
(Regelski, 1997, p. 44)
As I understand Regelski’s position, music educators at every level ought to be 
concerned not only with developing reflective practitioners but also with removing the 
hierarchies among different musical roles and practices. Within Regelski’s framework, 
even institutions devoted exclusively to musical training within very specific musical 
traditions serve their students better by reflecting upon and being prepared to challenge 
assumed social and cultural values. Ways of providing meaning and “goodness,” as a 
musician are defined more broadly, pedagogical objectives and practices are more 
flexible and evaluation and “success” can take many forms. Success is based on 
achieving “right results” in any given situation. The suitability, and thus the value, of
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particular musical skills, for example, will vary depending upon the human “good” 
which is being served at the time.
Elliott argues for recognizing the social and historical context of any act of 
musicing; however, the value of that musicing is determined by the depth of 
understanding and skill achieved by performers within particular musical genres. In 
contrast, Regelski does not make the absolute quality of a musical activity, within the full 
range of its tradition, a condition of meaning or value. Rather, he asks how well a 
particular musical undertaking has served its purpose within a specific context at a 
specific time. One fundamental goal of music to which Regelski refers is “the function” 
of music to “make special” an occasion. Music is often intended to enhance other 
occasions, “[i]n fact, by far the greatest percentage of music made in the world is not 
made expressly to be listened to” (Regelski, 1997, p. 45). “The underlying consideration 
of praxis is a concern with what music is ‘good for.’ ‘Good music,’ thus, is music that 
serves the ‘good’ purposes that are its raison d'être on a particular occasion” (Regelski, 
1998a, p. 40).
Elliott and Regelski both use the term praxis to refer to the kind of doing-thinking 
knowledge that is music, and both reject the view of musical works as “objects”—a view 
they attribute to the aesthetic tradition. Their priorities within this use of praxis, however, 
are quite different. For Elliott, the priority is to develop musicianship (i.e., and thus the 
“praxial knowledge” of music) by meeting the standards of various musical traditions. 
Regelski’s priority, however, is not to meet the demands of different musical traditions 
but to recognize that different levels of music-making serve different purposes and are
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evaluated based upon their success in serving the purpose of any particular occasion.
For Regelski, the role of music education is to get people “into action musically” 
(Regelski, 1997, p. 45). His views are compatible with those of Elliott but his emphasis 
is different. Elliott’s justification of the importance of music education is that it provides 
access to developing a unique form of knowledge. Consistent with a liberal humanist 
view of education, developing this knowledge at a sophisticated level is a means to living 
a “good life.” Regelski is less concerned with meeting the standards and traditions of 
particular musical practices and is more concerned with getting ordinary people into 
music-making. His priorities for music education are to “promote an active life of music 
making” by providing the means for students to remain involved in music as amateur 
performers. Regelski includes the need to teach students how to practice effectively and 
to offer them experiences of playing in small ensembles while in school as well as 
playing along with computer accompaniments so that there are aware of possibilities for 
continuing their musical lives beyond their school years (Regelski, 1998b, p. 39). 
Regelski’s justification of music education is based, not on the imperative to develop a 
unique form of knowledge, but on the many “goods” that music contributes to a life 
“well-lived and “made special” (Dissanayake as cited in Regelski, 1997, p. 44). Figure 3 
compares the fundamental ideas of Reimer, Elliott and Regelski in chart form.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
52
Reimer Elliott Regelski
General Philosophical Approaches
Aesthetic philosophy of 
music and music education. 
Recommends reflective 
practices.
Praxial philosophy of music and 
music education. Defined in 
opposition to aesthetic 
philosophy. Recommends 
reflective practices defined as 
"praxis."
Praxial philosophy of music 
and music education. 
Offered as a "corrective" to 
aesthetic thinking. 
Recommends reflective 
practices defined as 
"praxis."
Music as knowledge fits Into 
the liberal humanist tradition 
of education. Aristotelian 
concepts are used to 
support his viewpoints.
Music as a unique form of 
knowledge fits into the liberal 
humanist tradition of education. 
Aristotelian concepts are used to 
support his viewpoints.
Music as a form of 
knowledge fits into the 
liberal humanist tradition of 
education. Aristotelian 
concepts are used to 
support his viewpoints.
Music education fulfills 
humanist ideals.
Music education fulfills humanist 
ideals.
Music education fulfills 
humanist ideals.
What is the nature of music?
Musical works are 
"expressive forms;" 
Historical and social 
contexts do not affect the 
meaning of musical works. 
Music refers only to itself. It 
is not "about" anything.
Musical works are not "objects." 
Music is a form of “doing-action." 
The meaning of musical works is 
embedded in social and 
historical contexts; the meaning 
of music is also created through 
all the elements present at any 
given performance.
Musical works are not 
“objects." The meaning of 
music is tied together with 
the contributions music 
makes to “Being human.” 
Music is “instrumental” in 
serving social, existential 
and intellectual “good.”
Does music represent a particular form of knowledge?
Music represents a unique 
form of knowledge 
(perceptual structuring) that 
educates human “feeling”—  
a form of knowledge with 
intrinsic value. All arts 
should be approached as 
expressive forms.
Music represents a unique form 
of knowledge, called “praxis” 
that represents a kind of doing- 
action—a form of knowledge 
with intrinsic value. The 
meaning is in the performance 
itself.
Music is a “doing" guided by 
a phronesis for “right 
results” in human terms."
All music is functional but 
never in a strictly musical 
sense. Music has intrinsic 
value.
Figure 4a: Key Themes of Reimer, Elliott and Regelski...
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How is musicianship best developed?
A variety of pedagogical 
approaches is 
recommended. All arts are 
to be approached, 
perceived, responded to, 
judged and taught as 
"expressive forms."
Induction is the best way to 
learn musical practices. One is 
initiated into the standards and 
traditions of different musics 
under the guidance of one who 
has already mastered these 
traditions.
Popular art forms are 
legitimate genres for the 
classroom if the result is to 
“get ordinary people into 
action musically.”
Listening is the most 
important way to experience 
and learn about music 
because the listener is 
"creating along with the 
music."
Performance, (in the broadest 
sense) is the most important 
way to develop musical 
knowledge.
Getting ordinary people into 
action musically is the most 
important function of music 
education. Listening and 
performing are both valid 
approaches.
Becoming a successful 
performer should not be 
seen as the be-all and end- 
all of music.
Music is fundamentally a 
"performing" art.
The value of performance or 
any kind of music-making is 
in the "right results" 
achieved in any given 
situation.
Music education should 
include exposure to the 
music of many different 
cultures. An experiential 
approach is recommended. 
Comparison of the 
expressive qualities of the 
music of different cultures 
can foster an increased 
understanding of cultural 
traditions. All human beings 
share the basic condition of 
subjective awareness.
Music education should include 
induction into the music of 
different cultures. Music is “by 
nature” multicultural, thus 
studying a multiplicity of musics 
is essential to grasping the 
inherent qualities of music.
Music education might well 
include exposure to different 
cultures but Regelski's main 
goal is to get “ordinary 
people into action 
musically.”
What is the nature of creativity and how is this best developed?
Developing creativity should 
be an important part of 
music education. A 
continuum of creativity exists 
that all can access.
Developing creativity should be 
an important part of music 
education; however, few will 
experience genuine creativity. 
Creativity is only a meaningful 
concept in the context of the full 
tradition of a musical practice.
Regelski does not give an 
account of creativity.
Figure 4b: Key Themes of Reimer, Elliott and Regelski...
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What does music offer to human beings as individuals and in relationship to
others?
It is “inside" art that we find 
our deepest sense of 
community, as we feel 
deeply and empathize with 
others who also feel” (p. 68).
“Immersion into different 
cultures leads not only to self­
reflection but to an acceptance 
of difference— a goal of 
humanistic education” (p. 293). 
“Induction of students into 
different musical cultures may 
be one of the most powerful 
ways to achieve a larger 
educational goal: preparing
children to work effectively and 
tolerantly with others to solve 
shared community problems” 
(p.293).______________________
Music contributes many 
“goods” that make a life 
“well-lived” and “made 
special” (Regelski, 1997, p. 
44).
How is music evaluated?
Music is successful when it 
succeeds in expressing 
human subjectivity -  when it 
is "feelingful." The role of 
the teacher is to deepen a 
student's capacity to 
experience the events taking 
place in a piece of music. 
Teachers, however, should 
not put their opinions 
between a person's 
experience of listening and 
the music itself. Their role is 
to bring about a greater 
awareness of the musical 
elements in operation.______
Music is successful when it 
meets the standards and 
traditions particular to specific 
genres. Expert's specific to 
each musical genre are best 
able to assess musical quality. 
"Creativity," seen as a unique 
contribution in the context of a 
tradition adds value to a musical 
event.
Music is successful when it 
achieves “right results” for 
any given situation. “Right 
results” refer to “good 
times”—  not to specifically 
musical standards. Ethical 
considerations are part of 
any assessment of "right 
results."
Figure 4c: Key Themes of Reimer, Elliott and Regelski
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Estelle R. Jorgensen
Estelle R. Jorgensen is the final writer on the philosophy of music education I 
discuss in detail in this thesis. Jorgensen has written many papers over the years on the 
topic of justifying the inclusion of music in a general education. Her book. In Search o f  
Music Education^^, published in 1997, moves away from the question of justification and 
focuses on the questions and assumptions underlying music education itself, its objectives 
and methods. Jorgensen’s approach differs from that of the other writers discussed in this 
chapter. Rather than setting out a definitive philosophy of music education, her goal is to 
identify factors that influence and shape musical experiences and to develop a set of 
analytical fields that can be used by educators as they creatively construct music 
programs appropriate to a range of cultural constituencies. Jorgensen’s work is 
particularly valuable for its analysis of numerous learning contexts and pedagogical 
approaches.
Jorgensen begins her text by stating that her interest is in understanding
...how people come to know music, how so many diverse musical traditions and 
ways of teaching and learning music have emerged throughout the world, how 
musical and social systems maintain themselves, and what the responsibilities of 
musicians, teachers, and the public are to this multiplicity of musical and 
educational beliefs and practices. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. ix)
Here, Jorgensen suggests that we have a responsibility to understand the
intersection of many factors that shape our roles as musicians, music educators and
members of the public. This acknowledgement of responsibility is broader and more
Jorgensen, E. R. (1997). In search o f music education. Urbana and Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press.
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explicit than in the work of the authors discussed previously. Jorgensen sets her 
project^^ against the backdrop of the pressure to address “educational accountability”—a 
pressure that she believes reduces discussion to the search for practical solutions without 
addressing the “humanizing qualities” of music and its “contribution to spiritual, 
imaginative, and social life” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. xi). She suggests that discussions about 
the philosophy of music education have been distorted and side-tracked by the project of 
“justifying music education.” Jorgensen does not accept the polarization of music 
education philosophies into an aesthetic or praxial viewpoint and draws upon the 
literature of a variety of different traditions as she develops her analysis^^.
Jorgensen argues that music education has come to be seen “as a field of study 
that concerns itself only with music instruction in elementary and secondary schools;” 
however, as she points out, music education actually takes place in many different formal 
and informal settings (Jorgensen, 1997, p. x). The objectives, methods and tensions that 
shape music education will be seen differently if music education is considered in its 
many different settings, such as “families, churches, private music studios, universities, 
conservatories, and businesses, among other places” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. x). Her book
The term “project” refers to the overarching goal of the author’s philosophical 
work. Semantically, it refers to the work by which the goal is to be accomplished as well 
as to the actual goal itself.
Jorgensen cites John Dewey, Paulo Freire, Maxine Green, Susanne Langer, 
Israel Scheffler and Alfred North Whitehead as primary sources for her general 
philosophical approach. John Blacking, Patricia Shehan Campbell, David Elliott, Lucy 
Green, Vernon Howard, Anthony Kemp, James Mursell, Anthony Palmer, Bennett 
Reimer, Abraham Schwadron, John Shepherd, Christopher Small, and Keith Swanwick 
are cited as authors on music education with whom Jorgensen connects on various points 
(Jorgensen, 1997, p. xiii).
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does not offer a “practical plan” for music education; rather, Jorgensen sets out 
“theoretical questions and principles” that are expected eventually to lead to specific 
practical recommendations” ’^ (Jorgensen, 1997, p. xii).
Jorgensen states that music education “involves life-long teaching and learning, 
from the most elementary through the most advanced levels of musical artistry within the 
purview of a variety of societal institutions and exemplifying the gamut of world musical 
traditions” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. xii). Music education is an interdisciplinary field that 
“brings us faee to face with the challenges of reconciling differences in language, culture, 
religion, life-style, age, and color, among a host of other boundaries that separate people” 
(Jorgensen, 1997, p. xii). In order to integrate the different facets/influences inherent in 
approaching music education in the broad context described above, Jorgensen 
recommends that “the best way to meet these challenges is to take a dialectical and 
dialogical view of music education, recognize tensions in need of resolution, and hope 
that through dialogue these tensions can be worked through and either reconciled or 
tolerated” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. xiii).
Dialectical^* and dialogical processes are central to Jorgensen’s concept of music 
education. Through these terms Jorgensen suggests that values and understandings are in 
a constant tension. There are no single “right” answers to questions in music education. 
Rather, through dialogue, music educators can work towards recognizing dialectical
That is, it would be possible to make practical recommendations based on 
Jorgensen’s “theoretical questions and principles” in a later project.
A protracted discussion of a dialectic method of analysis is beyond the scope of 
this thesis as well as my expertise. My reading of Jorgensen’s examples of this strategy 
are that she sets up ideas, influences and solutions in polarities, reading one against the 
other and looking for a point of balance between them.
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tensions and attempt to balance competing priorities. Jorgensen proposes that music, 
like other disciplines, be examined in light of the holistic paradigm described in the Gaia 
hypothesis.
The Gaia hypothesis posits that all things on planet earth comprise part of an 
interconnected dynamic system in delicate balance, where the whole transcends 
the sum of its parts. Applied figuratively in the social realm, this hypothesis 
challenges the rule of technology, positivism, and rationality and posits the 
complementarity of the arts, the validity of nonscientific ways of knowing, and 
the importance of imagination and intuition. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 3)
The task of music educators is to balance competing tensions with a view towards
wholeness.
Jorgensen sees herself as “complicating the task” of music education while 
providing a better grounding in the real complexities of the music education enterprise 
(Jorgensen, 1997, p. xiv). She argues that music educators need to consider a wide range 
of factors and influences in order to fully grasp the potential of music education and the 
“multifarious ways in which music education can be conducted with integrity”
(Jorgensen, 1997, p. 66). “Music and education are part of a complex network of 
cultural and social beliefs” and as a consequence, there are no simple answers or 
formulas for teaching music. Understanding this complexity provides opportunities for 
music educators to work effectively and creatively in the many places where music 
learning takes place (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 65).
Jorgensen explores two areas of inquiry before presenting her rationale and 
recommendations for a dialectical and dialogical approach to music education. The first 
is a discussion of different concepts of music education seen from a broad historical and 
social perspective. The second explores a concept referred to as “spheres of musical
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validity.” Here, she outlines a range of factors that cluster around different types of 
music and the audiences/participants involved with different musics. Jorgensen then 
considers “the numerous tensions” inherent in a broad view of music education that lead 
to her recommendations for a dialectical and dialogical approach to music education.
Jorgensen begins her discussion by stating that Western classical music can be 
seen as “only one of many diverse musics rather than the ideal” and that a “contextual, 
rather than idealistic view of music education and music making” provides the “basis for 
a broad and dispassionate view of music education” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 2). While 
circumstances, including limitations of time and expertise, might limit a music teacher to 
dealing with only one musical tradition, to understand “music education” as “a historical 
and global phenomenon” it is necessary to see music education in the broadest of 
contexts. Jorgensen suggests that “music should be studied as a world rather than just as 
a Western phenomenon, holistically and contextually rather than atomistically and 
separate from the rest of human experience” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 3)*^ . Similar to the 
three writers discussed here previously, Jorgensen envisions that a musical education, 
based upon the exploration of music in numerous cultural settings, can help achieve 
broader social goals.
A comparative and contextual study of world musics can help students understand 
cultures other than their own and intuitively and imaginatively grasp the 
perspectives and expressions of others—what people have in common and how 
they differ—and foster tolerance of cultural differences with people in other 
societies, thereby providing a better basis for cooperation.^ (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 3)
N.B.: In Bennett Reimer’s most recent edition of A philosophy o f music 
education, he proposes a “synergistic” approach to music and music education (Reimer, 
2003).
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Like the writers cited previously in this chapter, Jorgensen credits music with 
the capacity to fulfill important individual and social needs. Unlike her colleagues, 
however, Jorgensen does not espouse a particular aesthetic or praxial approach to music 
education; rather, she advocates an approach that acknowledges the tensions between 
competing values, goals and objectives while pursuing a holistic view of the roles played 
by music and music education in multiple contexts.
Jorgensen gives a detailed analysis of five conceptions of music education that, in 
her view, represent major global and historical approaches to music education. These 
include “schooling,” “training,” “eduction,” “socialization” and “enculturation.” 
Jorgensen’s final recommendations are based upon a dialectical approach to these 
methods suggesting that an awareness of the tensions within and between these 
approaches is of equal importance to the concerns of each individual method. I offer a 
brief summary of the strengths and weaknesses she identifies for each of these 
conceptions of music education.
“Schooling,” represents an education where a sponsoring group or institution “is 
charged with carrying out its sponsor’s wishes, accurately representing and 
communicating its attitudes, beliefs, values, and mores, and devising definite programs of 
study consistent with these expectations” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 4). The approach tends to 
be teacher-directed and rule-oriented. With the focus on formal music education, 
schooling “may overlook the important informal dimensions ...in which one experiences 
the way of life of a musician” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 7). A ruled-based system may also 
“contribute to a discontinuity between music education and society.” “Rules provide a 
sense of tradition and continuity, yet if viewed retrospectively, rather than prospectively
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they make it difficult for music education to adapt to the changing circumstances of
time and place” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 7). An advantage of “schooling” is that “students
share a collective as well as personal experience derived fiom doing similar things and
submitting to a comparable critical process;” however, this educational process limits its
view to the school years only and doesn’t address learning that may take place outside of
the school context or school time (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 7). Thus, while a “schooling”
approach to music education may make it possible to “ensure the survival of groups [and]
institutions,” the model is not sufficiently flexible to include the many types of music
learning that take place outside the school setting.
The second conception of music education described by Jorgensen is “training.”
Training refers to the methods or ways whereby a person is taught or learns skills, 
know-how, or procedural knowledge, that is, how to do something, in contrast to 
propositional knowledge by which one “knows that” such-and-such is the case. 
(Jorgensen, 1997, p. 8)
Training is “competency-based music education” and is experiential, contextual and
generally, teaeher-led.
Training is accomplished through practice. Whereas drill implies the simple 
mechanistic repetition of tasks allied to conditioning, practice involves the 
application of critical thinking and imagination as one gradually moves toward 
the mastery of music-making skills. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 10)
Training relates directly to what practical musicians actually do; however, it is limited in
that the type of knowledge explored tends to be procedural rather than propositional.
Amongst the limits of music education conceived as “training” are that it can be
“prescriptive,” teacher-directed” and “hierarchical.” Student input is limited.
The one-way communication from teacher to student rather than two-way 
between teacher and student, may breed student passivity, convergent thinking, 
and dependence on the expectations of significant others rather than student
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activity, divergent thinking, and independent action. In this event, teaching 
reduces to a manipulative exercise of personal power over students for musical 
ends rather than the judicious use of influence or power with students implied in 
more egalitarian relationships. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 12/^
Jorgensen also argues that this conception of music education encourages a
dualistic viewpoint with the mind separated from the body and theory separated from
practice"**.
The conception of music education as training also drives a wedge between the 
theoretical and practical aspects of music and perpetuates a duality that has 
persisted throughout musical history. The idea that one knows more directly and 
experientially through doing music rather than thinking about it—that what one 
does constitutes primary knowledge and what one thinks about what one does is 
secondary knowledge—also maintains ancient philosophical dualisms between 
body and mind, theoretical knowledge and practice, and the physical mechanism 
and its ideal purpose. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 12)
Jorgensen states that the training approach to music education can reduce music to a
“craft” rather than an “art,” where technique is emphasized over “the ideas that shape an
artist’s understanding” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 13).
The third conception of music education Jorgensen discusses is “eduction”"*^.
"*** See Judith Kogan’s description of life studying at the Julliard School of Music 
and the acknowledgement that individual teachers have a huge influence over the well­
being of students in their personal lives as well as in their careers. Kogan, J. (1987). 
Nothing but the best. The struggle for perfection at the Julliard School. New York: 
Random House.
"** I am reminded of the classes in history and theory in which the instructor 
announced that performance students would not be “smart enough” to do well in their 
courses. Of course, as “performance majors” we also believed the oft asserted truism that 
history, theory and education majors were “failed performers,” incapable of actually 
making music in any significant way. Thus we reflected back and re-inscribed the belief 
in a mind/body split.
“The word eduction means to draw out, elicit, or develop” (Jorgensen, 1997, p.
13).
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Eduction implies that a student’s potential needs only to be drawn out by a 
teacher who skillfully arranges the external conditions such that growth and 
development naturally follow. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 13)
The teacher is responsible for constructing an environment that will draw out the
potential of every student. This approach to education is described in Dewey’s
Democracy and Education and “suggests a naturalistic approach” (Jorgensen, 1997, p.
14). The focus is on process over product; education is conceived as a life-long
endeavour; and, the learning program is student-centred. Shinichi Suzuki"*^  is cited as a
prominent educator who follows an “eduction” model of education. The role of the
environment is acknowledged, students are seen as active agents, and the personal
relationships between teacher and student are acknowledged as important. This view of
music education as growth inherent in the “potentiality of materials” parallels
descriptions of the process of composition as described by Arnold Berleant (quoted in
Jorgensen):
The immediacy of the musical event reflects the directness of growth in which 
internal forces press forward to realize the potentialities that are inherent in the 
materials at hand.” Although growth can be guided, he continues, “it is most 
successful when it works, in art as in biology, by fulfilling the possibilities that lie 
in the materials themselves and not by imposing external demands.” (Jorgensen, 
1997, p. 16)
Jorgensen does not believe, however, that the growth metaphor accounts 
sufficiently for “other operative factors—political, economic, religious, and familial” 
(Jorgensen, 1997, p. 18). Excellent teachers do not always produce excellent, moral.
Shinichi Suzuki developed the “Suzuki” method used particularly in teaching 
violin and piano. In this method, students work in groups and begin to play pieces 
immediately through rote and imitation. Students are drawn into music-making by the 
pull of the music itself.
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motivated students. There are factors other than the learning environment that
influence the outcome of every teaching/learning situation.
A fourth conception of music education is “socialization”—a process
whereby a group or institution inculcates its beliefs, values, and mores in its 
membership and ensures that its members continue to act in certain ways and hold 
particular shared beliefs. As such, it represents one of the social processes that 
characterize all groups and are essential to their survival. Without socialization, a 
group or institution cannot achieve and maintain a sense of unity by which 
members share values and expectations about how they should think and act 
individually and collectively. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 18)
An example of musical learning through socialization is that which takes place in specific
ensembles, where continued membership is dependent upon learning and conforming to
the standards of the group. Learning is both formal and informal. Instruction may take
place “by means of schooling and training, but also extends to incidental learning gleaned
by participation in the activities of the group or institution” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 19).
Beliefs and values are taught didactically but are also modelled. Organizations and
groups have their own life cycles and may at different times be oriented towards tradition
or towards change. Organizational structures may also influence the “content and
methods” of groups (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 20). For example, teachers, by virtue of their
background in classical music and their positions of authority in the classroom, impose a
particular viewpoint on what counts as music. Jorgensen refers to John Shepherd and
Graham Vulliamy who comment on music education’s function as a form of socialization.
Shepherd observes that music teachers are caught in the midst of a culture clash in 
the classroom that reflects “two conflicting patterns of socialization,” One 
represents the interests of Western classical music establishment with which 
teachers identify; the other, the popular music industry with which students 
identify. Although they try to reduce this clash. Shepherd posits, teachers still 
“act as agents of social control” by applying ideas derived from Western notation 
uncritically and uncontexually to other musics. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 21)
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Music education as socialization accounts for at least part of the social nature 
of knowledge that includes the vested interests of groups and the role of teachers as social 
agents.
Given the symbiotic relationship between knowledge and social institutions (that 
is, knowledge both reflects and impacts on them), it suggests that teachers have 
the twin roles of conserving institutions by transmitting ideas validated in the past 
and subverting them by communicating ideas oriented towards change. It implies 
that subject matter and instructional situation are suffused with social meaning 
and can only be fully understood in their social contexts; that instruction is an 
essentially social process whereby a teacher and student interact with, relate to, 
and communicate with each other about subject matter (among other things); and 
that comparing ways of music making and approaches to musical instruction 
necessitates value judgments that are socially and culturally based. (Jorgensen, 
1997, p. 21)
Socialization does not, however, account well for music “as music.” Nor does it 
take sufficiently into account “related anthropological, cultural, historical, philosophical, 
and theological issues among those that arise within the context of musical events” 
(Jorgensen, 1997, p. 22). Socialization can tell us a great deal about how different 
institutions transmit knowledge but it cannot show us how we can reconcile specific 
instances in the “wider cultural and human situation” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 22). Jorgensen 
associates a Marxist view with the concept of socialization. “The Marxist view of music 
making solely in terms of ideological clashes between social classes is reductionist and 
simplistic, for example, precisely because it fails to take into account other systems of 
thought and approaches to causation” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 22)"*"*. Thus, socialization is an 
observable phenomenon and can provide an analytical tool for understanding certain
"*"* In my view, this account of Marxist influence is over-simplified and does not 
acknowledge the range of analysis made available through the historical materialist 
concept of “praxis.” This question will be addressed in Chapter Four.
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musical and educational processes but, unless one is prepared to accept reductionist
thinking, one cannot use socialization as an analytical tool to generate global conclusions.
Enculturation is the fifth conception of music education described by Jorgensen.
Enculturation has both anthropological and idealistic meanings. Under the first category,
enculturation refers to the
.. .life-long process whereby people acquire a personal and collective cultural 
identity as humans—a way of life individually experienced and corporately 
shared within the context of a particular sociocultural group or society in which 
they live. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 23)
The idealistic view of enculturation includes the notion that culture is “something
cultivated, something ripened” (Dewey as quoted in Jorgensen, 1997, p.23) and the
“capacity for continually expanding the range and accuracy of one’s perception of
meanings” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 23). Paulo Freire takes this concept further by
acknowledging that society also contains repressive elements. In this context, pedagogy
envisioned as enculturation “is properly one of humanizing and liberating people from all
forms of repression, challenging and enabling them to transform their world into a just
and compassionate society” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 23). Jorgensen’s own view of
enculturation “recognizes the tension between these anthropological and idealistic views
and attempts, somewhat paradoxically, to meld aspects of them” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 24).
Enculturation may be likened, then, to a series of concentric circles representing 
progressively more inclusive understandings and extending outward from a 
particular culture to encompass a global view of humanity. It delineates the status 
quo and potentially encapsulates a transformative quality of making what now is 
into something better... .To acquire culture, in this view, is ultimately to gain a 
wider knowledge than the foregoing notions of schooling, training, eduction, or 
socialization imply. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 24)
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Enculturation implies that analyzing and performing particular musical works
is not sufficient in itself. “One must also understand, among other things, the social,
political, economic, philosophical, artistic, religious, and familial contexts in which
music making occurs” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 25). Enculturation reflects many of the
holistic principles set out by Jorgensen in her opening statements. It
... permits and encourages intemationalistic and contextual perspectives that take 
account of multicultural societies. As a life-long process, it includes the various 
social groups and institutions in which music making takes place. Further, its 
relativistic approach to musical traditions and the ways by which people come to 
know music (and its recognition of the need to accommodate or reconcile 
competing and conflicting approaches) avoids cultural chauvinisms or 
imperialism and necessitates and facilitates dispassionate comparisons among 
music traditions and approaches to music education. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 27)
Thus, enculturation draws together theory and practice, examines context and underlying
belief systems, “encompasses various systems of understanding and approaches to
causation” and invites interdisciplinary study (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 28). Enculturation,
however, also has its limitations as an educational approach. One criticism of
enculturation is that it is not sufficiently exclusive. It includes aetivities that are
unplanned and indirect as well as those that are explicitly planned as educational
activities. Also, “if the notion of culture is ambiguous and complex, so, too, are the
means and ends of enculturation” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 28). Other limits of enculturation
are that it “does not shed much light on the source of associated psychological,
philosophical, theological, ethical, religious, and musical understandings and does not do
“justice to [musics] formal aspects” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 29).
In concluding this chapter, Jorgensen suggests that the dialectical tensions
introduced by these different approaches need to be acknowledged. Music educators
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need to recognize that their role is greater than “providing a limited range of musical 
knowledge.” “They must see themselves [as] engaged in an enterprise that integrates 
music with the rest of life” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 30)"*^ . The task, then, is to “find out how 
to make a reciprocity among these various visions of education and to accept the 
ambiguities, tensions, and even conflicts that necessarily result” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 31).
Jorgensen’s second chapter is entitled “On Spheres of Musical Validity.” In this 
chapter, she addresses the question of the “nature of music” by establishing a theoretical 
framework that allows comparison between different musical genres. She identifies a 
range of factors and relationships that can be used to analyse different musics and the 
social context in which these musics exist, and points out that music education has a role 
within the music-making process. In other words, the way that music learning and music 
teaching takes place has an influence on the way that culture is manifested through music. 
Jorgensen sets out to “illuminate the nature of social and musical change and the role of 
music education within the music-making process.” She further explores “questions 
relating to the nature of the interrelationship between music and society, how social 
expectations of music arise, and how music, in turn, feeds social expectations”
(Jorgensen, 1997, p. 34). Her intent is to emphasize a process rather than a particular 
program. She depicts that process as one that explores tensions arising within particular 
social contexts, that identifies power relations and that determines how to translate these 
understandings into pedagogical practices.
This is a goal shared by the four Philosophers of Music Education examined in 
this chapter.
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Three assumptions form the basis of Jorgensen’s analysis of “Spheres of
Musical Validity.” The first is that “theoretical types” can provide ways to conceptualize
musical and social events.
“Theoretical types” (sometimes called “ideal types”) provide ways whereby 
musical and social events can be conceptualized; their use is well established in 
the social sciences. Musicologists have also employed them to distinguish 
musical styles and historical epochs in music. Theoretical types organize many 
specific events by means of a manageable array of conceptual constructs or 
categories from which generalizations about other related events can more or less 
be made. They provide models, or ways of looking at the phenomenal world that 
are both literal and figurative, but they should not he confused with the world 
itself. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 34)
The second assumption is that musical events have been examined, historically, 
“from a social perspective in two principal ways: first, through an analysis of their 
structure and functions ... and second, by focussing on meanings and symbols inherent in 
musical events through an examination of their social processes” (Jorgensen, 1997, p.34). 
Jorgensen cites Honigsheim’s analysis of the “process of musical sponsorship” as an 
example of a reconciling of these two approaches'* .^
Jorgensen’s third assumption is that “music is interrelated with society in 
multifaceted ways” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 35). According to Jorgensen, this set of 
relationships has been ignored by philosophers of music until recently'* .^
^  Honigsheim describes “various structurally and functionally grounded 
categories, such as the influence of religious leaders, royalty, nobility, private individuals, 
impresarios and agents, and schools.” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 34)
Jorgensen cites Alperson, P. (1994). What is music? An introduction to the 
philosophy o f music. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press. The work of 
David Elliott and Thomas Regelski already cited in this thesis also includes examinations 
of these relationships.
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Music is part of society, and musical structures reflect and exemplify social 
structures. During the past half-century, writers from the social sciences and 
humanities have advanced the notion of an intimate and intrinsic relationship 
between music and society. They have argued that music is suffused with 
meaning that is musically and culturally interpreted and that it contributes in 
important ways to a sense of shared social consciousness that characterizes a 
given society. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 36)
Jorgensen describes the interaction between society and music as “dynamic.” “Music not
only follows society but also impacts, portends, and even constructs and reconstructs it.
As such, music making involves a dialectic between social conservation and
reconstruction (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 36).
In order to examine the factors that relate to the formation and maintenance of “diverse
musical traditions, the publics within them, and the related challenges for music
education” Jorgensen adopts the concept of the “sphere of musical validity” (Jorgensen,
1997, p. 37)'**. Jorgensen defines “spheres of musical validity” as follows:
Similar cognitive, emotional, and physical understandings are communicated 
through a given musical event. The meanings conveyed, symbolisms grasped, 
and responses evoked are construed as beliefs, attitudes, understandings, feelings, 
and sensory and bodily impressions. These feelings and understandings are 
played out in actions and practices, moreover. Thus, when people make music, 
they do so within a community of those who share attitudes, understandings, and 
practical traditions. This community acts as any social group, corporately and 
individually, and assumes and maintains a life of its own. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 37)
A “sphere of musical validity” is both “inclusive and exclusive.” “Individuals
within a given sphere of musical validity have the collective sense that particular rules
must be satisfied in order for a musical event to be appropriate or exemplary” (Jorgensen,
1997, p. 38). Whatever type of music is being considered, the “community of the
initiated” understands its significance. The nature of this understanding is cognitive.
^  Jorgensen attributes the development of this concept to Georg Simmerl and 
Peter Etzkkom. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 37)
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affective and corporeal (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 39). Jorgensen states that “like all social 
groups, spheres of musical validity tend to become institutionalized and self-perpetuating 
as each community seeks to maintain itself in time and place” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 40). 
Spheres of musical validity may contain many sub-groupings. Individuals may belong to 
several different spheres of musical validity and may be positioned differently within 
each of those spheres. Spheres contain elements that constitute “the establishment” and 
others that “may be considered subversive and anti-establishment” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 
41). Some spheres may represent politically powerful elements of society and others may 
be “ignored, ostracized, and suppressed by more powerful elements in society despite the 
fact that they may have pervasively popular appeal (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 41). Spheres of 
musical validity are affected “by the societal orientation toward change or tradition” 
(Jorgensen, 1997, p. 42)^ *®. Each of these spheres contains dialectical tensions.
Jorgensen argues that at least five processes—with dialectical tensions apparent in 
each—influence the development of musical spheres. These processes are: family, 
religion, politics, the music profession, and commerce (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 45). In all 
five of these categories, Jorgensen acknowledges that musicians both influence and are 
influenced by the dynamics involved in each setting. I explore this interplay of 
influences in later chapters as part of my justification for developing critical 
consciousness. The following is a brief description of Jorgensen’s analysis of each 
category. Familial and societal value systems have an impact on esthetic^® values. Some
See also Jorgensen, 1997, p. 21 re socialization and role of teachers as agents of 
change and agents of conservation.
Jorgensen’s spelling.
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models are patriarchal; some are matriarchal; some are elitist; some hinge on collective 
participation. Both formal and informal methods of transmission take place.
Using the term “religion” broadly to encompass a vide range of practices, 
Jorgensen points to the “interrelationship between musical beliefs and practices and the 
religious groups and institutions that both spawn and are fed by them” (Jorgensen, 1997, 
p. 48). Music is used to create a sense of sacred time and place. Musical practices are 
governed by religious concepts and in turn, influence the way the spiritual events are 
experienced. “Politics” refers to “that having to do with the public and the state” 
(Jorgensen, 1997, p. 51). Musical practices can he influenced hy censorship, sponsorship, 
legislation, and education; however, musicians can also subvert political power by 
challenging the status quo. Within the music profession, “musicians are influenced by 
the musical practices characteristic of the traditions in which they work. They also 
reconstruct these traditions and create new ones, especially through their writings on, and 
activities in, music education” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 57). Musical institutions and music 
professionals within these institutions also serve as gatekeepers determining what 
attributes are important and what practices are considered valid.
“Commerce” refers to “a dynamic interaction between commercial or business 
beliefs, mores, and traditions and musical ideas and practices” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 59). 
Commercial interests can influence, develop and limit musical practices. The results can 
range from very positive to very negative depending upon one’s musical, social, and 
economic goals and objectives.
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The implications that Jorgensen draws from her examination of spheres of
musical validity suggest changes to how one conceives of the work of music educators
and other music practitioners.
Seeing music as part of a complex network of cultural and social beliefs and 
practices suggests that music educators must understand these contexts and 
integrate their work within them. If music is part of life rather than apart from it, 
it cannot be studied in isolation. Rather, it must be seen as an important aspect of 
general culture. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 65)
Music educators thus need to be able to “adjudicate the various spheres of musical
validity” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 66). Not all elements of all spheres can be addressed, but
music educators need to “weigh these claims and devise strategies that meet them
directly” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 66). There are “great” and “little” musical traditions
linked together in symbiotic relationships; however, no particular form of music “has a
comer on greamess” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 75-76). When planning curriculum, educators
must avoid “superficiality and tokenism,” carefully balancing the risk of “learning several
musical languages poorly” against the more traditional approach of “simply following
one musical tradition” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 77). Jorgensen suggests that music educators
need to grapple with the numerous dialectical relationships described in her text and to
accept that they “may sometimes need to be content with disturbance, disunity, and
dissonance” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 69). Teachers must find balance between the past,
present and future, “deciding the particular directions in which transmission and
transformation should be directed” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 81). Jorgensen’s final
recommendation to music educators is that they conceive of themselves as “artists,”
empowered to “devise methods that creatively and imaginatively suit the needs of their
students (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 91). With her recommendation to approach decision-
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making creatively, Jorgensen encourages music educators to think beyond 
methodologies and to recognize their roles as creators of social relations and musical 
culture.
In conclusion, Jorgensen delineates a series of analytical fields that open up many 
avenues of investigation for music educators as well as other music practitioners. She 
draws our attention to power dynamics in teaching/learning situations and points out 
learning contexts where passivity might supplant the potential for critical engagement. 
Jorgensen also includes goals of social justice in her consideration of music education 
practices. She identifies spheres of musical validity which both influence and are 
influenced by musicians; acknowledges the need to balance competing tensions. Finally, 
she recommends a holistic approach to music and music education that is guided by 
dialogical and dialectical inquiries. Jorgensen does not construct a definition of music 
and music education in the same sense as Reimer, Elliott and Regelski; however, she 
discusses many issues comparable with the ideas proposed by these writers. In Figures 
4a, 4b, and 4c, I compare the fimdamental ideas of Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and 
Jorgensen in chart form.
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Reimer Elliott Regelski Jorgensen
General Philosophical Approaches
Aesthetic philosophy of 
music and music 
education.
Recommends reflective 
practices.
Praxlal philosophy of 
music and music 
education. Defined in 
opposition to aesthetic - 
philosophy.
Recommends reflective 
practices defined as 
"praxis."
Praxlal philosophy of 
music and music 
education. Offered as a 
"corrective" to aesthetic 
thinking. Recommends 
reflective practices 
defined as "praxis."
Holistic view. GAIA 
hypothesis. Integrates 
social justice into her 
considerations of music 
teaching practices. 
Recommends reflective 
practices.
Music as knowledge fits 
into the liberal humanist 
tradition of education. 
Aristotelian concepts 
are used to support his 
wewpoints.
Music as a unique form 
of knowledge fits into 
the liberal humanist 
tradition of education. 
Aristotelian concepts 
are used to support his 
viewpoints.
Music as a form of 
knowledge fits into the 
liberal humanist tradition 
of education.
Aristotelian concepts 
are used to support his 
viewpoints.
Does not use Aristotle to 
support her arguments. 
Advocates dialectical and 
dialogical processes. 
Analyzes different 
social/musical contexts to 
understand how people 
“come to know” music.
Music education fuifiiis 
humanist ideals.
Music education fulfills 
humanist ideals.
Music education fulfills 
humanist ideals.
Music education fulfills 
humanist ideals.
What is the nature of music?
Musical works are 
"expressive forms;" 
Historical and social 
contexts do not affect 
the meaning of musical 
works. Music refers 
only to itself. It is not 
"about" anything.
Musical works are not 
"objects." Music is a 
form of “doing-action.” 
The meaning of musical 
works is embedded in 
social and historical 
contexts; the meaning of 
music is also created 
through all the elements 
present at any given 
perfonnance.
Musical works are not 
“objects." The meaning 
of music is tied together 
with the contributions 
music makes to “Being 
human." Music is 
“instrumental” in serving 
social, existential and 
intellectual “good."
Music Is interrelated with 
society in "multi-faceted 
ways reflecting and 
contributing to social 
consciousness.
Does music represent a particular form of knowledge?
Music represents a 
unique form of 
knowledge (perceptual 
structuring) that 
educates human 
“feeling"—a form of 
knowledge with intrinsic 
value. All arts should be 
approached as 
expressive forms.
Music represents a 
unique form of 
knowledge, called 
“praxis” that represents 
a kind of doing-action— 
a form of knowledge 
with intrinsic value. The 
meaning is in the 
performance Itself.
Music is a “doing” 
guided by a phronesis 
for “right results" in 
human terms.”
All music is functional 
but never in a strictly 
musical sense. Music 
has Intrinsic value.
Jorgensen develops the 
concept of “Spheres of 
Musical Validity” to 
describe multiple 
influences on our 
experiences of music.
Figure 5a: Key Themes of Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen ...
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How is musicianship best developed?
A variety of pedagogical 
approaches Is 
recommended. All arts 
are to be approached, 
perceived, responded 
to, judged and taught as 
"expressive forms."
Induction is the best 
way to leam musical 
practices. One is 
initiated into the 
standards and traditions 
of different musics 
under the guidance of 
one who has already 
mastered these 
traditions.
Popular art forms are 
legitimate genres for the 
classroom if the result is 
to “get ordinary peojDle 
into action musically."
A variety of pedagogical 
approaches is analyzed. 
Enculturation has much 
to recommend It; 
however, a dialectical 
and dialogical approach 
is necessary to balance 
the conflicting tensions 
of different musical 
needs.
Listening is the most 
important way to 
experience and leam 
about music because 
the listener is "creating 
along with the music."
Performance, (in the 
broadest sense) is the 
most important way to 
develop musical 
knowledge.
Getting ordinary people 
into action musically Is 
the most important 
function of music 
education. Listening 
and performing are both 
valid approaches.
Holistic and creative 
approaches are 
necessary to balance 
the competing needs 
and tensions in serving 
different learning 
constituencies.
Becoming a successful 
performer should not t>e 
seen as the be-all and 
end-all of music.
Music is fundamentally 
a "performing" art.
The value of 
performance or any kind 
of music-making is in 
the "right results" 
achieved In any given 
situation.
Musical practices need 
to be considered in light 
of a holistic view of life. 
Music learning is a life­
long process that 
encompasses as array 
of societal institutions.
Music education should 
include exposure to the 
music of many different 
cultures. An 
experiential approaches 
recommended. 
Comparison of the 
expressive qualities of 
the music of different 
cultures can lead to an 
appreciation that all 
human beings share the 
basic condition of 
subjective awareness.
Music education should 
include Induction into 
the music of different 
cultures. Music is “by 
nature" multicultural, 
thus studying a 
multiplicity of musics is 
essential to grasping 
the inherent qualities of 
music.
Music education might 
well include exposure to 
different cultures but 
Regelski's main goal is 
to get "ordinary people 
Into action musically.”
Wherever possible, 
music programs should 
be designed to embrace 
and reflect, at least in 
part, the demographics 
represented in a 
particular learning 
setting. “Music should 
be studied as a world 
rather than a Western 
phenomena” 
(Jorgensen, 1997, p. 3).
Figure 5b: Key Themes of Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen.
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What is the nature of creativity and how this is best developed?
Developing creativity 
should be an important 
part of music education. 
A continuum of 
creativity exists that all 
can access.
Developing creativity 
should be an important 
part of music education; 
however, few will 
experience genuine 
creativity. Creativity is 
only a meaningful 
concept in the context 
of the full tradition of a 
musical practice.
Regelski does not give 
an account of creativity.
Jorgensen does not 
give an account of 
creativity per se; 
however, she favors 
approaches to music 
education that 
encourage independent 
thinking by students.
What does music offer to human beings as individuals and in relationship to others?
It Is “inside” art that we 
find our deepest sense 
of community, as we 
feel deeply and 
empathize with others 
who also feel" (p. 68).
“Immersion Into different 
cultures leads not only 
to self-reflection but to 
an acceptance of 
difference—a goal of 
humanistic education” 
(p. 293). “Induction of 
students into different 
musical cultures may be 
one of the most 
powerful ways to 
achieve a larger 
educational goal: 
preparing children to 
vioTk effectively and 
tolerantly with others to 
solve shared community 
problems" (p.293).
Music contributes many 
“goods” that make a life 
“well-lived” and “made 
special” (Regelski, 1997, 
p. 44).
“A comparative and 
contextual study of world 
musics can help students 
understand cultures other 
than their own and 
intuitively grasp the 
perspectives and 
expressions of others— 
what people have in 
common and how they 
differ—and foster 
tolerance of cultural 
differences with people in 
other societies, thereby 
providing a better basis for 
cooperation” (Jorgensen, 
1997, p. 3).
Figure Sc: Key Themes of Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen ...
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How is music evaluated?
Music is successful 
when it succeeds in 
expressing human 
subjectivity-when it is 
"feelingful." The role of 
the teacher is to deepen 
a student's capacity to 
experience the events 
taking place in a piece 
of music. Teachers, 
however, should not put 
their opinions between 
a person's experience 
of listening and the 
music itself. Their role 
Is to bring about a 
greater awareness of 
the musical elements in 
operation.___________
Music Is successful 
when It meets the 
standards and traditions 
particular to specific 
genres. Expert's 
specific to each musical 
genre are best able to 
assess musical quality. 
"Creativity," seen as a 
unique contribution in 
the context of a tradition 
adds value to a musical 
event.
Music is successful 
when it achieves “right 
results" for any given 
situation. “Right results” 
refer to “good times’— 
not to specifically 
musical standards. 
Ethical considerations 
are part of any 
assessment of "right 
results."
There are "great" and 
"little" traditions of 
music. No tradition has 
a comer on greatness 
or goodness. 
Maintaining musical 
standards of excellence 
is important Teaching 
multiple forms of music 
is not worthwhile if the 
results are mediocre.
Figure 5d: Key Themes of Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen
In Chapter Two I have given an overview of the philosophical landscape as it has 
been developed and explicated by four major Philosophy of Music Education writers. In 
Chapter Three, I explore the roles of musicians as wage earners, artists, members of 
communities, teachers and cultural producers from within the framework of each author. 
I look at the context established by each author in order to establish the possibilities and 
limitations of their philosophical and pedagogical perspectives in relation to the roles I 
identify as places where politics and music meet.
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CHAPTER THREE:
THE INTERSECTION OF MUSIC AND POLITICS
Introduction
The working hypothesis of this thesis is that studies in critical consciousness 
might usefully broaden the education of professional musicians. My own experiences as 
a professional musician have led me to posit that conventional music education does not 
serve professional musicians well with respect to issues arising within the intersection of 
music and politics.
This project does not give an empirical account of music education practices such 
as a catalogue of courses nor does it investigate the outcomes of particular programs; 
rather, it is an inquiry into the philosophical thinking underlying music education.
Within this conceptual project, I have provided a survey of the principal philosophical 
themes and approaches offered by four major writers in the field of philosophy of music 
education. The work of these writers is directed to future music educators. My interest is 
related but more specific. I am concerned primarily with the education of professional 
musicians: performers, composers, conductors, musicologists and teachers. Though not 
directly parallel, I contend there are good reasons to believe that this literature can 
provide a useful point of reference for the philosophical themes underlying the education 
of professional musicians. First, the general shape of philosophical thought in the 
philosophy of music education literature is representative of liberal education themes 
dominant in North American universities. Second, this discourse predicates its 
recommendations upon a thorough-going analysis of the nature and value of music. It 
includes references to music performance, cultural significance, and pedagogy. Where 
differences arise between the general education and professional music education
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discourses arise (with respect to the greater presence of mentorship in the education of 
professional musicians, for instance), it is possible to augment the general discussion with 
references of a more specific nature^*.
What remains, then, is to generate an account of the conflict that forms the basis 
of my hypothesis that studies involving critical consciousness might usefully inform and 
broaden both the subjects and the manner in which professional musicians are taught. In 
keeping with an analytic rather than empirical mode, I explore questions within the area 
of the intersection of politics and music that, in my experience, seem outside the standard 
bounds of contemporary music education.
Within this area of interest, I identify five roles representing avenues of 
professional musicianship in which significant intersections of music and politics occur. 
This division is analytic, not lived. These roles are not intended to provide a 
comprehensive survey of such intersections; rather, my goal is to map out recognizable 
areas of concern and to demonstrate that an argument in favour of studies of critical 
consciousness is plausible. In keeping with this goal, the point of this chapter is to 
illustrate a reasonably recognizable and reasonably coherent area—namely politics and 
music — which appears not to fall within the purview of contemporary music education 
for professional musicians (at least insofar as the survey of philosophy of music 
education can be taken to be representative).
The five roles I explore are: wage earners, artists, members of communities, 
teachers, and cultural producers. In each case my discussion is divided into two parts:
For references to the mentorship of professional musicians see Kogan, J. (1987). 
Nothing but the best: The struggle for perfection at the Julliard School. New York: 
Random House.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
81
first, a narrative account of experiences in which music and politics intersect, drawn 
from the real and hypothetical lives of professional musicians, and second, an analysis of 
the educational resources for addressing these situations that can be found (or not) within 
the four accounts of music education introduced in Chapter Two. Two particular 
questions frame the latter: first, is it possible to address the issues identified on the bases 
of the philosophical and pedagogical positions articulated by Reimer, Elliott, Regelski 
and Jorgensen, and second, do they recommend that analysis of such issues be included 
within music education? In cases where the issues I introduce are not mentioned 
specifically within the philosophical discourse, I extrapolate “possible positions” that 
could be supported by their thoughts on other issues. As a preface to my discussion, 
however, I want to digress briefly in order to explain fiirther what I mean by politics, 
materiality and ideology.
Definitions of Terms
In this discussion the reader will encounter terminology that I use to illustrate the 
particular kinds of conflict that I want to declare ‘political.’ Before proceeding with the 
discussion, then, I want to define these terms. The first step is to define what is political. 
Politics refers to “the total complex of relations between people living in society,^^” in 
particular, social relations involving authority or power.^*”
Definition of "Politics." Retrieved August 8, 2003, from Merriam-Webster On­
line Dictionary: http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=politics.
Definition of Politics. Retrieved August 8, 2003, from WordNet 2.0 Search 
http://www.cogsci.princeton.edu/cgi-
bin/webwn2.0?stage=2&word=politics&posnumber=l&searchtypenumber=2&senses=& 
showglosses=l &showcontexthelp=l.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
82
David Elliott uses a definition of politics that is consistent with my own use of 
the term. He writes; “To the Greeks, the word politics meant whatever involved people 
in human concerns beyond their own individual needs” (Elliott, 1995, p. 130). I am 
especially interested in politics as it refers to situations that involve, or arise from, the 
exercise of power and authority.
Some classic political situations are identified as such because they involve 
phenomena that are perceived, typically, as political, such as, the distribution of resources, 
decisions about the ‘common good’ and civic rights and responsibilities. In the scenarios 
I discuss in this chapter, I introduce two additional phenomena that I claim are also, 
typically, political: materiality and ideology. Both of these terms have strong 
associations with Marxist theory, but I want to broaden their meanings to encompass the 
extended terms of reference introduced by feminist, anti-racist and post-colonial theory.
In the Marxist context, materiality refers to a form of causality that is attributed to 
economic and technological systems, structures, and relations. Marx used the concept of 
materiality to get away from political theories that accounted for historical and social 
change solely in terms of human (or Divine) causes. He wanted to emphasize the effects 
that are introduced to history as a fimction of the organization of society. Feminists and 
other contemporary social theorists adopt Marx's account of materiality but associate it 
with forms of social organization broader than economics. Thus — in addition to class
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— race, gender, disability, and colonialism are identified as forms of social 
organization that have a historical effect '^*.
I use the term materiality to highlight situations where something about the 
conditions within which we live has an identifiable effect on us — for instance — when 
our being parents adds the burden of childcare to the costs associated with working long 
hours or attending school at night, or, in another example, when our being White or First 
Nations means we are likely to be received (and perceived) very differently even though 
we are engaged in otherwise similar tasks.
“Ideology” is another Marxist term that became prominent once it was interpreted 
by Althusser. It refers to the ideas, or sets of ideas, that represent the world through the 
distorted (by vested interest) lens of the ruling class. Marx argued that ideological 
representations served a specific fimction, namely, to obscure the ways that material 
interests of members of different classes were contradictory. Althusser’s interpretation 
emphasized the influence of socializing institutions such as the family, the schools and 
the media, that perpetuated the ideologies of the ruling class, passing the distorted views 
off, in effect, as normal and natural.
I find the term ideology useful when I want to refer to sets of ideas or values that 
seem to be so entrenched, so naturalized, that they are almost incontestable. I do 
associate it, also, with situations where the ideas seem to be aligned with dominant 
(authoritative) interests, be they economic, gendered, or racialized. For example, artists
Definitions of Historical Materialism and Ideology. Retrieved August 15,2004, 
from School of Economic and Social Studies, University of East Anglia: 
http://www.uea.ac.uk/~j024/inmod/ideology.htm.
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are sometimes represented as Bohemians, people who are free or somehow separated 
from the responsibilities normally associated with adulthood or citizenship. To refer to 
this idea as ideology is to assert that it is a distortion that has material implications -  it 
serves to separate artists from other workers.
I turn, now, to a discussion of the five roles of professional musicianship that I 
have identified for the purpose of analyzing intersections of music and politics.
Musicians as Wage Earners
Issues
In considering the role of the musician as “wage earner,” I ask whether 
educational principles have been established to help music students explore the idea of 
music as “work.” I am not referring to the specifics of preparing to win a particular job; 
rather, I am asking whether an educational context exists in which students might explore 
factors, apart from competence, that influence the availability of paid work, potential 
income levels, the relative stability of forms of work and working conditions. Such 
factors might include economic and political conditions, technological change, and social 
and demographic considerations. For example, in Canada, many forms of employment 
for musicians are influenced by levels of government fimding (directly and indirectly 
through arts councils) including work in universities, schools, orchestras, arts festivals 
and as members of small ensembles. With changes in government policy, livelihoods can 
grow^  ^or modes of work can disappear altogether^^. Economic priorities affect
When the national government is pursuing strategic objectives in specific 
countries or regions, international touring can be quite lucrative.
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government decisions but underlying these priorities is the more fundamental question, 
that is, should public or private interests support various categories of “public service?” 
Without going into the specifics of this argument, it should be recognized that the 
material ramifications will affect people very differently, depending on how they are 
situated. For example, private funding of university departments is concentrated in 
engineering and science because research in these fields can result in marketable 
commodities. Those financially well-positioned in the private sector can profit by taking 
over public assets. Those in music departments, on the other hand, may find themselves 
without a department in which to work^’. The ideological shift taking place within the 
current neoliberal^* moment is from a notion of “public good” and shared public assets to 
a commodification of all aspects of life, including air and water.
Complementary to the question of public funding is the equally complex issue of 
corporate sponsorship^^. Musicians must deliberate such questions as. Is it important that
When arts council funding is cut, regional sponsors lose their capacity to 
present concerts and opportunities to tour within the country disappear. Particularly 
vulnerable are the many smaller communities outside of metropolitan centres where 
corporate sponsorship is difficult to sustain because of the small “markets” involved.
This is particularly true at smaller universities where arts faculties, including 
music, visual art, education and women’s studies, are chronically underfunded.
“A general characteristic of neoliberalism is the desire to intensify and 
expand the market, by increasing the number, frequency, repeatability, and 
formalisation of transactions. The ultimate (unreachable) goal of neoliberalism is a 
universe where every action of every being is a market transaction, conducted in 
competition with every other being and influencing every other transaction, with 
transactions occurring in an infinitely short time, and repeated at an infinitely fast rate.” 
(Emphasis in original. Definition of Neoliberalism. Retrieved September 10,2004, from 
http://web.inter.nl.net/users/Paul.Treanor/neoliberalism.html).
Saul talks about the problem of the managerial class not being able to 
participate in public political debates because of conflicts of interest with their corporate
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we agree with the goals and practices of a particular business when we accept their 
support in exchange for public relations benefits? There is no simple answer to this 
question. Without this support we may not be able to do our work as musicians (or 
festival presenters or opera companies). In addition, there are many examples of radical 
and culturally critical works of art sponsored by conservative corporations®®. On the 
other hand, if we were asked to play at an event with which we were uncomfortable, 
would we accept the work (since we probably need the money) or would we put the 
“meaning” of our public presence ahead of the opportunity to earn income®*. I will look 
at this issue again under the category of cultural producer.
obligations. The same often holds true for musicians. I recall an occasion when 
members of a metropolitan orchestra organized a well-publicized Peace Demonstration. 
When one of their corporate sponsors heard about the demonstration, they threatened to 
cancel their sponsorship of the orchestra. The conflict was resolved when the players 
published a public apology for the “naivety” of their actions. Of course, the main issue 
was that they used their professional affiliation to help advertise the event; however, that 
professional affiliation is also what identified the players as members of a recognized 
community wishing to take a stand on a public matter—a mark of their credibility.
Saul’s comments follow:
As for the individual, the one-third to one-half of the population who are part of 
the managerial elite are indeed castrated as citizens because their professions, 
their employment contracts and the general atmosphere of corporate loyalty make 
it impossible for them to participate in the public place. (Saul, 1995, p. 87)
®® The works presented by the Danny Grossman Dance Company are an example 
of this. Many of Danny Grossman’s pieces express social criticisms—criticisms in 
conflict with the philosophies of businesses supporting the company.
®* My own ensemble was asked to play at an event in support of a Toronto bid for 
the Olympics. I was not in support of the bid and was very uncomfortable crossing the 
protest line that was set up by the group “Bread not Circuses.” We were not hired as 
free-lance musicians for this event; rather, we were hired as a “name” group. Had we 
been anonymous, the performance would not have meant any more or less than the work 
provided by the caterers. As a group with a recognized profile, however, it was a source 
of conflict amongst our members as to whether or not we should be lending our name to
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Issues like these directly affect a musician’s capacity to earn an income. An 
added difficulty is that there are few forums for professional musicians to use for 
debate.®  ^ There are external factors as well that affect our ability to earn income as 
musicians, for example, the influence of local economies®*, the priorities of school 
boards®'* and the existence of audiences for particular forms of music®®. Working
the event (and accepting money from the organization). Of course, the fact that we were 
well-paid for the performance made the conflict that much more difficult. Here again, 
where one is situated is key. If the conflict is a choice between food and ethics, food 
usually wins out. Material relations will always intersect such decisions.
®* My observation of local music publications is that most are dedicated to 
promoting events. I am aware that there are journals aimed at composers and producers 
of experimental music and performance art (Musicworks Magazine is one) that discuss 
notions of cultural production and meaning however these have limited circulation and 
are not part of the awareness of the general pool of working musicians. The one forum 
that is available to all working musicians is the monthly journal. International Musician, 
published by the American Federation of Musicians—the union representing almost all 
working musicians (who earn their income as performers) in North America. This 
journal does, in fact, address issues pertaining to musicians as workers and it does so with 
a clear articulation of our connection to the broader labour movement and the history of 
labour relations in North America. Writers for the journal often situate their concerns 
within the larger political and social landscape. A limitation of the journal, as one that 
has to inform a large geographic constituency on legal issues, health concerns, contracts 
and working conditions, is that it is generally not a place where a great deal of active 
debate takes place. The newsletters of national symphonic organizations (OCSM in 
Canada) also discuss job related issues and sometimes contain thoughtful pieces 
reflecting on larger issues affecting our working lives. Like the A. F. of M. magazine, 
however, articles are mostly written my members of the executive. These journals are 
not easily adopted as forums for lively debate on philosophical issues.
®* Orchestral musicians face job losses and career crises as economic and 
demographic conditions push their orchestras into bankruptcy. Artistic and 
administrative decisions, out of the control of musicians, also affect the economic 
viability of these institutions.
®'* Music educators have lost positions or been reassigned to other disciplines as 
education authorities have eliminated funding for school arts programs.
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conditions are affected by supply and demand and access to union support—not unlike 
working conditions in non-musical workplaces®®. Social relations, including but not 
limited to gender relations, also play a role in the nature and quality of work 
opportunities®’ and on-going workplace negotiations.
It is easy to conflate the issues of income, personal and artistic success, celebrity 
and self worth. Without any sense of how we are situated within external structures, 
musicians (students and professionals alike) tend to see their career trajectories as purely 
personal. Individual ability, disposition and work ethic are factors in one’s success as a 
musician; however, there are significant external factors that influence the conditions 
within which we practice our art and seek out employment.
Another significant issue is the oversupply of highly skilled and underutilized 
professional players. In the orchestral field, the number of positions available is 
extremely limited. In all but the major orchestras, the wages are low—sometimes below 
the poverty line and certainly well below what other professionals receive for equal levels
®® Audience development is an issue important to musicians in many genres; 
however, the fear of shrinking audiences is a constant theme for classical musicians.
®® Musicians working in musical theatre face crowded working conditions, 
extreme noise levels, physical danger from objects falling into the orchestra pit and 
mental, physical and emotional fatigue fi"om the repetition of the same show, eight 
times/week over months and years. As in other work environments, when there is an 
oversupply of qualified people, workers have limited leverage to demand safe working 
conditions.
®’ This is a topic worthy of a separate thesis. I touch on a few issues here: With 
so much work controlled by contractors and conductors, there is always room for 
subjectivity in who gets hired. It is important to please the contractor in such situations. 
Quality is important but so is fitting in with the expectations of the people in power. This 
leaves all kinds of room for pressure to conform to particular gender and social standards. 
Sexual harassment is only one expression of this dynamic.
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of education. During my years at the University of Toronto, several instructors 
commented frequently in class that most of us “wouldn’t make it.” We were told we 
would never be good enough to succeed as musicians. This attitude represents two ideas 
relevant to musicians as workers: a narrow and specific view of what constitutes success 
and a belief that failure is due to personal inadequacy. The difficulties of earning a living 
as a musician in Canada, however, are systemic. The fact that some musicians are 
enormously successful does not change the general situation for most graduates—a 
situation that has specific historical material causes®*. Other issues that I would like to 
see debated in depth include the hierarchical nature of orchestras®® and how this affects 
the distribution of resources within an organization’® as well as the issues surrounding 
class differences between members of orchestras and members of symphony Boards of 
Directors that determine the distribution of resources.
In summary, the following is a sample of generalizable themes that emerge from 
the examples I’ve provided; they reflect the intersection of music and politics in reference 
to musicians as wage earners:
®* The most obvious of these historical causes was the expansion of professional 
orchestras, (funded by the newly formed arts councils in the 1960’s) and the expansion of 
university music programs created in part to satisfy the need for professional musicians. 
Orchestras outgrew the available funding while the numbers of students coming out of 
school music programs wanting to be professional musicians continued to increase.
Supply vastly outweighed demand.
®® See C. Small’s analysis of the public meanings generated by orchestral 
performances in Small, 1998.
’® See: Lebrecht, N. (1991). The Maestro myth. Great conductors in pursuit o f 
power. London: Simon and Schuster Ltd.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
90
• the effects of local, regional, national and international economic conditions
and philosophical debates/political battles on the distribution of resources (money) 
in relation to individual and community needs;
• political advocacy;
• power dynamics in the workplace including organizational systems (hierarchical 
or otherwise);
• class relationships as they effect the distribution of resources;
• the effect of supply and demand on working conditions and the quality and 
availability of work;
• the role of unions;
• the availability of audiences for particular musical genres;
• ethical issues relating to the funding of musical work.
I look now to the work of Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen for insight and 
pedagogical strategies that potentially address the kind of issues I have raised.
Specifically, I look for educational frameworks that encourage students to think beyond 
the practice room in their conception of themselves as musicians—to see themselves also 
as wage earners in a larger social context.
Positions expressed by philosophers of music education
The authors address several aspects of the issues I have raised. In particular, each 
writer articulates the need for political advocacy, the relationship of sound advocacy 
strategies to philosophical positions and an acknowledgement that government funding 
affects the profession. Each author acknowledges that philosophical positions influence 
advocacy efforts and Reimer and Elliott, in particular, acknowledge the need for music
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education professionals to work together to advance the profession as a whole (Reimer, 
1989, p. 215 & Elliott, 1995, p.4). Discussions on the need for advocacy appear to be 
integrated into each author’s concept of the preparation of musical education 
professionals.
More idiosyncratically, the philosophers offer divergent messages with respect to 
music as work. Reimer advocates building in opportunities for students to explore the 
contributions their work makes to society as a whole (Reimer, 1989, pp 3,156,193). He 
also articulates the need to be aware of changing paradigms and consequently, the need to 
reconsider our possible roles within shifting perceptions of the world (Reimer, 1989, pp 
222-224). Reimer also notes that the meaning of musical experiences and the ways they 
are acknowledged, and/or valued monetarily, do not always correlate (Reimer, 1989, p. 
207).
Elliott does not address the dynamics of musical work places. His project is 
focused on establishing a new definition of the nature of music and his discussions are 
focused on establishing how different kinds of music validate that definition. Elliott does 
name “politics” as a factor in music; however, it is, again, part of his project to define the 
nature of music itself (Elliott, 1995, p. 130). He appears to avoid references to larger 
scale political contexts. His concept that music is multicultural in nature has 
ramifications for the way professional music students see and value musical expression 
from different cultures. This could well result in increased audiences for a variety of 
music forms—a change in cultural dynamics that could result in formerly marginalized 
genres of music taking a more central place in society. Elliott, however, does not
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articulate any of these political references (“political” in this case because they have 
material consequences) as they relate to musicians as wage earners.
Regelski also does not address directly any political issues affecting musical work. 
His project is to show what music is “good for.” Within this context, however, he 
suggests that musical experiences of all kinds serve a limitless number of “human goods” 
(Reglski, 1998a, p. 31). In his approach to pedagogy within the school environment, he 
suggests teaching instruments that are easily accessible and less dependent upon 
ensembles for continued use into adult life” (Regelski, 1998b, p. 36) In this sense, he 
disrupts the notion that musical training, to be considered successful, has to look and 
function in a certain way. He does not, however, address issues pertaining to the 
numerous settings in which power dynamics have an influence on a musician’s role as a 
wage earner.
Jorgensen raises a number of issues with significance for musicians in their roles 
as wage earners. In her discussion of spheres of musical validity, she identifies many 
factors that influence the nature and availability of musical work. She also describes 
numerous social, financial and ethical tensions that bear consideration at all levels of 
teaching and professional musical practice. Jorgensen provides a “conceptual framework 
for reflecting on and resolving current ideological clashes and methodological 
differences” (Bogdan, 1998, p. 71)’* in the realm of music education; however, she does 
not deal specifically with the power dynamics of different work situations. The role of
’* Bogdan, D. (1998). Estelle R. Jorgensen, In search of music education [Review 
of the book In search o f music education]. University of Illinois Press, Urbana and 
Chicago. Philosophy o f Music Education Review, 6(1), 71-73.
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ideology is raised in numerous contexts as is the possibility that musicians can act as 
agents of change or agents of conservation (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 42). These themes 
provide important opportunities for students to evaluate how they are positioned within 
musical and professional frameworks and how they might wish to engage with such 
themes in their working lives.
Conclusions
There are some political issues that appear consistently in the philosophical 
accounts of Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen. Each author argues strongly in 
favor of students taking the time to develop a philosophy to guide their career and life 
choices. Each author acknowledges that philosophical positions can affect advocacy 
efforts and acknowledges, as well, the political necessity of advocacy work. Each of the 
authors can be seen to address, particularly well, specific elements of the political issues I 
have raised. For instance, Reimer considers it important to take the time with students to 
explore their career goals in light of social needs. Jorgensen considers various factors 
that influence the nature and availability of work and she considers the influence of 
ideology in different spheres of musical validity; however, she does not consider how 
these factors might affect the musician as a worker within these environments.
What is missing for me in these accounts is an articulation of larger historical 
factors that shape the conditions of work, for example, capitalism, industrialization, 
colonization, globalization, the influence of technological change and the influence of 
demographics—all of which affect the nature, availability and quality of work as well as 
levels of pay. None of the authors considers the fundamental debate of private-versus-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
94
public funding or the social/political factors that influence the dynamics of different 
workplace environments.
Musicians as Artists
Issues:
Who gets to count as an “artist?” What is the role of creativity in art? Is there 
something inherently “special” about being a creative artist (if indeed what I do is 
“creative”)? How important is it to the self-image of musicians to be “special” and how 
do notions of “being special” affect our material locations?
In this section, I am not looking for definitions of art and the artist per se. All 
four of the authors examined in this thesis write extensively about the nature of music 
and art and both Reimer and Elliott, though from different viewpoints, write about the 
nature of creativity and its place in music education. I explore to what extent we can 
contest our conventional assumptions and beliefs about these categories within the 
context of current thinking by philosophy of education writers. Two examples illustrate 
my reasons for seeking a critical perspective on our concepts of art and artists.
First, there is a common belief that it is “creative” people who pursue careers in 
the arts and that careers in the arts allow us to “be creative.” Susan Heald writes, in 
“Pianos to Pedagogy: Pursuing the Educational Subject,’ ”^ that “creativity is assumed to 
be a property of anyone who engages in activities which—through their association with 
what artists do—are assumed to demonstrate creativity” (Heald, 1991, p. 130, author’s
Pianos to Pedagogy: Pursuing the Educational Subject. In H. Banerji, L. Carty, 
K. Dehli, S. Heald & K. McKerma (Eds.), Unsettling Relations: The University as a site 
o f feminist struggles (pp. 129 -149). Toronto: Women's Press.
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emphasis). Her experience of becoming an accomplished pianist, however, did not
always encompass developing her own creativity.
But “playing” still meant sticking to the music-as-written; any effort on my part to 
play in a way which might be “inventive” or “imaginative” -  as the dictionary 
defines “creative” -  was quickly censored by my mother, who would ask, “is that 
practicing?”
As such, my entrance into the realm of the “creative person” was marked by an 
absence of precisely those features which define “creativity.” (Heald, 1991, 
p.133).
Heald quotes Parker and Pollack on the concept of the “creative artist.” I include
this passage as it sheds light on some of our expectations and perhaps our confusions
around the role of “creativity” in musical training.
The concept of the artist as a creative individual is a modem one... .The modem 
definition is the culmination of a long process of economic, social and ideological 
transformations by which the word “artist” ceased to mean a kind of workman 
and came to signify a special kind of person with a whole set of distinctive 
characteristics: artists came to be thought of as strange, different, exotic, 
imaginative, eccentric, creative, unconventional, alone. A mixture of supposed 
genetic factors and social roles distinguish the artist from the mass of ordinary 
mortals, creating new myths, those of the prophet and above all the genius, and 
new social personae, the Bohemian and the pioneer... .Today, to be an artist is to 
be bom a special person; creativity lies in the person not in what is made. (Parker 
and Pollack as quoted in Heald, S., 1991, p. 130)
The issues raised by Heald, Parker and Pollack suggest that our assumptions 
about what it might mean to be an “artist” need to be examined c r i t i c a l l y I  am 
particularly interested in the effects of the notion of “being special.” Is this notion 
problematized in professional music education? This is not just a question of self-image 
(although it has important consequences for individuals, particularly if they are not 
successful as musicians and are, therefore, no longer “special”). This notion of
My own classical training most definitely did not contain opportunities for 
developing creativity.
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“specialness” has consequences beyond individual notions of self because it creates a 
hierarchy of categories: those who have value (as special people) and those who have less 
value (as “not” special people) '^*. I believe the designation of “specialness” has several 
implications. One is that it affects our view of what “counts” in ourselves, in others and 
in life. This designation separates us conceptually from other working people, keeps us 
out of labour market analyses’  ^and relieves us of the obligation to make connections 
with others who walk different life paths. Is our designation as “special” part of the 
rational for paying musicians so poorly—since we have the privilege of loving what we 
do? Conversely, does our designation as “special” connect with our 'willingness to accept 
“starving artist” wages along with the label?
Consider a second example. I recently sat on a multi-disciplinary arts council jury 
evaluating grant applications for professional development. The jury was made up of two 
visual artists, a theatre director, a modem dancer and a musician. Applications 
represented every branch of the arts. In music alone, we were required to assess the work
The centrality of “competition” in advanced levels of musical development is 
another link to this “specialness.” Competition is a means of distributing scarce resources 
while attributing the lack of resources to personal inadequacy. Here, again, the ideology 
of “being special” frames issues in terms of personal success or failure and masks 
economic forces. For example, twelve fabulous pianists might compete for a prize that 
includes recordings and international touring. Only one of the twelve will win the prize 
and thus gain the means to launch a sustainable career. The other eleven pianists will still 
be as brilliant as they were before the competition; however, they will not have access to 
the same opportunities to develop their careers. In spite of doing everything conceivable 
to develop themselves as musicians, their career trajectories are shaped, to a significant 
degree, by limits on available resources.
A lot of lobbying efforts by arts councils are based upon analyses of the ways 
that artists contribute to the economy. Paradoxically, if we were acknowledged as part of 
the labour market, this form of argument would not be necessary. See: Ontario Arts 
Council. (2002, February). Economic and employment impact of the arts and culture 
sector in Ontario. ArtFacts/Artifaits, d(l).
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of composers (tonal, experimental, jazz, folk) and performers representing African, 
Middle Eastern and Latin genres as well as the western art forms of jazz, pop and 
classical. We needed to consider the mandate of the arts council to support artists from a 
diversity of communities and, with limited funds available, we needed to determine how 
the work of each applicant might contribute to the cultural growth of differently situated 
communities’ .^
What struck me about this particular experience was the fact that the artists from 
other disciplines, and the visual artists in particular, had a critical analysis of cultural 
discourses about the nature and function of art. They brought with them an intellectual 
and activist mode of analysis that saw artists as participants in the creation of meaning. 
They were familiar with literatures from of sociology, philosophy, cultural criticism and 
aesthetics as they relate to visual art and had concepts of artists as cultural producers. It 
was clear from our conversations that this approach to art had been integrated into art 
education at the university level for many years. This is not the case in standard music 
studies. Music studies generally include music history, theory, form and analysis in 
addition to concentrations in one’s area of specialty. Ethnomusicology is usually 
available as an elective, and composition programs might include forms of cultural 
criticism; however, generally speaking, music programs do not require studies in 
aesthetics, critical theory or the sociology of music.
The reader should not mistake these criteria as imposing a quota system. 
Artistic quality is the most heavily weighted factor in all evaluations; however, the 
responsibility of arts councils and therefore the people asked to sit on advisory or jury 
panels, is to evaluate the range of applications based on the needs of all segments of 
geographically and culturally diverse communities.
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What preparation would be adequate to enable a musician to negotiate the 
critical issues of diversity and representation and thus participate meaningfully on such a 
jury? Decisions made by arts juries have material consequences for communities and for 
individual artists. With the authority and responsibility to determine what “counts” 
during a round of competitions, it is crucial that a jury member have the ability to analyze 
notions of art and value critically” .
The intersections of music and politics are evident in the above examples in 
several ways. The ideological value of “being special” justifies huge material rewards for 
some as effectively as it justifies negligible wages for others’®. The necessity to question 
frames of reference is apparent in the role of a jury of peers. Politically-derived 
questions include. What costs are incurred as we assume that creativity is the purview of 
artists and what values are suggested by this assumption? What means do we have to 
establish criteria for what “counts?” How does a professional musician gain a critical 
view of themselves as a member of a community of artists meeting the needs of a diverse 
population?
The frames of reference that we bring to decisions of value regarding art and 
artists set limits on what we can express musically, as well as on how those expressions 
will be heard, received, and assessed. By use of these two examples I try to illustrate the
”  Within this framework of competition for limited resources there will always be 
worthy applicants who are not funded.
’® Some guest artists receive $50,000 for a single performance—about the 
equivalent of a year’s wages for an orchestra member in a large centre. In a small centre 
annual wages range approximately $14,000 to $25,000 per year. Source: Wage Scales 
and Conditions in the Symphony Orchestra. OCSM/OMOSC Orchestras. 
http://www.afm.org: American Federation of Musicians. (2002-2003).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
99
extent to which all of these activities bear political implications. As I turn to the 
philosophers' accounts of artistic value, I do not doubt the capacity of their analyses to 
provide reasonable, even nuanced, ways of explaining the value of music. What I am 
very interested in, however, is the capacity of their
analyses to help musicians notice and contest the dominant ideologies that shape our 
conventional assumptions and beliefs about such values. I am interested to see whether 
their accounts open up ways of noticing not only the positive consequences of being 
recognized as artists but also the potential pitfalls. And I am interested in ways that they 
address the
questions of what makes for mutually beneficial (as opposed to exploitative) sharing of 
differing musical values and traditions.
Positions expressed by philosophers of music education:
Each of the four authors discusses the nature of music and its value to human life. 
Though based on different rationales, each author argues for the need to explore the 
music of a multiplicity of cultures in order to appreciate the cultural values expressed in 
unfamiliar cultures.
Reimer stands in tension with the others with respect to the connection between 
socio-cultural factors and the nature of music. Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen consider 
that religious, moral and political factors, as well as audience, location and social context 
to be part of a series of relationships that contribute to the nature of music. Reimer does 
not consider such factors relevant and argues that giving them undue consideration
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
distorts the purpose of music education, which is to sensitize students to the
expressive possibilities found in purely “musical” elements such as texture, dynamics and
form.
Based on my interest in challenging taken-for-granted frames of reference about 
our roles as artists, I want to attend carefully to the kinds of reflection each philosopher 
advocates. Reimer, Jorgensen and Regelski recommend forms of reflective practice that 
have us consider how our work fulfills the needs of different constituencies. Jorgensen in 
particular offers an approach to balancing competing tensions amongst different 
ideological positions and the needs of different student constituencies. Elliott also 
recommends reflective practices; however, he uses the concept mostly in reference to the 
need to replicate the standards and traditions of different musical genres.
The question of creativity generates more complicated tensions with the field.
The notion and role of creativity in music education is explored by Reimer, Elliott and 
Jorgensen. For Reimer, creativity is part of every aspect of musical experience, from 
listening to performing to composing. His pedagogical viewpoint is that it is crucial to 
create opportunities for creative decision-making during all levels of musical 
development (Reimer, 1989, p. 59 & 69) and he posits a “continuum” of creativity 
(Reimer, 1989, p. 84). He cautions that performance students may not get sufficient 
opportunity to develop their creativity within conductor-led ensembles and argues that 
more opportunities need to be created for students to develop their creative skills (for 
example, through composition and small ensemble work). Providing opportunities to 
develop independent thinking is key to Reimer’s concept of creative development.
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Elliott contests Reimer’s definition of creativity. In Elliott’s terms, creativity 
is synonymous with “originality” and can only be achieved by those who have absorbed 
and exceeded existing expressions within a particular art form. From within this 
framework, he offers definitions of what constitutes greatness, creativity and originality 
and offers a detailed description of his pedagogical approach to developing musical 
creativity’ .^ Elliott suggests that all aspects of musical development are best 
accomplished through induction—an approach to learning that, in my view, does not 
necessarily encourage independent thinking. Elliott’s approach is consistent, however, 
with his view that creativity/originality can only be achieved by first absorbing and 
exceeding existing musical standards.
Jorgensen does not attempt to define the nature of creativity; however, she 
examines its place within different pedagogical traditions clearly favoring those 
approaches that encourage opportunities for independent decision-making. Like Reimer, 
Jorgensen cautions against developing mechanistic skills without also learning to make 
creative and fully contextualized decisions (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 12). Jorgensen also 
discusses the notion of artists as agents of conservation and agents of change (Jorgensen, 
1997, p. 42) and the need to balance these competing tensions in music education. She 
encourages music students and educators to accept the many dialectical tensions she
“Creativity and musicianship should be taught concurrently by ‘targeting 
students’ attention, progressive problem solving, problem finding, musical generating and 
selecting, opportunity finding, and musical promise detecting” (Elliott, 1995, p. 234).
Elliott offers six principles for developing creativity in students and describes the 
role of the music educator as “music teacher-as-coach, adviser, and informed critic, not 
teacher as proud mother, stem father, or know-it-all big brother” (Elliott, 1995, p. 234).
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enumerates in her text and to see the need to balance competing goals and viewpoints
as a positive challenge.
Finally, neither Elliott nor Regelski offer any view on the ideology reflected in the
notion of “being special.” Reimer suggests that the motivation to be “special” can shape
priorities in ways that do not serve a musician’s or society’s best interests (Reimer, 1989,
p. 197) and suggests the importance of looking outside of the world of music to
understand what musicians might contribute to society as a whole. Reimer also
introduces the idea that changing paradigms might ultimately alter our world views and
thus our priorities (Reimer, 1989, pp 222-225). Jorgensen presents a more positive view
of the desire to stand out from one’s peers.
Attempts to democratize music by emphasizing popular musical culture at the 
expense of classical traditions are misguided. They fail to recognize every 
musician’s desire for immortality through her or his composition and 
performance—to be remembered as having achieved greatness, whether for 
hedonistic or other reasons; to attain the normally impossible or difficult; and to 
create something significant, even unique if possible, whether cooperatively or 
individually. (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 77).
Of note for my discussion, Jorgensen challenges the notion that the meaning of 
music can be reduced to representing any particular class values and offers as an example 
the place classical music has amongst all “social classes, languages, and ethnic 
backgroimds” in Eastern countries (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 76). Jorgensen places music 
educators in the role of working for social change (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 80) and suggests 
that music educators “see themselves engaged in an enterprise that integrates music with 
the rest of life” (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 30).
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Conclusions
Overwhelmingly, the predominant concerns regarding artists and the value of art 
expressed by Elliott, Reimer, Regelski and Jorgensen, have to do with reflections 
intrinsic to the nature of music. They dispute various details of one another’s positions; 
Reimer questions whether creativity is fostered within existing teaching environments, 
while Elliott contests the availability of creativity at all in the absence of superior 
performance technique. They rarely question the place or representation of artists in 
society at large.
Each philosopher advocates a level of reflection (evaluation) of diverse musics 
from other cultures as well as varied genres. Yet without exception, the material 
conditions within which such exploration would take place are ignored completely. The 
historical paths by which certain art forms come to ascendancy and others languish are, 
for the most part, left unquestioned.
With Jorgensen as the only—and I would emphasize “qualified”—exception, 
none of the philosophers address large scale socio-political phenomena such as the role of 
music education in pitting music students one against another in a form of competition 
that sustains a star-based performance market and assesses the majority as “unfit” sooner 
than it offers opportunities for cooperation or a range of performance opportunities to all. 
Jorgensen’s willingness to address the tensions inherent in musical pluralism warrants 
revisiting both for what she introduees to the diseussion as well as to what she, too, 
leaves out.
Jorgensen’s process-oriented focus on dialogue creates a context in which 
students can explore the tensions amongst artistic/cultural practices and traditions. In her
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assessment of the role of classical music in Eastern Europe she rightly rejects 
essentialist and reductionist views on the nature of music. Nonetheless, her failure to 
create a space within which to examine critically the material effects of different 
discourses and positions weakens her account. She does not acknowledge that meanings 
are more than varied across contexts—they are also differently rewarded and/or impeded. 
No cultural context is ever “irmocent”. When classical music is performed by 
professional classical musicians on “Indian Reservations”®'’, the music can not help but 
reflect the history of colonization®’. Similarly, in other colonized countries, the founding 
of classical orchestras is part of a pattern of validating the arrival of middle-class 
Europeans and their values (Small, 1998 p, 18). Thus, while Jorgensen’s advocacy of a 
holistic and dialectical approach to the contradictions that emerge in musical discourses, 
and her acknowledgement of the role of ideology that influences our viewpoints are 
advances over the basic pattern of silence that characterizes the philosophical literature 
more generally, she does not invite a critique of the material implications of these cultural 
skirmishes.
I conclude, then, that although each author questions how we function as artists in 
society, none of them creates a context within music education where students could 
explore musical practices and ideologies in association with historical and material
®” The term used on Canadian maps to designate lands set aside by the Canadian 
government for First Nations peoples.
®’ Recent visits to First Nations commimities by the Thunder Bay Symphony 
Orchestra are an example of an attempt to alter this relationship and the meaning of our 
presence in those communities. The visits have been set as an opportunity for cultural 
exchange amongst equals.
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factors. In my view, the programs offered by these authors do not create conditions 
that will prepare students to address the issues raised in my examples. Their sincere 
attempts to connect music vyith the rest of life fall short of accounting for the relationship 
between belief systems and material realities.
Musicians as Members of Communities
Issues
We are members of musical communities but we are also located within local, 
regional and national communities, shaped, at least in part, by social, economic and 
political structures. Recalling the passage by John Ralston Saul that opens this thesis, I 
am aware that, as musicians, we are one of the sectors of society that receives a highly 
specialized education. According to Saul, specialist educations leave professionals 
poorly prepared to situate themselves in a larger context. The perception amongst some 
groups of people is that formally trained musicians (particularly classical musicians) are 
elitist and privileged. We are seen as having benefited from expensive private lessons 
for most of our lives®’ and we play a form of music that appeals, at least in North 
America, primarily to members of the white educated middle-class®®. Classical 
musicians, themselves, are mostly white and middle class. As musicians, we spend a lot 
of time associating with other musicians. We also tend to cormect with people who 
support what we do—people, generally, with similar class and education backgrounds to
®’ Those who financed their own studies through summer jobs and scholarships 
notwithstanding.
®® Efforts made by various orchestras and musicians to alter this perception and 
broaden their audience base are evidence of the pervasiveness of the stereotype.
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our own. How well prepared are we to put the work we do in the context of the 
larger society in which we live?
In this section, I explore to what extent the framework of each author facilitates 
an understanding of ourselves as “members of communities.” I am particularly 
interested in how well we are able to participate and function as citizens in a democracy 
and if we are able to take in the realities of people who do not make their livings as 
musicians. A number of questions have arisen for me: how prepared and willing are we 
to engage in issues of local, regional, national and international concerns. When 
musicians decide to take job action, do we expect support from the broader community? 
If so, on what do we base this expectation? Do musicians understand enough about our 
economic and social interdependence to consider supporting other groups who go on 
strike or undertake other forms of protest? If a group of people in our community are 
struggling, are we able to recognize them as having needs similar to our own? Are we 
able to empathize and consider contributing in some way if the issue doesn’t appear to 
affect us personally?
An event that shaped my own questions was a strike by members of a major 
Canadian orchestra during the 1990’s. The basis for the strike was the difference in pay 
between American and Canadian orchestras of equal ranking. The situation was 
considered unfair because, as members of a top ranked orchestra, the players believed 
they were entitled to the highest wages in the industry. They also felt that they were 
losing talent to better paid orchestras south of the border®'’. Seen from the point of view
®'’ I believe another issue was the distribution of resources within the organization 
itself with music directors and guest artists working at pay scales vastly out of proportion
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of the players as members of an international calibre orchestra, the strike was 
justifiable; however, seen in the context of the larger community, its merits were 
questionable. The strike took place after a long period of government cutbacks to social 
services. In the years prior to the strike, welfare payments®® had been cut back 20% (well 
below the cost of living in urban centres), the use of food banks increased many fold and 
the Ontario Arts Council had its funding cut by approximately 40%, affecting every arts 
group in the province. Layoffs were taking place in large numbers in many industries 
throughout the country.
Was this strike realistic considering the economic climate? Was it ethical, 
considering the severe economic hardships others in the same city were experiencing 
when members of the orchestra were still making comfortable middle-class incomes?
Was it rational, considering the differences between Canadian and American social 
services? For example, all Canadians are entitled to health services where many 
Americans are not. The levels of poverty in American cities are far greater than in 
Canadian cities. Couldn’t a difference in pay be justified between Americans and 
Canadians based on the social benefits offered in Canada? Finally, could the orchestra
to those received by the members of the orchestra. It is possible, in fact likely, that the 
way this strike was jframed by the media did not accurately reflect the aims of the 
orchestra members. This possibility does not alter the basis for my argument. Every 
group that launches some kind of protest is vulnerable to having their issues framed by 
the mainstream media as morally suspect. This reality further supports my argument that 
we need to see how we connect to people outside of our immediate work communities.
®® People on welfare are also recipients of government support. The rationale for
the cuts was argued to be a severe deficit.
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justify its demands to the community as a whole? Did they have a view of how they 
fit into the social, economic and cultural needs of the broader co m m u n ity®^?
Another situation that raises similar issues is the number of times in recent years 
that orchestras have faced bankruptcy. The causes of these financial crises vary 
somewhat depending on the particular orchestra. In many, if not most instances, the 
problems that lead to the crisis do not involve decisions made by musicians. Boards of 
Directors are ultimately responsible for the financial well-being of orchestras although 
managers, music directors and musicians (in greatly diminishing proportions) have an 
influence on board decisions. Whether or not the musicians feel responsible for, or 
victimized by the situation, the community profile of the musicians, themselves, is an 
important key to the recovery of the orchestra—if a recovery is to take place.
My questions in regard to this example are as follows; What is the profile of the 
orchestra in the community? Have members of the orchestra expressed and shown 
support to other people in the community facing hardships due to systemic change (such 
as government cutbacks or economic recessions)? How do different members of the 
community see the value of the orchestra in relation to their own concerns? Musicians 
have become involved in lobbying efforts with various levels of government in order to 
justify the importance of maintaining (or increasing) levels of support. When musicians 
are involved in such lobbying efforts, do they have a sufficiently broad and critical 
analysis to see the forces at play beyond the need to influence a particular group of 
politicians?
®® Although a majority of members of the orchestra voted to strike, there were 
members of the orchestra who did not support this strike based on many of the issues 
raised above.
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With the above questions in mind, I look to each author for strategies that 
prepare students to address what we contribute to society, what our responsibilities might 
be as members of communities, and how we are intercormected to larger social and 
economic conditions.
Positions expressed by philosophers of music education
The philosophy of education writers do not have a great deal to say about how we
might connect with others as members of broad-based communities. To the extent that
they do address this issue, each of the authors sees music education as fulfilling important
humanist goals®’ and writes of the need to reflect democratic values through teaching
practices. In addition, each author argues that experiencing the music of different
cultures will lead students to appreciate and understand the needs and experiences of
others. Reimer recommends that students consider their careers in light of what their
work contributes to society. Elliott writes at length about multiculturalism as a social
ideal®® and argues that it is music itself that will lead us to breech our differences .
I shall take a leap of faith at this point and suggest that the induction of students 
into different music cultures may be one of the most powerful ways to achieve a 
larger educational goal: preparing children to work effectively and tolerantly with 
others to solve shared community problems. (Elliott, 1995, p. 293)
In other words, understandings of “otherness”— one of the primary goals of the humanist
education that Elliott espouses — develops as one pursues musical development through
multicultural experiences (Elliott, 1995, p. 309). Regelski also makes a case for the
®’ See Reimer, 1989, p. 145; Elliott, 1995, p. 209; Regelski, 1997, pg. 45; 
Jorgensen, 1997, pg. 3.
®® “But multicultural has an evaluative sense. It connotes a social ideal; a policy 
of support for exchange among different social groups to enrich all while respecting and 
preserving the integrity of each.” (Elliott, 1995, p. 207)
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value of music to communities; however, he does not explore how else we might 
connect to our communities, beyond sharing musical experiences® .^ Jorgensen includes a 
reference to Paulo Freire (Jorgensen, 1997, pp. 23, 78, 79) and the idea that education 
should have a liberating role in people’s lives but does not provide a way to analyze 
material relations—a step that is integral to Freire’s view of liberation (Jorgensen, 1997, 
p. 24).
Conclusions
Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen refer quite generally to matters of concern 
to communities disconnected from the field of music but they do so from a musical 
reference point. The tendency not to look beyond musical frames of reference (whether 
these are defined as aesthetic, praxial or spheres of musical influence) provides an 
excellent example of materiality. Most faculties of music are located in separate 
buildings. Our conversations are with other musicians, our concerns are about learning 
music and our colleagues and instructors tend to come from backgrounds similar to our 
own. Between lectures, assignments, practicing, rehearsing and attending concerts it is 
possible to fill up every minute of the day without ever leaving the building. Debates 
about issues taking place in other university departments are rarely heard of within the 
separate, and separated, spaces we inhabit. Within circumstances of psychic and physical 
separation, I suggest we are vulnerable to simple factual errors and the provincialism
®^ See Bogdan, D. (2001, Spring). Musical listening and performance as embodied 
dialogism. Philosophy o f Music Education Review, P(l), 3-22, and Bogdan, D. (2003, 
Summer). Musical spirituality: Reflections on identity and the ethics of embodied 
aesthetic experience in/and the academy. The Journal o f Aesthetic Education, 37(2), 80- 
98 for discussions on self-reflexivity, situatedness, and embodiment in musical 
experiences.
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without a critical framework that lets us actively explore the economic and social 
forces that affect our communities, large and small, and our places within them. Such a 
framework needs to give us the means to see how we are situated relative to others and to 
recognize the relatedness of our circumstances.
Musicians as Teachers
Issues
Most musicians teach at one time or another in their careers. For some, teaching 
at the university level becomes an important aspect of their careers and self-identity. 
Instructors have a great deal of influence over the shape and quality of the university 
experience for music students. Instructors decide ensemble assignations. Groups of 
instructors within departments make decisions about who will get solo opportunities, 
whose compositions will be performed, who gets permission to take on external 
performance opportimities. Instructors can open professional opportunities for students 
and often help to develop a musician’s career after they have finished their formal 
studies^”. Whether instructors see their roles as formal, parental or collegial, these 
relationships have a tremendous impact on the quality of life for music students—during 
the university years and often long afterward®’. These relationships are often complex. 
The shapes they take reflect the values and beliefs of the instructors, as well as the 
students, and range from extremely positive to indifferent to abusive.
90 Kogan, J. (1987).
®’ Instructors in other university disciplines may also have this kind of impact; 
however, a high level of personal involvement with students is typical in faculties of 
music.
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A difficult power dynamic is built into these relationships. Musicians tend to 
see them-“selves” as one with their instruments (encouraged by the ideology of 
“specialness” associated with being a musician). The ego and self-worth of all parties is 
tied into the day-to-day workings of the relationships. This is especially true in the 
relationships formed in conjunction with one’s area of specialization, whether it is 
composition, performance or an academic subject like musicology. Judith Kogan writes 
about the nature of the relationships between students and teachers®’ in her book, Nothing 
but the best:
The student never forgets that he [sic] is the apprentice at the feet of the 
master... .The teacher is no less concerned with the student. The teacher is an 
artist, and artists have egos. The student is an extension of his ego. The student is 
the vessel he speaks through. The student is his puppet, his lump of clay to mold, 
the apostle to spread his word. He lavishes attention on promising students. The 
others sometimes feel ignored....The result of this is that relationships between 
the teachers and the students are filled with the tension and gratitude of the most 
troubled relationships between children and their parents and with the love and 
hate of the most tempestuous love affairs. (Kogan, 1987, p. 86)
The level of intensity Kogan describes is typical of relationships between music 
teachers and their students at the advanced level. The Juilliard School represents an 
extreme end of the spectrum in terms of the skill level required to get into the school and 
the view of what constitutes success. In this extreme form, however, it is easy to see the 
systems of value that shape the professional music education project. This value system 
pits students against each other and establishes ’’beating out the competition” as the 
highest priority. Part of what is so disturbing to me about this value system is the way 
the “value of music to life” is reduced to a competition only a few people will ever be
92 1 am referring here to instrumental/vocal instructors who teach one-on-one.
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able to win. It is interesting to reflect on philanthropist Andrew Carnegie’s reasons
for refusing Frank Damrosch’s request to fund the Juilliard School, at the turn of the
century, when the school was founded:
[Carnegie] thought that Damrosch would do more for music by spreading the love 
of music among “the people” than by establishing an expensive school for those 
who would become professionals. ...There can be music so finished as to rob it of 
feeling. The Great Musician, intense and wrought up in his calling, is very apt to 
miss what is really uplifting in music. There must be such character, but it is not 
such I wish to help....1 must not have anything to do with this venture because I 
doubt very much its success, and I don’t consider it the best work he can do for 
the spread of music in this country. (Kogan, 1987, pg. 4)
In Carnegie’s comments we see a perceived conflict between the values and needs of
professional musicians and members of a general public who might also wish to leam
music. The passages above reveal that there are different ideologies attached to music
education at the amateur and professional levels. This latter ideology contributes to high-
stakes relationships between teachers and students that merits greater analysis.
I identify the dynamics of these relationships as connected to an economic
environment that determines how many people can realistically make their living as
musicians and how many can be “stars” before stardom loses its value. This is an
economic environment in which competition ensures lower costs and keeps the value of a
few very high. The tragedy is that this external reality is so personalized. Failure to
succeed is construed as personal inadequacy with the burdens of this “failure” falling
entirely on the shoulders of the individual musician and the benefits accruing entirely to
the system.
Kogan describes Juilliard, this highest ranked of all music schools, as a viciously 
competitive institution where the need to “nurture a student’s development” is
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acknowledged, but where, in reality, the institution is a place of intense and relentless 
anxiety, fraught with highly charged and dangerous power dynamics between teachers 
and students. A single-minded view of life’s priorities is a prerequisite to survival (Kogan, 
1987), and people are valued almost exclusively according to their ability to perform. 
“Those worth knowing are on the top,” those who don’t play well are not worth knowing: 
“He’s a jerk.” “How do you know?” “He can’t play.” (Kogan, p. 13)
In light of these examples, my questions are as follows: First, is there a 
framework within which to critically examine the power dynamics in teacher/student 
relationships on a systemic level? Such an examination could include consideration of 
the impact of gender, race, class, sexual orientation and positions of non-conformity in 
the teacher/student relationship. Second, is there a critical framework within which the 
goals and objectives that shape university music studies can be considered? In other 
words, if the cultural environment has changed, do the goals and objectives of the 
institutions that prepare students to enter this environment need to be reconsidered? Does 
a new cultural environment imply different notions of what constitutes success?
For example, if the goal of the institution is to educate a large number of students 
in the hopes of creating a few star performers, composers, conductors, academics—those 
whose work will be acknowledged as valuable by large numbers of people—then a one- 
size-fits-all program makes sense. All students strive for the same ends, and those who 
do not achieve these ends need to accept that they have failed. Accompanied with the 
designation of failure these students are then advised either to go into teaching®® or to
®® The care and passion expressed in the work of the four “educators of music 
educators” explored here as well as the many wonderful, committed school music
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choose another career path altogether. In this model, individual achievement is the 
ultimate goal. The learning environment is intensely competitive, and even though music 
education (at the school level at least) is lauded as a place to leam how to work together 
to achieve shared goals, the imperative to compete accompanies every new skill 
developed.
In this section, I look at the work of Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen to see 
first, whether they offer a framework to explore the effect of power dynamics in 
teacher/student relations and second, whether each writer offers a framework in which 
the goals and objectives of faculties of music can be examined critically.
Positions expressed by philosophers of education
Each of the authors offers a detailed discussion of the purpose of music education 
and recommends approaches to pedagogy; however, their references to the effect of 
power dynamics on teacher-student relationships are minimal. Elliott and Regelski do 
not address the subject, although, in my view, Elliott’s advocacy of “induction” as the 
primary form of instmction leaves students without many opportunities to step outside of 
the mentor-student relationship. Reimer and Jorgensen both advocate teaching practices 
that encourage independent thinking. Jorgensen, in particular, provides a detailed 
analysis of different pedagogical approaches showing the philosophical underpinnings of
teachers in the field notwithstanding, there is still a tendency to consider music education 
as a lower-ranked career for people who can’t make it as full-time 
performers/composers/conductors. It is only necessary to be a student at a music school 
for a few weeks before it becomes apparent that there is a hierarchical order of value 
within music schools with performers ranked highly and music education students ranked 
at the bottom.
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these approaches and the socio-musical enterprises they support. She favours 
pedagogical approaches that encourage independent thinking in students.
Conclusions
All four of these writers have committed the greater part of their professional 
lives to considering questions of music pedagogy. That they do not directly address the 
questions I raise is not surprising as their projects concern the preparation of music 
educators, not music professionals generally. With this caveat in mind, I suggest that a 
discourse that allows the examination of relations of power and meaning-making between 
teachers and students, considered both philosophically and pedagogically, is lacking. 
Second, I suggest that a critical framework is necessary to explore the goals and 
objectives of faculties of education, again considering meaning and meaning-making as 
they occur within these environments. Such a critique might challenge the assumed 
values of music schools in a way that could benefit all participants—students and 
instructors alike.
Musicians as Cultural Producers
Issues
Artists have a imique role in society in that we present objects and/or events that 
take place in public and that are purported to carry inherent public importance/value. 
Advertising also takes place in public spaces and is, indeed, a form of cultural production; 
however, the creators of advertising generally do not invite people to set aside special 
time in order to experience their work. Artists, on the other hand, and musicians in 
particular, invite people to step out of their ordinary lives to participate in unique, 
embodied events.
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For the purpose of this thesis, I define “cultural producers” as people whose 
work, through the medium of their chosen art form, reflects and articulates the “attitudes, 
values, beliefs, modes of perception and habits of thought and activity”®'’ of various 
communities. This definition includes musicians as “producers of culture” and “music” as 
a particular “process or kind of activity that expresses and creates values”®® through the 
medium of sound. Musicians, in our role as cultural producers, have the means to 
generate values and ideas Avithin the context of “lived artistic experiences.” These lived 
artistic experiences translate into “life experiences,” shared, in some form, by all who 
participate in artistic events whether as audience or performers. According to Christopher 
Small, location, clothing, performance rituals, audience, choice of repertoire, style of 
advertising, relationships amongst the performers, and relationships between performers 
and audience, all contribute to the meaning of any particular musical event (Small, 1998, 
p. 10). Seen as “cultural producers,” musicians thus generate meaning not only through 
the music we choose to write or perform but also according to the manner in which we 
choose to present our work in public. Music education is also an important site of 
cultural production as articulated in the following passage: “If the process of learning is 
an essential characteristic of culture, then teaching also is a crucial characteristic. The 
way culture is taught and reproduced ... is itself an important component of culture”®^.
®'’ Blackburn, S. (1996). The Oxford Dictionary o f Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
®® McClary, S. (1991). Feminine endings. Music, gender, and sexuality. 
Miimeapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
®® Miraglia, E., Law, R., & Collins, P. What is Culture? (A Baseline Definition of 
Culture). Retrieved November 11, 2002, flrom Washington State University Virtual
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Leaving the audience aside for the time being®’—music educators and performers can 
be seen, clearly, to bear particular responsibility as cultural producers for the conscious 
and unconscious transmission of values.
The politics of cultural production are well-rehearsed in Canada, the home of 
French language laws and Canadian content regulations. Yet, as I attempt to show with 
my examples in this category, professional musicians frequently encoimter political 
dynamics through the course of their activities as cultural producers for which they are 
ill-prepared. I want to draw particular attention in this category to the political 
implications of being unprepared (or tmwilling) to rethink, let alone contest, conventional 
expectations of ourselves as people who generate meaning through the public-nature of 
our artistic work.
Two examples illustrate my concerns in this area. The first refers to a 
programming conflict, in which I was a participant which took place amongst members 
of a small ensemble. The conflict was over whether we should perform a humorous blues 
piece, written by a member of the group, that joked about the disappointment of a father 
who pays for his son to go to an Ivy league music school only to have him come home 
playing the blues. The piece was well written and funny (in a limited context) but, to my 
mind, was shamelessly indifferent to the history of blues music. I felt that the meaning 
we were generating by performing that particular piece denied the stark material
Campus: http://www.wsu.edu:8001/vcwsu/commons/topics/culture/culture-
defmition.html.
®’ Audiences also have a role in cultural production—the most glaring example 
being the selection process for Canadian/American “Idols;” however, I do not explore 
this further.
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differences between the way that particular cultural expression evolved (and the 
history and life experiences of the southern, poor Black people who created it) and the 
way that a well-heeled white boy could simply appropriate the art form without having to 
examine the relationship between his own material location and that represented by the 
blues. What the audience saw was five young white musicians wearing fine clothes, 
playing expensive instruments they learned in the process of gaining university degrees, 
making a joke by using an art form that originated in conditions of oppression. If the 
musicians were aware of the history of material conflict represented by the song and its 
performance, the audience as not apprised of their awareness.
The performance of this song generated a huge conflict in the group that quickly 
became personal. One of the reasons the conflict was so quickly redefined in personal 
terms is that we had no experience considering the broader significance of forms of 
cultural expression. We were meticulous about considering every aspect of our 
presentations: every member of the group was presented as an equal; every member 
spoke to the audience; we didn’t let our roles be defined by gender; we worked at 
breaking down the barriers between audience and performer and we chose music that we 
felt committed to in the hopes that what moved us would also move our audiences. In 
other words, we made conscious decisions about how we were creating culture according 
to the frames of reference with which we were familiar. Likewise, we could only make 
light of the material circumstances associated with the blues because we had not been 
affected by this history.
I use this conflict as an example, not to debate whether it was right or wrong to 
perform any particular piece but to highlight the need for musicians to have a framework
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that allows us to consider, critically, our relationship to the broader meanings 
embedded in musical/cultural forms. Such a framework needs to create a context within 
which it is possible to consider the relationships between social locations, the production 
and reception of cultural activities (who pays, who is paid, who attends) in our roles as 
cultural producers.
The second example goes back to an issue raised previously in the discussion of 
musicians as wage earners. Because we use public space to present our work, ihusicians’ 
labour has some measure of symbolic value. This raises issues about our need for, and 
connection to, sponsorship of various forms. When we accept sponsorship from tobacco 
companies for example, to what extent does our partnership act as an endorsement of 
tobacco products? This is not an academic question. The Montreal Jazz Festival has 
depended upon tobacco sponsorships for its existence and now, since tobacco advertising 
has been banned, they no longer have access to this support. The Festival has protested 
against the new law because they need the funding; however, by protesting the law, the 
Festival is effectively lobbying for the interests of the tobacco company — interests that 
have been shown to be a major cause of illness and death. Such contradictions appear to 
be built into every aspect of our work as musicians. It is difficult to argue in favor of 
ethical choices when one’s survival in at stake. What, then, are the ideologies that frame 
our cultural engagements and what are the material realities that shape our possibilities of 
engagement?
My questions are as follows: First, do the authors offer a critical framework in 
which to examine the “meanings” we generate through public events, including the 
“meanings” embedded in the music itself? Second, do the authors offer a critical
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framework to examine the ideologies that influence where, when, how, with whom, 
and to whom, we present our work?
Positions expressed by philosophers of edueation
Reimer argues that factors external to the music itself should not be seen as 
influencing the nature of a musical work. Thus, even though Reimer raises the issue that 
process and value are often in conflict within our commercial world, it is not easy to find 
a way in his work to establish a critical framework to address such issues.
Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen do identify music and music education as both 
reflecting and creating culture. They consider numerous factors that have an influence 
on the nature and meaning of musical events, including other musicians, listeners, critics, 
the time and place of a performance and the style of music performed. The notion that 
music can have multiple meanings depending on context is also consistent with their 
positions. Jorgensen identifies gender as expressed in and through music, social codes as 
manifested in different musical genres, music in its role as supporting values of the status 
quo, and music in its role as subverting the status quo (Jorgensen, 1997, pp. 41, 51). 
Jorgensen and Elliott include discussion of the two-way influences of religion, politics 
and commerce; however, neither author creates a framework from within which to 
examine, critically, the ideologies and influences that shape cultural events. Elliott and 
Jorgensen refer to these many factors in a descriptive maimer, showing how they 
contribute to the nature of music and how music contributes to the nature of society.
What I am seeking, however, is a framework that would enable us to contest our 
assumptions and uncover the ideologies that shape our views of what is valid and what is 
possible. Regelski attempts to establish an ethical framework with the idea that phronesis
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should govern our decisions; however, here, again, he does not tell us how we might 
recognize “right results” given that we have no means to analyze what is at stake in any 
particular setting.
Conclusions
Although Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen argue that music education should 
include the study of the various interrelationships between music and society, they do not 
create a space to examine the material locations of different musics and musicians or the 
ideologies that help create these material locations. Elliott and Jorgensen, in particular, 
acknowledge ideology as a factor reflected in the form and shape of music, but they stop 
at identifying what music “is.” In my view, we can grasp neither the influences that 
shape our lives as cultural producers nor our responsibilities as cultural producers without 
looking closely at the ways that materiality and manifestations of power and authority 
proscribe our choices.
Summary of Chapter and Final Comments
In this chapter, I have analyzed each author’s work in the context of roles 
representing places where music and politics intersect. My position is that the 
phenomenon of music and the lives we experience as professional musicians do not exist 
separate from the social, political and economic conditions that characterize our historical 
locations. There are material and ideological influences that organize our relations with 
other people and influence our knowledge and experience of different musics. Thus, my 
goal in this chapter has been to discover whether the viewpoints of these music education
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philosophers illuminate the issues or provide philosophical and educational contexts 
from within which it might be possible to explore these intersections of music and 
politics.
Although the rationale of the authors is different, what each author shares are 
convictions that music and music education are important to human development and that 
they lead to the fulfillment of humanist goals. With the exception of Jorgensen, however, 
I find that the authors locate themselves and their arguments within the world of music, 
without reference to the structural conditions that also shape our experiences. Elliott, for 
example, states that induction into multicultural music experiences will lead us to 
appreciate and accept difference. This appreciation, in turn, will contribute to a 
multicultural society based on equality^*. Elliott does, in fact, argue that we are in 
relationship with others; however, he limits his discussion to relationships that take place 
within musical communities and treats these relationships as a smorgasbord of musics 
available (ostensibly to all, in the same way and to the same extent) to provide growth 
opportunities for students. Elliott states that Canada represents a society that has 
multiculturalism as an ideal; however, he does not examine this ideal in relation to the 
actual relationships that define the terms of equality or inequality in Canadian society.
As a result, he leaves the impression that the ideal of multiculturalism is attainable simply 
by opening our minds to new experiences, suggesting in turn that cultural conflict is
Elliott, Reimer, and Regelski typically use the term ‘equality’ in its classic 
liberal sense, meaning ‘equality of opportunity.’ It asserts that equality before the law 
ensures that individuals are starting on a level playing field. A historical material 
analysis argues that this view ignores material/social conditions such as class, race and 
gender that filter and alter those opportunities for differently situated people even in the 
absence of legal discrimination.
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primarily an attitudinal problem. Attitudinal changes are important in the process of
bringing about social change; however, without acknowledging the material causes of
inequality, that is, the political realities of differently situated people’s lives, the language
of multiculturalism can serve to make unequal relationships invisible. In the following
passage, Peter McLaren argues that understanding cultural relations (multiculturalism)
also means recognizing social conflict.
Diversity that somehow constitutes itself as a harmonious ensemble of benign 
cultural spheres is a conservative and liberal model of multiculturalism that, in my 
mind, deserves to be jettisoned because, when we try to make culture an 
undisturbed space of harmony and agreement where social relations exist within 
cultural forms of uninterrupted accords we subscribe to a form of social amnesia 
in which we forget that all knowledge is forged in histories that are played out in 
the field of social antagonisms. (Peter McLaren as cited in hooks, 1994, p. 31)
Elliott’s framework does not suggest that understanding actual social relations, as 
opposed to idealized relations — is important to achieving the humanist values he 
ascribes to a multicultural music education. In my view, if we are to work towards a 
multicultural society in which all citizens are equal, we must first understand what is at 
stake and what interests have been and continue to be furthered through inequality. As 
Donald Macedo states, “one cannot teach conflict as if, all of a sudden, it fell from the 
sky. The conflict must be anchored in those completing histories and ideologies that 
generated the conflict in the first place” (Donald Macedo in Introduction to Freire, 2003, 
p. 24). Elliott’s framework does not explicitly exclude political discussion; but if study 
of other cultures is defined in musical or even cultural terms, without reference as well to 
political relations, it is arguably more likely to result in a kind of multicultural
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consumerism and/or colonization than a transformative experience in which social 
inequalities are addressed.
Regelski also leaves out the political in his consideration of the different functions 
and effects of music. He argues that exploring musics from different cultures fulfills 
important social needs and allows us to understand the various functions of music in 
making life special for human beings. His investigation focuses on the purposes that 
music can serve but is limited to a justification of music and music education and does 
not include reference to the material conditions that shape our relationships within and 
across cultural groups. He argues that recognizing the purposes that music serves in 
different cultural contexts will help achieve humanist goals but does not suggest how this 
recognition might serve to effect the changes required to meet these goals. For example, 
when exploring what purpose music serves in any given situation, one might also ask: 
“Who is served or not served by this music?” “What values are embraced and what 
values are rejected through this music/event?” If one is to understand the functions that 
music serves, one must be prepared to look beyond the actual “goods” or “right results” 
represented to ask whether the “goods in question” actually further humanist interests.
Bennett Reimer also believes that exploring music from different traditions will 
help achieve humanist goals; however, he argues that the value and meaning of musical 
works is unrelated to other cultural factors, thus reinforcing the concept that music 
transcends time and place. Music itself is understood to be neutral and, therefore, Reimer 
limits the exploration of musical meaning to strictly musical concepts. Reimer might 
well be in favour of addressing social inequality actively as some of his statements about 
the role of multicultural music education suggest. In fact, he argues that democratic
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principles should be central to music pedagogy practices; however, such an 
exploration would presumably have to take place outside of music study. For example, in 
Reimer’s framework, some classes might be devoted to exploring ethics, but, like 
questions about the cultural and historical context of musical practices, these questions 
would be treated as outside the purview of the music itself. Reimer’s framework thus 
precludes an exploration of the ways that musical genres, and the musical language found 
within them, reflect values and political location. Lutheran Chorales, Rap, Music of the 
Rococo and Bob Marley’s Reggae come to mind in this regard as forms of music that 
reflect values and political location in both their purpose and musical syntax that could 
only be examined as musical “works” within Reimer’s framework..
Reimer, Elliott and Regelski focus on the uniqueness of the nature of music 
within human enterprises. I think of this focus as the “view from the inside looking 
out.^^” Each author begins with a love of music and a conviction that music is important 
and then argues for its importance to the world outside of music. I believe this focus is 
due, at least in part, to the need to defend the existence of music education -  particularly 
in the work of Elliott and Regelski. Music does serve unique human functions; 
nevertheless, I believe that, music, as we experience it, comes to us as part of political, 
economic and social structures. These structures are acknowledged to different degrees 
within the frameworks created by Elliott, Regelski and Reimer but not in such a way as to 
encourage analysis of political location, material relations and their possible implications 
for professional musicians. Granted that analyzing these factors was not their project, I 
contend, nevertheless, that the liberal humanist framework underpinning their
99 This analogy is developed further in Chapter Four.
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philosophical arguments creates a conceptual barrier that, left uncontested, prevents 
us from considering the political and material factors that shape our lives as musicians.
Jorgensen develops a broader framework by encouraging musicians to consider 
the influence of a number of external structures. Her intent is both to identify the 
purposes that music serves and to establish a range of issues of significance for educators. 
Further, she encourages music educators to think of themselves as “artists” consciously 
making choices about approach and content as they create culture through their music 
education practices. Exploring our historical, economic and political locations and how 
these locations might influence our understanding of ourselves in relation to others—in 
musical and nonmusical capacities, is implicit in Jorgensen’s framework. Reimer does 
ask us to consider “why we do what we do” but he limits the range of consideration. 
Jorgensen’s framework is more satisfying in her argument that music teachers should see 
themselves as artists and thus take responsibility for making choices amongst elements of 
various spheres of musical influence and pedagogical practices. Jorgensen illuminates 
many factors that influence the nature of musical experiences and provides a context in 
which music educators can consider the larger social context of their work. This brings 
us closer to considering the political location of various aspects of musical experience. 
Nevertheless, although Jorgensen argues that teachers need to develop the capacity to 
think and act independently, her approach to spheres of musical validity tends to be 
descriptive. Each of the four authors discussed argues that music should not be seen as 
isolated from the rest of life. Nevertheless, there are significant aspects of our roles as 
cultural producers, musical workers, artists and members of communities that are not 
easily explored within their frameworks. In conventional music education, we leam to be
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musically literate; yet, rarely, do we investigate the structures that organize our 
relationships, not only with other musicians, but with other members of society. We 
leam about music qua music -  as an enterprise -  but we don’t know how this enterprise 
relates to other social institutions and we don’t explore how social, political and 
economic values are embedded in music itself. In my view, we need to acquire a 
consciousness of these structures and our location within them. I am looking, therefore, 
for analytical and educational approaches that will help us recognize relations of power in 
our roles as wage earners, artists, individuals functioning within larger communities, 
teachers and producers of cultural meaning.
Praxis as a Bridge to Critical Consciousness
Regelski and Elliott both use the term “praxis” to help redefine the nature of 
music and music education. They use an Aristotelian definition of “praxis;” however, 
there is an extensive body of twentieth century literature, known as critical theory (and 
critical pedagogy) that defines and interprets “praxis” differently. This second view of 
praxis, based, in part, on a Marxist definition of the word “praxis,” offers a possible 
framework for considering the political aspects of music education and musical practices. 
In the next chapter, I use the contrast between the two versions of praxis to introduce the 
concept of critical consciousness as a means to recognize and analyze relations of power.
Chapter Four begins with a comparison of Aristotelian and Marxian versions of 
“praxis” followed by an outline of the analytical tools that become available if we adopt 
the second view of praxis. By comparing Elliott and Regelski’s use of the term with its 
use by critical theorists, such as Paulo Freire, bell hooks, Maxine Greene and others, I am
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able to contrast the elements that are excluded from the one discussion and included 
in the other. Following this comparison, I look in greater detail at the literature of critical 
theory and critical pedagogy and outline at least some of the tools that are made available 
to develop critical consciousness.
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CHAPTER FOUR;
PRAXIS, CRITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND EDUCATION 
AS A SITE OF CONTESTATION
The following chapter begins with a comparison of the term praxis as used by 
music philosophers David Elliott and Thomas Regelski with praxis as it is used in the 
parallel disciplines of critical theory and critical pedagogy. In Elliott and Regelski’s view, 
praxis refers to a particular category of human activity; specifically, it refers to a form of 
knowledge, a form of thinking-doing. This view is drawn centrally from Aristotle. In the 
latter view, praxis also refers to a category of human activity—a form of thinking- 
doing—but this view emphasizes the integration of theory and practice—the materiality 
of thinking-action. This second view draws centrally upon a Marxist tradition of 
historical materialism. Most important for the purpose of this chapter, this second view 
of praxis invokes a critical approach to thinking-doing which I argue is not present in the 
Elliott-Regelski-Aristotle form of knowledge view.
Following my comparison of these two views of praxis, I look more closely at the 
disciplines of critical theory and critical pedagogy as they apply to general issues of 
education, examining premises, concepts and strategies developed within this body of 
work. At the close of this chapter, I propose weak, middle and strong arguments for 
integrating the principles of critical consciousness into educational practices. In Chapter 
Five I offer justifications specific to the field of professional music education.
The goal of this chapter is to identify the gaps between the two definitions of 
praxis and, further, to identify the questions that can be raised about educational practices
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if we pursue the analysis offered by the second definition of praxis and the disciplines 
of critical theory and critical pedagogy.
Part One: Praxis: Aristotle versus Marx
The term praxis, based upon an interpretation of the Aristotelian use of the term, 
is central to the arguments of music philosophers David Elliott and Thomas Regelski. In 
Aristotle’s writings, praxis is introduced as a particular form of knowledge that is one of 
a number of “excellences.” It is the “acquisition or transmission of excellences that is the 
‘problem of education’” (Frankena, 1965, p. 16). Aristotle distinguishes between 
knowledge that produces tangible objects and knowledge which is valuable for its own 
sake. In Aristotle’s writings,/jrnxw refers to “practical action, or “doing” (Frankena, 
William, 1965, pg. 26). This is in contrast to his concept of poesis, that is, “productive 
action” or “making,” where the object is to leam the “correct” way of creating a tangible 
product. With praxis, there is no single “right way” to accomplish a goal nor is there a 
fixed goal. With praxis, consideration of context and situatedness is intrinsic to the 
“excellence” of “doing.” “Doing has its value or excellence in itself.. .while making 
finds its worth entirely in that of its product. Both may be excellent, but the excellence of 
making is borrowed while that of doing is its own” (Frankena, 1965, p. 27)
Music-making does not result in tangible objects such as buildings or pieces of 
pottery and therefore it does not have “instrumental value”—it is not a form of poesis. 
Music as a form of “doing,” has intrinsic value. It falls into the category of praxis and
Frankena, W. K. (1965). Three historical philosophies o f education: Aristotle, 
Kant, Dewey. Chicago: Scott, Foresman.
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represents a type of knowledge, or an “excellence,” that is worth acquiring for its own
sake. Aristotle considers that music, as one of the “excellences,” is intrinsically good
and contributes to human happiness.
“The excellences come in and are to be cultivated if and because they are 
prerequisites of the good or happy life... Happiness is the ultimate goal of all 
human striving; it fulfills both of the conditions stated, and therefore it is the 
highest good”. (Frankena, 1965, p. 21)
David Elliott takes this Aristotelian definition of music almost verbatim. He uses 
it to define the nature of music and music education as a form of knowledge that is 
intrinsically valuable and, therefore, important to the education of all people. In Elliott’s 
words.
Among other things, this concept [praxis] contends that music making and music 
listening are unique forms of thinking and unique sources of the most important 
kinds of knowledge human beings can gain. "Hie reasoning that supports these 
propositions allows music educators to affirm to themselves and others that 
music—as a unique form of thinking and knowing—deserves a central place in 
the education of all people. (Elliott, 1995, p. 14)* *
Consistent with Aristotle’s argument for the value of “excellences,” Elliott claims that
music, as a unique form of “knowledge,” represents a human capacity that must be
developed in order to fulfill our human potential.
Music-making as praxis has essential qualities—each consisting of numerous
decision-making tasks. Elliott refers to musicers as “ethical practitioners,” that is, as
individuals who must make choices based on the relative merits of different possible
actions (Elliott, 1995, p. 14). When making musical decisions one must be aware of
*°* In this chapter I examine the authors’ work through the lens of historical 
materialism. Occasionally, I repeat a passage quoted earlier in the thesis to help the 
reader recall details and to point out the significance of certain passages in light of the 
alternative frame of reference introduced in this chapter.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
133
“standards, traditions, images and purposes” involved in any musical practice. Elliott 
writes:
Aristotle used praxis to mean informed and deliberative “doing-action” in which 
doers (as ethical practitioners) are not merely concerned with completing tasks 
correctly (techne), but with “right action”: enlightened, critical, and “situated” 
action. Praxis means action committed to achieving goals (telos) in relation to 
standards, traditions, images, and purposes (eidos) viewed as Ideals that are 
themselves open to renewal, reformulation, and improvement. Put another way, 
to act artistically as a music maker is to engage in music making and music 
listening (and MUSIC) as praxis. (Elliott, 1995, p. 69, author’s emphasis)
Elliott’s analysis is influenced by the historical fact that he is writing within the
context of having to defend music education as a subject important to the education of all
people. Within this particular context, praxis serves several important functions. First,
Elliott uses it to redefine the nature of music and music education in contrast to
definitions provided by writers within the “aesthetic” tradition such as Bennett Reimer
and Susanne Langer (Elliott, 1995, p. 28)*®^ . In Elliott’s view, aesthetic theorists
undermine the value of music education in people’s lives by defining music
“performance” as a skill or craft and music “listening” as a particular set of cognitive
functions that serve to educate “human feeling.”*®^ By defining music as a form of praxis,
Elliott supports his claim that music-making is neither a “skill” or “craft” nor the gateway
to understanding human subjectivity; rather, it is a fully integrated form o f ‘''knowledge
Reimer, B. (1989). A philosophy o f music education, 2nd Edition. Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall; Langer, Susanne K. (1976). Philosophy in a new key: a 
study in the symbolism o f reason, rite and art. 3'^ '^  Edition. Cambridge , Mass.: Harvard 
University Press.
The reader should note that these remarks are Elliott’s representation of the 
work of Reimer, not this writer’s.
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that partakes of consciousness as a whole (attention, cognition, emotion, intention, 
and memory)” (Elliott, 1995, p. 69, author’s emphasis).
Second, defined as a unique form of knowledge, music as praxis fits the 
requirements of the liberal humanist tradition of education. Elliott’s rationale for the 
inclusion of music as a form of knowledge is consistent both with the Aristotelian view 
of the value of the “excellences” and the view of liberal philosophers of education. One 
such author, R. S. Peters argues that developing a broad experience and understanding of 
different forms of intrinsic knowledge is vital to the development of educated citizens.
As a unique form of “intrinsic knowledge,” music represents a human capacity that must 
be developed in order to fulfill our human potential***^ . Elliott is drawing upon long­
standing justifications for prioritizing “intrinsic” values, that is, intrinsic knowledge, over 
the lesser values of “instrumental” or “extrinsic” knowledge.
Finally, Elliott claims that immersing ourselves in different musics has the 
additional virtue of helping us to understand ourselves “in relation to self and others”
Thus Elliott distinguishes his position from his aesthetic predecessors and also 
justifies the “new” statement in his book’s title, i.e.. Music Matters. A New Philosophy o f 
Music Education.
105
There is, however, another interpretation of 'liberal' which is closer to the point I 
have just been making about cognitive perspective. This is the plea that education 
should not be confined to specialist training. The individual, it is argued, should 
be trained in more than one form of knowledge ...so that he can grasp the 
historical perspective, social significance, or stylistic merit of his work and of 
much else besides, 'liberal' education requires that he should also be trained, to 
some degree at least, in such other ways of thinking (Peters, 1965, p. 101)
N.B.: Note the similarity between Peters’ argument and Saul’s premises in The
Unconscious Civilization. (Saul, 1995) See in particular pages 5, 164, 176.
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(Elliott, 1994, p. 14). For Elliott, knowledge of “others” leads to understanding and 
understanding leads to a “better world.” In Elliott’s model, immersion in different 
cultures through music (by definition: praxis^, will contribute towards the goals of 
multiculturalism and a society based upon equality and mutual respect (Elliott, 1995, 
207-208).
Thomas Regelski’s use of the term “praxis” is also based upon an Aristotelian
definition of the word. His purpose in using the term is to analyze and describe what
music “does,” to show how it contributes to “Being human” and, once again to justify the
importance of maintaining music education programs.
In a praxial view, all music is “functional” in some respect. Musical process- 
values may provide the primary occasion for a particular social or individual 
praxis but the pragmatic benefits of that praxis are never strictly musical. They are 
always partly existential in contributing to the actions of human beings Being 
human. (Regelski, 1997, p. 45)
Regelski advocates praxis as an analytical tool to understand the “value of music”
in relation to “life and the specific conditions of its use” (Regelski, 1997, p. 44). Music
and music education, he claims, are “primary avenues for Becoming more fully alive or
enlivened by the fullness life has to offer beyond merely surviving” (Regelski, 1997, p.
44). Music offers enriching life experiences unavailable in any other medium and is,
therefore, an important component in the education of all people. Here, it is possible to
trace, again, Aristotle’s view of the excellences contributing to happiness or the good life.
Regelski also emphasizes an ethical component in his definition of praxis:
Praxis is governed by the kind of ‘doing’ called phronesis—an ethical knowledge 
of and for achieving ‘right results’ judged in terms of actual benefits for one’s self 
or for others. Thus, praxis is centrally concerned with the critical and rational 
knowledge of both means and ends needed to bring about ‘right results’ for
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/7eoj9/e....Praxis...involves judgments concerning the ‘goodness’ of such
goals and ends in the first place. (Regelski, 1998, p. 28)
In my view, one of the primary functions and accomplishments of Regelski’s 
arguments is its contestation of the place of musical “virtuosity” as the primary way of 
assessing musical “goodness” or “value.” His work provides an important challenge to 
the tendency of classical musicians to see virtuosity as the measure of a musician’s or 
person’s worth. Regelski’s project is to justify and find ways to “get all students into 
action musically” (Regelski, 1997, p. 45). The responsibility of music educators is to 
facilitate this engagement, recognizing that musical goods come in a variety of forms.
The Marxist use of the term “praxis” is profoundly different from that of Elliott 
and Regelski. Music, as any other form of knowledge, is examined “critically” in light of 
its materiality, both in historic and contemporary contexts. Marx’s use of the term*°  ^is 
the basis for a body of literature known as critical theory and critical pedagogy. This 
literature defines praxis as: “action and reflection upon the world in order to transform 
it” (Freire, 1990, p. 36). Education, which has the capacity equally to indoctrinate 
learners into particular value systems or to empower learners to participate in changing 
dominating relations to non-dominating ones, has a particularly important role in 
developing critiques of relations and the discourses that surround them. Inequality, 
according to critical theorists, has historical roots and is reinforced through structural, 
legal, social and economic means. Further, there are winners and losers in unequal 
relationships/systems and this inevitably means that there are vested interests in
Hegel’s use of praxis pre-dates Marx. I begin my references with Marx 
however, as his work is the starting point for many of the ideas developed in the literature 
of critical theory.
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maintaining particular views of the world and differently valued categories of human 
beings*®’. Correspondingly, the purpose of critical theory and critical pedagogy is not 
merely to observe or describe relationships but to participate in changing the material 
conditions that perpetuate relations of domination and oppression. Music, through a 
Marxist or historical materialist lens, then, would be examined critically in light of its 
materiality*®*.
Praxis, as used by Marx and later critical theorists*®® refers to an epistemological 
relationship between theory and action that is linked, necessarily, to change in the 
material conditions of inequality. There is a gap between the Aristotelian view of praxis 
and critical thought and action. Aristotle connects ideas with action and situates them 
within specific contexts, but does not address their materiality. Likewise, experiencing 
other cultures and learning to tolerate and accept difference, without exploring and 
altering the dynamics of power, will not create equality. If greater equality through social
*®’ Marx’s identification of the importance of these concrete manifestations of 
vested interest and inequality, and his analysis of the social relations that reproduce them, 
is the basis for labeling his form of critical analysis historical materialism.
*®* As I draw upon feminist, anti-racist and post-colonial accounts of historical 
materialist praxis in this chapter, I will use the more generic reference, to “historical 
materialism,” rather than the term “Marxist praxis,” through the remainder of the thesis.
*®® For example, Wallerstein, N. (1987). Problem-posing education: Freire's 
method for transformation. In I. Shor (Ed.), Freire for the Classroom (pp. 33-44). 
Portsmouth, NH: Boynton/Cook Publishers; Ayers, W. C., & Miller Janet L. (Eds.)
(1998). A light in dark times. New York; Teachers College Press, Columbia University; 
Shor, I. (1980). Critical Thinking and Everyday Life. Montreal: Black Rose Books; hooks, 
b. (1994). Teaching to transgress. Education as the practice o f freedom. New York: 
Routledge; Freire, P. (2003). Pedagogy o f the Oppressed. New York, London:
Continuum; Freire, P. (1994). Pedagogy o f hope. New York: Continuum.
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change is to be achieved, ideas must be integrated with action and both must be
examined “in relation to,” and from the vantage point of, historical material factors.
The notion that human beings can remake the world is central to the historical
materialist concept of praxis. Praxis, in this context, refers to forms of knowledge as
neither fixed nor absolute; rather, praxial knowledge is bom of human relations, situated
within historical context and relations of power.
If we take knowledge to be generated within praxis in a world that is created by 
the historical presence of human beings, then it cannot be abstracted from human 
action and treated as a reified, fixed object that can be transferred from one being 
to another, given by one human to another or provided by one to be consumed by 
another. (Allman & Wallis, 1990, p. 22)
Allman and Wallis, here, are not suggesting that knowledge is a fiction, but that it 
is embedded within assumptions that can be difficult to recognize or analyze because we 
are living these practices and relations in the present—without the benefit of historical 
distance and critical analysis. For critical theorists, praxis entails questioning the bases of 
our knowledge. “Acknowledging the genesis of knowledge from historically located 
praxis enables us to recognize forms of understanding as potentially problematic, and this 
requires critical analysis to test their validity and to seek further or deeper insights” 
(Allman & Wallis, 1990, p. 21). With Aristotle, praxis is used to describe the nature or 
“virtue” (excellence) of a thing. In historical materialism, praxis refers to a process in 
which one works towards understanding one’s present-day historical context in order to 
locate oneself within a myriad of social relations —including relations of power—and 
work towards creating new sets of relations. This 20* century use of praxis thus differs 
substantially from the Aristotelian version of the term. In Marx’s words, “Philosophers
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have only interpreted the world in different ways; the point, however, is to change it” 
(Marx as quoted in Allman & Wallis, 1990, p. 15).
In the Aristotelian sense, praxis refers to the nature of the thing itself (i.e. music). 
To be “situated” as Elliott uses the term, is to be located within a series of more or less 
equal relationships between different cultural practices. Local musics, then, can be 
appreciated for their distinctive manifestations of musical excellences. Nonetheless, 
these disparate, culturally specific musical excellences are recognized as equal in 
philosophical terms, because each belongs to the “category” of music. Musical 
excellences are, categorically speaking, interchangeable.
To be “situated,” according to critical theorists, on the other hand, means to locate 
different knowledges (musics) and knowers (musicers) * *® within historical, material, 
social and political contexts. In this sense, music, or any other subject area cannot be 
reduced only to an “essence” or category of being. Knowledge is the result of 
historical/social and political forces—of human action—and therefore cannot be 
“essentialized” or “objectified”— that is, seen as of a fixed nature (that is essentially 
good). Praxis, then, in the historical materialist sense, refers to a view in which premises
**® Some contemporary criticisms go so far as to contest the power relations 
effected by the processes by which we create ourselves as subjects. See especially 
Foucault, M. (1988). The political technology of individuals. In L. Martin, H. Gutman & 
P. Hutton (Eds.), Technologies o f the self A seminar with Michel Foucault (pp. 145-162). 
Boston: The University of Massachusetts Press. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
explore postmodern theory; however, postmodern criticism would undoubtedly 
contribute to developing critical consciousness. An example is the question of how we 
constitute our identities as “musicians.” Exploring postmodernism in relation to the five 
categories of musical life is a project for a future date.
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are constantly reevaluated in light of changing conditions and changing 
understandings of changing conditions***.
Aristotle does not consider power relations, material relations or oppression in his 
discussion about the topics that should be included in the education of citizens. Similarly, 
neither Elliott nor Regelski consider such factors, although they both argue that music 
education can lead to better social relations. A best case view of this position is that it 
reflects a naivete, based on the assumption that good intentions, as evidenced through an 
openness to experience other cultures, can resolve human conflict. A less charitable view 
is that limiting one’s view to the “essential” qualities of music masks the political, 
preserves the status quo and allows those with privilege to maintain their privilege 
without guilt. While it is true that shared projects (as suggested by Elliott) can build 
community, a historical materialist analysis maintains that fundamental inequalities will 
not change without identifying and changing the structures that enforce/inscribe 
inequality.
Elliott and Regelski use the Aristotelian version of praxis to define the nature of 
music and music education and as a means to justify the importance of both in general 
education. I believe that part of the weakness of this viewpoint is that it reflects what I 
term “a view from the inside.” This is a viewpoint located from within the field of music 
that is used to justify music education to an “outside” world that does not always accept 
music as an important subject area for general study. Because the focus is on the 
essential “goodness” of music in all its myriad forms, there is no necessity to consider 
who is included or excluded from different musical/social practices and what relevance
*** Unusual wording is used to emphasize epistemology.
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this might have to the pursuit of social equality. In the Aristotelian context,
“goodness” will come to someone’s life as a result of engaging in the excellence that is 
“music.”
Elliott and Regelski take this concept of “goodness” further by arguing that 
understanding and appreciating different cultural contexts and different musical goods 
will lead to better human relations. Elliott posits that his praxial approach to music 
education — that includes broadening one’s experience to understand different musical 
cultures — will lead to social equality. Equality, in Elliott’s frame of reference, is the 
result of tolerance, understanding and interaction with different cultural groups; however, 
this position ignores the realities of race and class struggles and the ways that music and 
culture are manifested in the lives and practices of people situated in vastly different 
material contexts. Elliott, himself, states that culture is not “neutral territory” (Elliott, 
1995, p. 91); yet he does not consider his comment in light of material relations. Simply 
engaging in others’ musics will not alter these material positions; in fact, the engagement 
may encourage an attitude of ownership and entitlement to other people’s cultures that 
reinforces positions of dominance. Anti-racist activists**’ have long criticized the 
concept of multiculturalism as a government-initiated project of “containment” designed 
to make the state’s role seem benign while obfuscating material realities. The neutrality 
of engagement with other cultures is also contested in contexts of cultural
**’ Carty, L., & Brand, D. (1993). Visible Minority Women: A Creation of the 
Canadian State. In H. Bannerji (Ed.), Returning the Gaze: Essays on Racism, Feminism 
and Politics (pp. 169-181). Toronto: Sister Vision Press.
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appropriation***— an issue of particular importance to students learning the music 
and traditions of different cultures.
Both Elliott and Regelski use the term praxis in order to talk about music as 
something that is understood as being “in relation to” various cultural practices and needs. 
The limitation that is present with the use of the Aristotelian version of praxis is that it 
limits the kind of relationships that are examined to ones that are musical. This “view 
from the inside” is based upon exploring the nature of music “as music,” a nature, as 
already noted in Chapter Three, that is valued, in particular, because of its uniqueness in 
the human enterprise. Praxis, as used by Paulo Freire and other critical theorists, is based 
upon looking critically at what one does and attempting to see oneself “in relation to” 
one’s historical, political, social, and cultural locations — with a comprehension of how 
society works (Freire, 1994, p. 133). I characterize this perspective as the “view from 
the outside.” What interests me in particular about the Freirean use of praxis is its 
acknowledgement of the political in shaping both knowledge and relationships. Paulo 
Freire and other critical theorists begin from the assumption that no relationship is neutral. 
We are enmeshed in relations of power — whether or not we are conscious of our 
locations within such relations. Equality is only achievable by first “stepping back” and 
“disposing ourselves to know about” our lives and work, within a critical framework 
(Freire, 1994, p. 98). Critical theorists argue that locating oneself and others, politically.
*** Hatzis, C. (1999, January). Footprints in new snow: Postmodernism or 
cultural appropriation (Revised Transcript of Lecture Sound Symposium, St. John's, 
Newfoundland). Retrieved 27.07.04, from 
http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/~chatzis/footpaper.htm.
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is necessary to the development of any theory intended to bring about social equality. 
From this perspective it would not be sufficient to compare the artistic, musical or social 
characteristics of different cultures or even to immerse oneself into different cultures to 
bring about an equality-based multicultural society**"*. What would be required would be 
to look within and beyond any particular subject area or body of knowledge. One looks 
within to critically examine the discourse itself — and one looks without to see how the 
practice of that area of knowledge or culture is situated within a larger context, including 
historical and contemporary relations of power.
This second definition of praxis opens up questions about education in general, 
and music education in particular, that are not easily considered within the frame of 
reference established by Elliott and Regelski***. Based on historical materialism, the 
disciplines of critical theory and critical pedagogy offer a means to locate ourselves 
politically, broaden our viewpoint and make informed decisions about how we participate
* *"* Arguably, in Canada we live in a multicultural, pluralist society; however, this 
in itself, tells us nothing about the political/economic relations between different groups 
of people. I add “equality-based” above to identify a kind of multiculturalism that is 
attentive to material and political relations. For example. First Nations peoples do not 
have social, economic or legal equality with most Canadians. Housemaids brought in 
fi"om Caribbean countries have limited rights and limited access to legal support in cases 
of abuse. Sources: Calliste, Agnes (1991): Canada's immigration policy and domestics 
from the Caribbean: the second Domestic Scheme. In: Race, Class, Gender: Bonds and 
Barriers. 2nd ed. (Eds: Vorst, J et al.) Garamond Press, Toronto, 136-168, and, Hutchings,
C. Canada’s First Nations: A Legacy o f Institutional Racism. Retrieved 30.07.04, from 
http://www.tolerance.cz/courses/papers/hutchin.htm.
*** Reimer and Jorgensen—to different degrees—also leave us without sufficient 
connection to the questions raised by the Marxist view of praxis and our connectedness to 
material relations. I will come back to Reimer and Jorgensen in Chapter Five. I have 
approached the subject in this way—through the contrasting definitions of praxis— 
because this is the way I first identified the absence of questions about material relations 
in the works of philosophers of music education.
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in the world. They offer a different strategy for looking at the world and looking at 
the potential of education. Critical theorists argue that adopting praxis, in the Marxian 
sense, is necessary, if we are to move beyond replicating culture “in the absence of 
critical choice” (Allman & Wallis, 1990, p. 14).
In Part Two of this chapter, I examine the disciplines of critical theory and critical 
pedagogy, the related concepts of eonscientization, problematization, and dialogieal 
method, amongst others, and explore how developing “critical consciousness” relates to 
education in general.
Part Two: A View from the Outside: Critical Theory, Critical Pedagogy* and
Critical Consciousness.
“Culture is a contested domain that provides no escape from the challenge to identify 
its “negativities” and “positivities” (Freire, 1994b, p. 107) in order to construct 
bulwarks of resistance to dehumanization as well as construct the grounds for self- 
determination." (Glass, 2001, p. 22)**^
The literatures of critical theory and critical pedagogy offer a means to analyze 
relations of power in society. Associated with liberatory and social justice movements, 
the parallel disciplines of critical theory and critical pedagogy have their roots in the 
work of Karl Marx and Paulo Freire and are primarily concerned with exploring and 
acting upon relations of power with the goals of achieving greater democracy and
** ^ Critical pedagogy looks specifically at how one comes to acquire a critical 
perspective on one’s political location and how pedagogical approaches contribute to or 
militate against developing the ability to be self-determining within the constraints of 
material reality. Critical theory analyses specific disciplines, for example, art, science, 
business, and considers how to apply the concepts of critical pedagogy within specific 
learning contexts.
**’ Glass, R.D. (2001, March). On Paulo Freire’s philosophy of praxis and the 
foundations of liberation education. Educational Researcher, 30 (2), 15-25.
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replacing oppressive relations with non-dominating relations. To achieve these goals, 
critical theorists argue that we must become conscious of our capacity to effect social 
transformation by developing critical consciousness, joined by meaningful praxis.*** 
Critical consciousness and praxis are conceived as a continual evolution and interaction 
of ideas, action and reflection.
Critical theory and critical pedagogy seek to facilitate a shift in how people 
conceive of themselves. This shift involves changing one’s self-concept from being an 
“object” of history to being a “subject.” This requires, first, a recognition of oneself as a 
subject — one who labours and who makes choices about the role one undertakes within 
history — and, second, as one who is subject to historical material conditions and 
relations.**  ^ With such a shift in consciousness we move from being passive spectators 
of contemporary relations (while nevertheless being “subject to” such relations) to 
becoming informed and active participants in changing those relations. “Men and 
women develop their power to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with 
which and in which they find themselves; they come to see the world not as a static 
reality but as a reality in the process of transformation” (Freire, 2003, p. 12).
The goal of this critical praxis is not to make arbitrary shifts in social and 
economic relations that simply move power from one group to another; rather, the goal is 
to participate in a continual transformation of society into one that is more democratic
*** 1 am paraphrasing bell hooks here, hooks, b. (1994). Teaching to transgress. 
Education as the practice o f freedom. New York: Routledge, p. 47.
**® See also Foucault, M. (2000). The Subject and Power (R. Hurley, Trans.). In J.
D. Faubion (Ed.), Essential Works o f Foucault 1954-1984. Vol. 3: Power (pp. 326-348 [p. 
331]). New York: The New Press (Original work published 1994).
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and equitable. Critical theorists attempt to recognize where oppression takes place
and to change the structures of society in order to reject relations of oppression and
dominance. The guiding vision of critical theory as articulated by Paulo Freire is “to
imagine a world that is less ugly, more beautiful, less discriminatory, more democratic,
less dehumanizing, and more humane” (Freire, 2003, p. 25).
The literatures of critical theory and critical pedagogy develop a set of analytical
tools based on principles of historical materialism that can be used to examine how our
own activities, within different disciplines and aspects of our lives, reflect, reinforce or
serve to alter our political locations. The literature of critical pedagogy looks
specifically at teaching and learning practices and how pedagogical approaches
contribute to or militate against developing not only a critical perspective on one’s
political location but the confidence and conviction to act upon this knowledge.
Importantly, critical pedagogy does not bypass or water down the knowledge base of any
discipline. On the contrary, tools, techniques and strategies, that is, the knowledge that
students need to function successfully at a professional level within any discipline, are
essential to critical pedagogy. Freire explains:
It is imthinkable for a teacher to be in charge of a class without providing students 
with material relevant to the discipline. But if both a progressive and a 
reactionary are equal in their obligation to teach, if both agree that it is 
unthinkable to be a teacher without teaching, nevertheless they will differ with 
regard to their understanding of what teaching really is. They will differ in their 
practice, in the way they teach. Professional competence, command of a subject 
or discipline, is never understood by the progressive teacher as something neutral. 
There is no such thing as a category called “professional competence” all by itself. 
We must always ask ourselves: In favor of whom and of what do we use our 
technical competence? (Freire, 1987, p. 211)*^ **
Shor, I., & Freire, P. (1987). A Pedagogy for liberation. South Hadley, MA:
Bergin & Garvey.
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A fundamental difference between traditional approaches to knowledge and
critical pedagogy is that critical pedagogy includes analysis on the part of teacher and
student together, of the meanings embedded within discourses, practices, and taken-for-
granted assumptions pertaining to any given field. Critical theory and critical pedagogy
ask us to step back from the preoccupations of our disciplines and to gain a view firom the
“outside” to understand the context of the work that we do, to recognize our relations
with the world and gain the means to participate in the larger project of humanizing*^*
our social and political relations.
Recognizing our relatedness is a key element in the work of critical theory and
critical pedagogy. The need to discover one’s historical and political location in order to
act upon this knowledge is, importantly, not based upon the classical liberal notion of
individual autonomy and choice—the notion of the self-made person. On the contrary,
critical theorists argue that in order to understand what possibilities lie before us we must
first understand our shared circumstances in order to recognize the possibilities of
constructing, together with others, a more democratic and equitable set of relations.
Education as the practice of freedom — as opposed to education as the practice of 
domination — denies that man is abstract, isolated, independent, and unattached 
to the world; it also denies that the world exists as a reality apart from people. 
Authentic reflection considers neither abstract man nor the world without people, 
but people in their relations with the world. (Freire, 2003, p. 81)
Premises of Critical Theory and Critical Pedagogy
Several premises underpin the disciplines of critical theory and critical pedagogy:
*^* “But while both humanization and dehumanization are real alternatives, only 
the first is the people’s vocation. This vocation is constantly negated, yet it is affirmed 
by that very negation.” (Freire, 2003, p.43)
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1) Human relations are created by humans and can be changed by humans;
2) Knowledge is the result of dialectical forces;
3) Forms of knowledge are contestable and ideology functions to mask and 
justify political relations;
4) Education, as a site of culture, is not neutral.
I delineate each of these premises briefly below.
Human relations are created by humans and can be changed by humans
As human beings, we are continually in the process of creating our own history,
our own culture. “Objective social reality exists not by chance, but as the product of
human action” (Freire, 2003, p. 51). Freire elaborates on this concept below:
It is as transforming and creative beings that humans, in their permanent relations 
with reality, produce not only material goods—tangible objects—but also social 
institutions, ideas, and concepts. Through their continuing praxis, men and 
women simultaneously create history and become historical-social beings. (Freire, 
2003, pg. 101)
Freire’s premise is that we can change our social relations if we recognize that 
they are human creations, open to critical analysis and change if we engage in praxis. 
Praxis in this context, as historical materialism, requires that we look beyond surface 
appearances to imderstand what material conditions have led to contemporary 
relationships. For example, if black people are not succeeding in North American society, 
the “fault” might be (and often is attributed to) a flaw in the character of blacks: they are 
lacking in “gumption.” This is an explanation that might be allowed to stand based on a 
superficial analysis of a contemporary situation. A historical materialist analysis, on the 
other hand, would investigate past material conditions to understand how current 
conditions have come into being. Extreme wealth was generated for a white ruling-elass
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through black labour. The development of a white middle-class was, in part, a 
function of the slave economy*^ .^ These economic relationships, generated during a 
particular form of economic production, continue to influence and shape where people 
are positioned within contemporary material and social relationships. Those with wealth, 
for example, did not lose what had been accumulated after manumission,*^^ and their 
position today is still one of economic and social advantage. The task of historical 
materialist analysis, is then, to determine what conditions have led to the particular shape 
of current relations and to identify more just and equitable outcomes. This sense of 
locating oneself in history and then thinking-doing—i.e., theorizing and inserting oneself 
into contemporary struggles to bring about positive change is what Freire means by the 
term “praxis.”
Knowledge is the result of dialectical forces
Critical theorists argue that while some kinds of knowledge may appear to be 
immutable, our approach and understanding of various knowledges are shaped by 
dialectical tensions.
[Marx] understood that the truth or the principal of change in our social world 
was based on the movement and development of dialectic contradictions. A 
dialectic contradiction, or relations, is a unity of two opposites which are 
internally related such that neither could exist as it presently does outside its 
relation to the other. (Allman & Wallis, 1990, p. 15)
122 Davis, A. (1981). Women, race and class. New York
*^  ^ Manumission: “The act of manumitting, or of liberating a slave from 
bondage.” (Definition of Manumission. Retrieved 17.08.04, from Webster's Revised 
Unabridged Dictionary: http://www.wordiq.com/dictionary/Manumission).
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By first acknowledging that knowledge is shaped by dialectical forces, we can then
focus our efforts on unveiling what forces might be at play in shaping our understanding.
At the very least, we gain the capacity to question our assumptions.
Acknowledging the genesis of knowledge from historically located praxis 
enables us to recognize forms of understanding as potentially problematic, and 
this requires critical analysis to test their validity and to seek further or deeper 
insights. (Allman & Wallis, 1990, p. 21)
Aeeording to eritical theorists, when we do not consider the possibility that 
knowledge and social relations are shaped by conflicting material interests and the 
dialectical tensions they produce, we “tend to reproduce them [these relations] even when 
we engage in resistance” (Allman & Wallis, 1990, p. 21). Thus, both pressures for and 
against certain relations (class or gender relations for instance) actually preserve the 
status quo. Locked in an established opposition, we are blinded from seeing other 
possibilities. The concept of “dialectical tension” suggests that we must find ways to 
challenge our most fundamental premises—those that seem on the surface to be “given.” 
The term “dialectical tensions” refers to contradictions that are the result of 
material conditions. For example, in the 1980’s, the women’s movement in North 
America was largely defined by the “Pro-choice” issue—framed as the right to free and 
legal abortions. Resistance came from members of society who did not agree with this 
premise; however, the most significant challenge to the agenda of the women’s 
movement came from activist women of colour and First Nations women. For women of 
colour (particularly in the United States) and First Nations women, reproductive “choice” 
was about the right not to be forcibly sterilized. As marginalized women fought to bring 
this issue to the foreground, it became apparent that the issue of “Choice,” as it had been
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
151
framed by the mainstream women’s movement, served the interests primarily of 
white middle-class women. The movement that claimed to represent all women only 
represented the interests of a particular, historically-located, group of women. This group, 
because of social and economic privilege—again the consequences of historical material 
conditions—had greater access to resources and “voice” than other less privileged groups 
of women. As people came to recognize these contradictions, activists of all 
backgrounds were forced to reconsider their goals and their actions in light of these 
material realities.
If we are located within dehumanizing social relations, engaged in reproductive 
rather than eritical praxis and without a thorough grasp of the dialectical nature of 
our reality, it is likely that our understanding may at best be partial and 
fragmented. (Freire in Allman & Wallis, 1990, p. 21)
Thus, acknowledging dialectical tensions leads to new directions, to new formulations 
and to change. As we recognize the existence of dialectical tensions, it becomes an on­
going challenge to imagine possibilities that don’t yet exist, even as we engage in 
developing critiques of our current situations.
Forms of knowledge are contestable and ideology functions to mask and 
justify political relations
In addition to the concept of dialectical tension, critique as an approach to 
investigation assumes that we live within and are surrounded by ideologies that need to 
be analyzed in order, first, to discern their relationships to people’s lived experiences, and 
second, to recognize the interests that they serve. According to theorist Antonio Gramsci, 
our “common sense” beliefs tend to reflect the interests of those with the most power in 
society. Named as “hegemony,” “common sense,” in this case refers to a dominant 
ideological framework that so permeates a culture it is perceived as a “given”.
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Hegemony in this sense might be defined as an 'organising principle' that is 
diffiised by the process of socialisation into every area of daily life. To the extent 
that this prevailing consciousness is internalised by the population it becomes part 
of what is generally called 'common sense' so that the philosophy, culture and 
morality of the ruling elite comes to appear as the natural order of things. (Smith,
1999)124
Critical theory is devoted to unraveling different social narratives in an attempt to 
understand the elements that influence social, economic and political relations; to 
recognize competing ideologies and their relationships to lived experience and to 
recognize who benefits and who doesn’t according to the terms of different narratives. 
Recognizing the existence of hegemonic discourses challenges us to contest where our 
definitions come from. It challenges us to ask who is included and who is excluded from 
any particular discourse and to recognize that dominant discourses tend to support and 
justify existing power structures, making these structures appear to be part of a natural 
order. The concept of hegemony also shows us that our positions are not innocent. 
Whether or not we are conscious of our political locations, our positions reflect and 
reinforce value systems and thus reinforce our places within those systems.
Mark K. Smith. (1999, February). Antonio Gramsei. In (Prepared by Barry 
Burke, Ed.) The encyclopedia o f informal education. Retrieved 7/9/03, from infed.org: 
http://www.infed.org/thinkers/et-gram.htm. (Re: Ideological Hegemony)
125 term "ideology" is seen as referring simply to a system of ideas and
beliefs. However, it is closely tied to the concept of power Anthony Giddens.. .defines
ideology as "shared ideas or beliefs which serve to justify the interests of dominant 
groups" [Giddens 1997 p583] Its relationship to power is that it legitimizes the 
differential power that groups hold and as such it distorts the real situation that people 
find themselves in.” (Mark K. Smith. (1999, February). Antonio Gramsci. In (Prepared 
by Barry Burke, Ed.) The encyclopedia o f informal education. Retrieved 7/9/03, from 
infed.org: http://www.infed.org/thinkers/et-gram.htm.)
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Education, as a site of culture, is not neutral.
Curricula and pedagogical practices are related. In critical pedagogy, “education
is conceived of as being intimately tied to the power structures in society.” The “broader
politics of social transformation” and the “power dynamics involved in the teaching-
leaming process itself’ (Mayo, 1994, p. 24)*^  ^are central concerns of critical pedagogy.
Education is not neutral territory where objective facts are transferred from
teachers to students. On the contrary, all education represents particular values and belief
systems. These values are reflected in what is considered appropriate and what is
considered “irrelevant” in terms of content, in the kind of relationships established by
teachers within learning settings, and, in pedagogical strategies. According to Freire,
There is no such thing as a neutral education process. Education either functions 
as an instrument which is used to facilitate the integration of the younger 
generation into the logic of the present system £ind bring about conformity to it, or 
it becomes “the practice of freedom,” the means by which men and women deal 
critically and creatively with reality and discover how to participate in the 
transformation of their world. (Shaull, in Introduction to Freire, 2003, p. 34)
Education can be domesticating; it can be radical, it can fall somewhere in between these
polarities, but all education reflects certain kinds of relations. Pedagogical practices per
se also function to create culture thus serving to challenge or reinforce certain kinds of
values and relationships. The music education philosophers discussed earlier in this
thesis argue for the importance of recognizing teaching as a site of cultural creation. The
defining characteristic of the disciplines of eritical theory and critical pedagogy, however,
is that pedagogical practices are clearly identified as having “political” implications.
Mayo, P. (1994, November). A comparative analysis of the ideas of Gramsci 
and Freire from an adult education perspective. Canadian Journal for the Study o f Adult 
Education, 8(2), 1 - 28.
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Education, as a form of culture, is not something we experience apart from political,
economic and social considerations. The political is a part of our experience of culture
and is as far-reaching as any other component of our education.
[Educational practices] all have a form and a context that relate to power in 
society, that construct one kind of society or another, and they all have social 
relations in the classroom that confirm or challenge domination. (Ira Shor in Shor 
& Freire, 1987, p. 12)
Teachers and educational institutions often argue that what they are presenting is 
a neutral education; however, critical theory suggests that neutrality is a potentially 
dangerous fiction. Neutrality, seen in light of Gramsci’s critique of hegemony, indicates 
an unquestioned acceptance of whatever values currently prevail. Freire discusses this 
notion below:
Neutrality is just following the crowd. Neutrality is just being what the system 
asks us to be.
Neutrality is the best way for one to hide his or her choice, you see. If you are not 
interested in proclaiming your choices, then you have to say that you are neutral. 
(Horton and Freire in Collins, 2001, p. 98)* ’^
Thus neutrality represents an acceptance and tacit promotion of the status quo. Critical
pedagogy challenges us to consider our pedagogical practices in light of their political
impact and their roles in creating culture and creating the values and terms by which we
live.
Tools of Critical Pedagogy
In the preceding section, I described the premises that underlie both critical theory 
and critical pedagogy. In the following section, I look specifically at one of the principal
Collins, C. (2001). Developing critical consciousness: A personal reflection. 
Canadian Journal for the Study o f Adult Education, 75(1), 88-103.
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goals of critical pedagogy; that is, developing critical consciousness. I follow this 
with an explanation of two approaches or tools, “problematization” and “dialogieal 
method” which Freire recommends to develop critical consciousness and to lay the 
groundwork for praxis seen as a continuai evolution and interaction of ideas, action and 
reflection.
Critical Consciousness
Critical consciousness refers to an engaged awareness of oneself as politically
located. As bell hooks describes it, critical consciousness is “that historical moment
when one begins to think critically about the self and identity in relation to one’s political
circumstance” (hooks, 1994, p. 47)*^ *. Critical consciousness refers to developing an
awareness of a number of different aspects of our political location. Thomas Heaney
describes critical consciousness as follows:
This is a level of consciousness characterized by depth in the interpretation of 
problems, through testing one's own findings with openness to revision, 
attempting to avoid distortion when perceiving problems and preconceived 
notions when analyzing them, receptivity to the new without rejecting the old 
because it is old. In striving toward critical consciousness, the individual rejects 
passivity, practicing dialogue rather than polemics, and using permeable, 
interrogative, restless, and dialogieal forms of life. Critical consciousness is 
brought about not through an individual or intellectual effort, but through 
collective struggle and praxis. (Heaney, 1995 p. 3)*^ ^
hooks: 47: “And so Freire’s work, in its global understanding of liberation 
struggles, always emphasizes that this is the important initial stage of transformation— 
that historical moment when one begins to think critically about the self and identity in 
relation to one’s political circumstance.”
Heaney, T. (1995, June). Issues in Freirean Pedagogy. In Thresholds in 
Education. Retrieved September 11,2002, from National-Louis University: 
www.edu/ace/Resourees/Documents/FreireIssues.html.
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In the process of discovering that we are “politieally located,” we recognize 
our relatedness to others as human beings within webs of political relations. For example, 
women in Canada belong to a class of people who were not persons, legally, until 1929. 
White women in urban centres, unlike young black men, can go about their business 
without being stopped and questioned by police**®. In the 1970’s there were no women’s 
shelters. Family violence was considered an individual problem brought on by the 
behaviour of the victims. Since that time, men’s violence towards women and children 
has been acknowledged as a systemic problem. Women, as a group, are vulnerable to this 
form of abuse. Financial vulnerability is also attached to women in abusive family 
settings. Each of the situations described above identifies a political location with 
identifiable material realities. We experience the effects of these locations in a personal 
way but they are consequences of our historical material relations.
In the process of discovering our political locations, we begin to develop critical 
literacy. In the process of developing eritical literacy (in study and activism) we discover 
our political locations. Recognizing oneself as a member of a collectivity, we also 
recognize that we can act—as subjects—conscious of our political locations and 
conscious of the ways that political decisions affect material reality. Anti-racist 
movements, post-colonial critiques and equal rights movements are examples of critical 
consciousness in action. These movements embody the principle of praxis. Individuals 
recognize their political locations and take action, as part of a collectivity, to change 
material relations.
**® Of course other marginalizing factors can alter this safety for women, 
including indigency, mental illness, or disability.
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Freire contrasts “naïve” thinking with critical thinking.
Naïve thinking .. .sees historical time as a weight, a stratification of the 
acquisitions and experiences of the past, from which the present should emerge 
normalized and “well-behaved.” For the naïve thinker, the important thing is 
accommodation to this normalized “today.” For the critic, the important thing is 
the continuing transformation of reality. (Freire 1973 in McLaren, 2000, p. 8)***
Critical consciousness is thus the overarching concept that connects praxis to historical
materialism. The critically conscious thinker examines past and present material
conditions to understand what particular conditions have led to current realities.
Problematization
Problematization is an important tool for developing critical consciousness.
Learners and instructors examine the assumptions, histories and relationships of the
various discourses in which they are engaged—looking for, and at, value systems, power
relations, inclusions and exclusions in order to see how human relations are reflected in
the meanings established in various discourses. Through problematization, one looks at
discourses to see what labour and what changes in thinking and practice might bring
about more equal relations of power.
The objective is not to generate a solution but to explore the complexity and inter­
relatedness of individual, organizational, and social issues, to leam about a 
problem and its context, and to identify ways in which learners can take collective 
action that constructively responds to the problem with which they have been 
engaged. (Boyee, 1996, p.8 ) **
*** McLaren, P. (2000). Paulo Freire's pedagogy of possibility. In S. Steiner, H. M. 
Krank, P. McLaren & R. Bahruth (Eds.), Freirean pedagogy, praxis, and possibilities: 
Projects for the new millennium. London: Falmer Press.
*** Boyce, M. E. (1996, Summer). Teaching critically as an act o f praxis and 
resistance. Retrieved June 2003, from
http://newton.uor.edu/FacultyFolder/MBoyce/lCRITPED.HTM.
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As stated earlier, critical pedagogues argue for the importance of rigorous
intellectual work, learning various disciplines but also learning how these disciplines and
knowledges contribute to or militate against social equality within a democratic context.
Problem-posing does not suggest that students have nothing to leam from 
established knowledge or that fundamental knowledge must be reconstmcted by 
each group of learners. Rather that instructors and students concern themselves 
with how texts and syllabi are organized, with the underlying assumptions of a 
course or discipline, and questioning the sources and perspectives included and/or 
excluded from the domain of the course. Problem-posing eontextualizes 
knowledge and is based on instmctor - and learner-posed questions as catalysts 
for learning. (Boyce, 1996, p. 7)
Problematization serves the function of connecting our interests with “a
comprehension of “how society works”. An education without problematization
produces conformity in overt and covert ways. It reflects the power of the status quo by
blocking access to eritical questions. Learners without access to eritical questions are
effectively making decisions without knowing they are being made.
The capacity to enforce nondeeisions by keeping an issue from ever being raised 
is a profound, if largely invisible, form of power. In this regard, the role of 
educators in maintaining and stabilizing dominant forms of power is best 
described in terms of what is not contained in the curriculum, namely, eritical 
questions excluded frequently in the name of maintaining a neutral posture. 
Nonknowledge and limited access to critical questions are a prior condition of 
nondecisions. The control and manipulation of knowledge, as well as the 
resulting mobilization of bias, represents a more economical and far-reaehing 
exercise of power than reliance on overt force or the direct imposition of will. 
(Heaney, 1995, p. 103)***
Problematization includes examining the role of education per se, the roles of various
pedagogical practices and looking at power dynamics as reflected in teaching practices
*** Heaney, T. (1995, June). Issues in Freirean Pedagogy. In Thresholds in 
Education. Retrieved September 11, 2002, from National-Louis University: 
www.edu/ace/Resources/Documents/FreireIssues.html.
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and teacher/süidents relationships. If part of the goal of teaching is to empower 
students to develop critical consciousness, teaching practices need also to embody these 
principles.
Dialogieal Method
In critical pedagogy, students and teachers engage in dialogues about their
disciplines. Critical pedagogues refer to this approach as “dialogieal.” It is described
below by Thomas Heaney:
The dialogieal approach to learning is characterized by eo-operation and 
acceptance of interchangeability and mutuality in the roles of teacher and learner, 
demanding an atmosphere of mutual acceptance and trust. In this method, all 
teach and all leam. This contrasts with an anti-dialogical approach which 
emphasizes the teacher's side of the learning relationship and frequently results in 
one-way communiques perpetuating domination and oppression. Without 
dialogue, there is no communication, and without communication, there can be no 
liberatory education. (Heaney, 1995)
The teacher moves out of an authoritarian role in order to embark, together with students,
on an exploration of the social, historical, political, and material contexts of their
disciplines. The teacher, nevertheless, retains the responsibility of facilitating the
learning process. In the passage below, Nita Freire, the widow of Paulo Freire discusses
his thinking on this issue.
His thinking is radical and postcolonial; his approach to education is one which 
stresses the politics of knowledge throughout. Despite his constant advocacy of 
democratic social relations of education, he always affirmed the directive nature 
of socially transformative education, centering around the notion of praxis, in 
which the educator has authority which, nevertheless, should not degenerate into 
authoritarianism. (Interview with Nita Freire in Mayo & Borg, 1976)**'*
**'* Mayo, P., & Borg, C. (Eds.) (1976, Spring'OO). Reflections from a "third age" 
marriage: Paulo Freire's pedagogy of reason, hope and passion. McGill Journal o f 
Education, 55(2), 105-120.
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Thus the task of the educator is to balance the need to impart subject matter 
while creating a space to explore critically the tenets and context of the subject.
Dialogieal thinking requires engaging with differently situated people in order to leam 
about material and social realities. Freire gives as an example, the education work he did 
with peasants in the Brazilian countryside***. It was not adequate to take a critical 
analysis of their situation to this group of people because Freire’s understandings could 
only be incomplete without integrating their own knowledge and experience of their 
material circumstances. It was through this experience that Freire recognized the need to 
approach teaching dialogically—together with leamers. Mary Boyce describes this 
process below;
To achieve this education, Freire proposes a dialogieal approach in which 
everyone—teacher/student, administrator/teacher, health educator/community 
member—participates as eoleamers. The goal of dialogue is critical thinking (or 
“eonscientization” from the Portuguese) and action. Critical thinking starts from 
perceiving the root causes of one’s place in society—the soeioeeonomic, political, 
cultural, and historical context of our personal lives. But critical thinking 
continues beyond perception—toward the actions and decisions people make to 
shape and gain control over their lives. Tme knowledge evolves from the 
interaction of reflection and action (or praxis) and occurs “when human beings 
participate in a transforming act” (Freire [1985, p. 106] in Wallerstein, 1987, p. 
34)**®
Concluding comments on praxis, critical theory and critical pedagogy
There is much literature on the subject of how to put the principles of eritical 
pedagogy into practice. Bell hooks writes extensively about her experiences in the
135 Freire, 2003, (Chapter Three, particularly p. 108). Also, Freire, 1994, p. 85.
**® Wallerstein, N. (1987). Problem-posing education; Freire's method for 
transformation. In I. Shor (Ed.), Freire for the Classroom (pp. 33-44). Portsmouth, NH: 
Boynton/Cook Publishers.
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classroom, as do Elizabeth Ellsworth, Ira Shor, Paul Mocombe and others**’. It is 
beyond the seope of this thesis to investigate these critiques; however, I am encouraged 
by the amount of literature available to support and challenge educators as they attempt to 
integrate the principles of critical pedagogy into their practices. As I noted in an earlier 
footnote, postmodernist critiques also have a great deal to offer to the process of 
developing a critical viewpoint. I would argue that the growth of literature on critical 
thinking is a manifestation of the version of praxis (based on historical materialism) 
described by Paulo Freire. Thus, although there are many ways that more recent 
literature might inform future work in this area, my provisional goal, set within the limits 
of this thesis, is to argue for adopting a historical materialist view of praxis along with the 
principles of critical theory as a starting point in developing critical consciousness.
In this chapter I have compared two usages of the term praxis and have explored 
briefly the premises of eritical theory and some methods of critical pedagogy. In my 
view, the historical materialist view of praxis allows us to see our work from both the 
“inside” and the “outside.” While we leam the skills necessary to any particular area of 
interest, we leam also to question our assumptions, to look at ideology and its effects, to 
question our relationship to knowledge, to look at the power dynamics in teacher/student 
relationships, and, to consider how our work impacts on the creation of culture and
**’ hooks, b. (1994). Teaching to transgress. Education as the practice o f freedom. 
New York: Routledge; Ellsworth, E. (1994). Why doesn't this feel empowering?
Working through the repressive myths of critical pedagogy. In L. Stone (Ed.), Education 
feminism reader : Developments in a field o f study (pp. 300-327). London: Routledge; 
Mocombe, P. (After 2002). Where did Freire go wrong? Pedagogy in Globalization: The 
Grenadian Context. Retrieved 5.5.04, from
http://www.ehl.ehalmers.se/main/inst faek/dlc/Mocombe.pdf; Shor, I. (1980). Critical 
Thinking and Everyday Life. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
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material relations for differently situated people. Exploring different cultures, in the 
terms suggested by Elliott, has always offered benefits for some. In terms of creating real 
change in social relations, however, the question for me remains: How do we support the 
notion of equality when we are unwilling to recognize its material manifestations? Stated 
another way: How do we become “friends” without first addressing the material 
conditions that have led us to being “not” friends?”
Part Three: Critical Consciousness in a Canadian Context
In this final section of Chapter Four, I look briefly at reasons why people might 
resist developing eritical consciousness. 1 then offer three formulations of arguments in 
favour of developing critical consciousness.
Points of resistance to developing critical consciousness
Freire’s first book. Pedagogy o f the Oppressed is written in the context of a 
strikingly polarized society of landowners and peasants. In this setting, the eategories of 
oppressor and oppressed may be acknowledged more easily along with the rationale for 
developing eritical consciousness. In the North American context, however, university 
students may find the concepts of “oppressor and oppressed” foreign and unrelated to 
their experience—this is particularly true for middle-class students. The tendeney to 
dismiss radical-sounding discourses notwithstanding, a great deal of aeademie and grass 
roots work contradicts this impression of irrelevance. Racism, classism, sexism and other 
forms of oppression are well rooted in North American society. Writings by women of 
colour and First Nations peoples, for example, provide particularly strong analyses of
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systemic inequality in Canada, and, indeed, powerful critiques exist of all aspects of
our fundamental economic and social institutions.
From within the field of critical theory, there are also critiques of the dichotomous
formulation of power expressed through the oppressor/oppressed designation. Peter
Mayo*** quotes Weiler as arguing that “the dichotomy between oppressor and oppressed
is a false one.” Mayo explains, citing Holub:
[The false dichotomy] is a situation which invites parallels with Foucault’s dictum 
that, in resisting power, one is not external to it. We are all implicated in relations 
of power. In fact, one of the major contributions of Gramsci’s Hegemony theory 
is that it places emphasis on the way power is ubiquitous and manifests itself even 
in the most intimate social relations (Holub in Mayo, 1994, p. 23)
This critique is important to how one presents and conceptualizes relations of 
power in a contemporary context. It challenges us to look beyond possible dichotomies 
to more deeply integrated and complex manifestations of power relations and to take into 
account the possibility of being multiply situated**® in relation to power dynamics. That 
the task is more complex than identifying “oppressors” and the “oppressed,” however, 
does not change the relevance to our lives of understanding material relations and the 
impact of relations of power.
*** Mayo, P. (1994, November). A comparative analysis of the ideas of Gramsci 
and Freire from an adult education perspective. Canadian Journal for the Study ofAdult 
Education, 8(2), 1-28.
**® See earlier references to postmodernist critiques. See also Pratt, M. B., Burkin,
E., & Martin, B. (1984). Yours in struggle: Three feminist perspectives on anti-Semitism 
and racism. Ithaca NY: Firebrand Books and Pratt, M. B. (1991). Rebellion: Essays 
1980-1991. Ithaca, NY: Firebrand Books.
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Resistance to developing critical consciousness may have other bases as well.
Randall Allsup writes specifically about resistance to critical thinking from music
students. He asks, “How do we problematize an art form that is not meant to be
problematized? How do we examine a world that does not wish to be examined? How,
specifically, do we engage our students in a pursuit of freedom if there is nothing from
which they wish to be free?” (Allsup, 2001, p. 8)*“*®.
Students generally do not come to university expecting their view of the world to
be deeply challenged. Many will accept that the role of the university is to broaden their
experience and understanding beyond known territory but will not necessarily be willing
to explore territory that makes them uncomfortable. Mary Boyce discusses this
resistance in the following passage:
The approach and practices presented in this paper are not uniformly welcomed 
by leamers (Shor & Freire, 1987; Shor, 1992). Passivity in leamers has been 
fostered in the education industry for a long time. A receptive and compliant or at 
least information gathering and organizing approach to learning is familiar to 
students. Some leamers resist practices that require engagement, listening to 
classmates, developing a reasoned critique of knowledge and of extemal experts, 
and identifying meaningful action. To use a metaphor of waking and sleeping, 
developing critical consciousness involves waking up in fundamental ways. 
Remaining asleep is comfortable. The work of waking up and becoming actively 
engaged in one's life and leaming in meaningful ways is in no small way, work. 
(Boyee, 1996, p. 8)*"*
In her 2001 paper, “Developing critical consciousness: a personal reflection,” 
Carole Collins examines the sources for her own resistance to developing critical
*'*® Allsup, R. E. (2001). Music education as liberatory practice: Exploring the 
ideas of Milan Kundera. Philosophy o f Music Education Review, 9(2), 3-10.
Boyce, M. E. (1996, Summer). Teaching critically as an act of praxis and 
resistance. Electronic Journal o f Radical Organisation Theory, II, No. 2(September 
1996). Retrieved June, 20,2003, from
http://wvm.mngt.waikato.ac.nz/depts/sml/joiomal/vol_3/mary.htm.
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consciousness. One of several factors she cites is the fear of eommitting to engage in 
a process of change. “Finally, I resisted because critical consciousness requires a 
commitment to work for social change as well as personal change and I was not sure 
whether I wanted to make such a commitment” (Collins, 2001,97). Collins points out 
that it was the passage on neutrality in Horton and Freire cited earlier in this chapter that 
forced her to recognize that the “neutral” position she was claiming actually represented 
values she was reluctant to identify (Collins, 1990, 98).
The forms of resistance cited here represent a small sample of reasons students 
and teachers may not wish to integrate the development of critical consciousness into 
their studies. Many may simply argue that they already have too much material to cover 
and don’t have the time or mandate to go beyond teaching or leaming traditionally 
accepted skills. To those who see talk of oppression as irrelevant to their lives there are, 
nevertheless, compelling justifications for engaging with critical consciousness. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I formulate three arguments requiring differing levels of 
“proof,” in favour of integrating the development of critical consciousness into university 
studies. In Chapter Five I offer justifications specific to the field of music and suggest 
ways that eritical consciousness can be integrated into professional music studies to the 
benefit of students in all branches of the field. For the moment, however, I limit my 
discussion to the importance of eritical consciousness, generally, for students at advanced 
levels of education.
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Weak, moderate and strong formulations of arguments for developing critieal 
consciousness 
The weak formulation:
A “weak” formulation designates a philosophieal argument that requires a lesser 
degree of proof to be compelling. In this case, I argue that developing critieal 
consciousness is in our self-interest as individuals engaged in the pursuit of intellectual, 
professional, social, economic and life skills. This argument is based solely on our need 
for material survival and does not infer obligations to other people or the acceptance of 
any particular personal philosophy.
Developing critical consciousness offers an opportunity to understand the 
competing discourses of the disciplines in which we engage, to make informed decisions 
about the context of our personal work, and to question our own assumptions about 
values and purposes. When these questions are not explored, we lose the opportunity to 
make conscious choices about how we want to live in the world; we find ourselves 
obedient to ideals we have never examined and find ourselves driven by forces we may 
resent but can’t identify or address effectively. Critical consciousness is a powerful 
antidote to absolutist attitudes. With critical consciousness, we can avoid the dangers of 
idealism disconnected from reality. Likewise, although cynicism is a common first 
reaction to critical studies, this reaction is eventually mitigated by recognizing the 
potential for change through our own engagements*'**. We gain the tools to question
*'** With these comments I do not mean to understate the challenge of integrating 
critical consciousness into one’s way of interacting with the world. One of the tasks of 
the educator is to help students recognize places where changes in consciousness have led 
to positive social change. A powerful example is the dismantling of apartheid in South 
Africa—a change that could not have taken place until the ideology of apartheid (and the
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notions of success and self-worth and to recognize our relatedness to other people.
With the benefit of historical material analysis, we have a means to distinguish
circumstances and factors attributable to individuals, from circumstances and factors that
reflect shared material, social, economic realities. Carole Collins expresses her
recognition of this relatedness in the following passage: “I now more fully understand
my obligation to put everything I will teach into a social context and continually to do so,
as Mills (1959) advocates, [to]“translate personal troubles into public issues, and public
issues into the terms of their human meaning for a variety of individuals” (Collins, 2001,
p. 98). There are positive benefits to developing eritical consciousness but there are also
negative consequences when we fail to do so. John Ralston Saul demonstrates the risks
of limiting one’s knowledge and concerns to a specialist field in the following example.
Here Saul refers to fishermen who can no longer earn a living because fish stocks have
been so severely depleted.
No one thought about the long- or even medium-term maintenance of stocks; not 
the fishermen, not the boat builders, not the fish wholesalers who found new uses 
for their product, including fertilizer and chicken feed; not the financiers. It 
wasn’t their job. Their job was to worry about their own interests. (Saul, 1995, 
p.135)
Saul’s example makes a strong case for developing critieal consciousness on the 
basis of material survival. With only small picture views of the world, we remain, by 
default, “subject to” forces we don’t recognize or understand and deprive ourselves of the 
possibility of taking informed action on our own behalf. Other current examples that
material relations it was used to justify) had been exposed and challenged. I speak here 
of the ideology of white supremacy that was used to justify taking over arable land and 
moving black people onto reservations — a practice modeled on the Canadian Indian 
Reservation system.
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support the need for developing eritical consciousness are the multilateral trade 
agreements that appear in different formats every few years. These agreements have 
given corporations the right to sue national governments for potential profits lost, for 
example, due to environmental regulations. The trade agreements, therefore, alter 
Canadian political sovereignty by exposing government decisions to contestation by 
international corporate interests *'**.
In my view, when we do not consider the “why” and the context of what we do, 
we function at a level of perpetual adolescence — only semi-conscious of the larger 
historical influences “to which we are subject” and the means by which we might act as 
“subjects” in remaking the world. Thus the crux of my “weak” formulation, that is, the 
formulation needing the least amount of proof, is that in order to function well in the 
world—to survive in a rapidly changing world—we need access to critical questions. 
Without critical consciousness we lack sufficient information and insight to act upon 
areas vital to our individual, material survival.
The moderate formulation
The moderate argument is that, as citizens in a democracy, we need the awareness 
and ability to act brought by developing critical consciousness in order to have
*'** Final Report of Citizen's Inquiry Into the MAI. Retrieved 17.08.04, from 
Council of Canadians:
http://www.canadians.org/display_document.htm?COC_token=23@@8c47435bbefl545 
d03ee073ebf264b46&id=350&isdoc=l&catid=88 and The Citizens' Guide to Trade, 
Environment and Sustainability: The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). 
Retrieved 17.08.04, fi-om Friends of the Earth: 
http://www.foei.org/trade/activistguide/mai.htm.
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democracy function well. In a democracy we have choices and one of these choices 
is not to participate in the democratic process. Nevertheless, the argument that 
democracy can only be maintained with the informed participation of citizens is 
compelling. Rather than attempting a proof that developing critical consciousness is 
necessary to democracy, I argue that it is in our collective interest to do so if we wish to 
maintain or advance the level of democracy we currently enjoy.
In 1937 John Dewey argued that
the very idea of democracy, the meaning of democracy, must be continually 
explored afresh; it has to be constantly rediscovered, remade and re-organized, 
while the political and economic and social institutions in which it is embodied 
have to be remade and re-organized to meet the changes that are going on in the 
development of new needs on the part of human beings and new resources for 
satisfying those needs. (Dewey in Osborne, p. 54)*'^
The ongoing need to make and re-make democracy cannot be fulfilled by
individual involvement alone. Institutional supports must be in place to develop the tools
needed on a broad scale to facilitate informed and active participation. A surface reading
of relations will not reveal power dynamics, hence, the need will always exist to develop
critical understandings of social and economic institutions. Henry Giroux writes:
One of the most important functions of a vibrant democratic culture is to provide 
the institutional and symbolic resources necessary for young people and adults to 
develop their capacity to think critically, to participate in power relations and 
policy decisions that affect their lives, and to transform those racial, social, and 
economic inequities that impede democratic social relations. (Giroux in Portelli & 
Solomon, 2001, p. 17)''*^
Osborne, K. (2001). Democracy, democratic citizenship, and education. In J. P. 
Portelli & R. P. Solomon (Eds.), The erosion o f democracy in education: From critique 
to possibilities (pp. 29-61). Calgary, Ab: Detselig.
Portelli, J., & Solomon, P. R. (Eds.) (2001). The erosion o f democracy in 
education. Calgary, Alberta: Detselig Enterprises Ltd.
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In our current liberal democratic configuration in Canada, public fimding of 
education and various services is “up for debate.” These are not academic questions or 
questions to be decided by “experts” only. How these issues are decided will have 
profound effects on the material reality of differently situated people. As citizens and 
people who will be affected by any legal changes made, we need to know the why and 
how of such public issues. Again, if we know only how a government deeision might 
affect our particular sector and have no means to distinguish between different 
arguments—some of which represent extremely well-financed interests—then we leave 
ourselves open to manipulation by public relations firms—with the cleverest 
manipulators winning the most support.
As we become senior practitioners in our respective fields, we may have
opportunities to sit on development or review teams charged with creating new policy
and/or determining how public fimding should be distributed. On what basis do we make
these decisions if our world view and life experience is limited to a narrow discipline and
we have no strategy or tools to understand the impact of such decisions on people
situated differently than ourselves? Citizenship in a democratic society comes with
benefits but, as Freire notes below, it also comes with responsibilities.
The second aspect I would like to focus on here is the responsibility of citizenship. 
We will only come to terms with this problem through a critical awareness of our 
social and political responsibility as a civil society, a responsibility not to take 
over the state’s role, letting it sleep undisturbed, but to learn to mobilize and 
organize so that we can better supervise the state as it fulfills or fails to fulfill its
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constitutional duty. Only in this way will we be able to move toward a broad
dialogue, at the centre of society. Freire, 1998, p. 10)*'*^
Thus, my moderate argument is that we can only benefit and grow as a society if 
we develop the means to look critically at the historical, material factors that shape our 
contemporary relationships. For example, the system of apartheid was based on a belief 
in the inherent superiority of whites and inherent deficiencies of blacks. Today the 
contradictions of these ideologies may seem obvious, but they were well entrenched in 
belief systems of an earlier era. The means to change such relations of inequality came, 
at least in part, through recognizing the relationship between ideology, power and 
material reality.
In Canada, we are fortunate to live in a modem democracy. We are not and never 
will be immune, however, to ideology and its function of masking relations of power. 
There are marginalized under-classes in Canadian society and severe imbalances in 
access to resources*"*’. We have been told that trickle-down economics and “less 
government” would benefit everyone. This is a belief system that has benefited a few at 
the top with obvious contradictions in lived experience for the growing numbers of 
people at the bottom. The fact that two corporations’"** own most of the newspapers and
*"*^ Freire, P. (1998). Teachers as cultural workers. Letters to those who dare 
teach. (D. Macedo, D. Koike, & A. Oliviera, Trans.). Boulder, Colorado; Westview Press 
(Original work published 1993).
’"*’ Single mothers on social assistance, people with jobs who can’t find affordable 
housing (“the working poor”), and in this white dominant society, many First Nations 
people are obvious examples.
’"** These newspaper empires are sometimes identified by their individual owners, 
sometimes as corporate entities. I am referring here to Hollinger (Conrad Black) and 
CanWest Global Communications (Izzy Asper).
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many radio and television outlets in the country should be warning enough of the
limits imposed on our access to competing viewpoints’"*®. To gain a critical perspective
on events happening to and around us, we need to look much further for analyses of
ideology and material relations. When we do not engage in questions beyond surface
appearances, we cannot be confident that we are looking after our Own interests as
citizens. In Saul’s words;
Human society is a human construct, even if outside forces oblige, propel and 
limit us. Humanist society -  that is, in our terms, the individual as citizen in a 
democratic society -  is not only a human construct. It continues to exist only 
through the daily efforts of its citizenry. (Saul, 1995, p. 154)
We can’t afford to live in a vacuum, regardless of our field, if we hope to live
within a democracy. This moderate argument is not dependent upon a shared notion of
what constitutes a “good life.” It does suggest strongly, however, that we are risking our
personal security, insofar as we believe it is protected by democratic institutions, by
remaining ignorant and outside of any form of collective engagement. We need, actively,
to put ourselves in a position to deepen our understanding and enlarge our possibilities
for engagement. Remaining a bystander is not a position of neutrality; rather, it indicates
our agreement with relations as they are. This lack of informed engagement allows
power relations to evolve uncontested. Democracy depends upon omgoing challenges in
order to function.
’"*® An example of “praxis” in response to corporate control of the media has been 
the development, internationally, of independently run, not-for-profit media centres open 
to the public and available on-line. The movement began during the “Battle of Seattle”— 
the 1999 protests against the World Trade Organisation in Seattle Washington. See 
http;//ioumal.planetwork.net/article.php?lab=coleman0704 for a history of the movement.
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The strong formulation
In philosophical terms, a strong formulation is one that requires a high level of 
proof, usually defined in terms of a necessary truth. An argument based on necessity 
holds for those people who agree on a particular view of the “good life.” Therefore, I 
posit my third formulation as one o f a number ofpossible ethical approaches to 
knowledge, education and engagement with the world. In this case, my strong argument 
is premised on the belief that engagement with critical consciousness is a necessary part 
of fulfilling ourselves as human beings. In the following discussion, then, I present 
ethical and psychological arguments articulated by critical theorists that support the 
contention that developing critical consciousness is an essential part of what it means to 
be human.
Educational philosopher Maxine Greene writes about the importance of
developing a philosophy: that is, understanding the why of what one chooses to do.
The philosophical “act” requires one “to take the risk of thinking about what he is 
doing...to become progressively more self-conscious about the choices he makes 
and the commitments he defines...and to examine critically the principles 
underlying what he thinks and what he says. (Greene, in Kohli 1998, p. 16)’ ®^
Greene’s position is not imlike that taken by Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen in
relation to the need for “philosophy;” however, she takes this notion further by arguing
that “problematizing” our relatedness is essential to a genuine freedom.
Freedom that is detached from the relatedness of others is a form of bad faith. ... 
There may be no sense of identification with people sitting on park benches, with 
children hanging around the street comers after dark. There may be no ability to
Kohli, W. (1998). Philosopher oftfbr freedom. In W. C. Ayers & Miller Janet 
L. (Eds.), A light in dark times. New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
174
take it seriously, to take it personally. Visible or invisible, the world may not 
be problematized; no one aches to break through a horizon, aches in the presence 
of the question itself. So there are no tensions, no desires to reach beyond. 
(Greene, in Allsup, 2001, p.5)
According to Greene, the lack of forums within education for grappling with existential
questions about the meaning of life translates into a moral failure.
Nel Noddings also argues that ethical behaviour requires an imderstanding and
response to “others.” “Ethical behavior or “caring” is central to education and
community. Feelings of caring cannot operate “routinely, according to some fixed rule.”
To care requires an understanding of an “other” (Noddings in Allsup, 2001, p. 5).
Understanding the “other” cannot come about through empathy alone. Understanding the
“other” can only come about through an engagement with the material reality of those
whom we wish to understand. We often carmot see the concerns of others until we
engage in resistance with them. Through this resistance it becomes possible to see
manifestations of p o w e r T h i s  is what critical theorists and Paulo Freire, in particular,
mean by “engaging in praxis.”
Marx conceived of the project of developing critical consciousness, leading to
praxis, as part of the project to “humanize the world.”
See Ford, M., & Pepper-Smith, K. (1998). Dividing the difference: 
Intelligibility as an element of moral education under oppression. Journal o f Moral 
Education, 27(4), 275-293 for an illuminating discussion on moral intelligibility. In this 
case, Katherine Pepper-Smith was unable to understand her colleagues’ practice of 
continually coming “out” as a lesbian. It seemed an overblown worry. Pepper-Smith 
perceived the safety and innocuousness of her own position, as a married heterosexual, to 
be generalizable, and, thus, neutral, when in fact this apparent neutrality masked a 
position of privilege she had not recognized prior to her engagement in writing this paper.
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At the heart of Marx’s project was the question of what it means to be fully 
human and his belief in our potential to humanize the world.” (Allman & Wallis, 
1990, p. 18)
Allman and Wallis describe Marx’s position in greater depth below:
And because we have not critically chosen these social relations, they, on the 
whole, tend to be relations of domination and subordination or outright oppression. 
Although this often implies material impoverishment of one of the opposites, it 
need not. Marx often referred to impoverishment in that sense, but more often he 
used it to refer to our impoverishment as human beings. (Allman & Wallis, 1990,
p. 16)
Freire also argued that our vocation as human beings is to humanize our relations, that is,
by working to end relations of dominance and oppression.
But while both humanization and dehumanization are real alternatives, only the 
first is the people’s vocation. This vocation is constantly negated, yet it is 
affirmed by that very negation. (Freire, 2003, p.43)
In Freire’s Pedagogy o f Hope^^\e expands on this notion of humanization as the
vocation of human beings:
It is important to emphasize that, in speaking of “being more,” or of humanization 
as ontological vocation of the human being, I am not falling into any 
fundamentalist position—which, incidentally, is always conservative. Hence, my 
equally heavy emphasis on the fact that this “vocation,” this calling, rather than 
being anything a priori in history, on the contrary is something constituted in 
history. (Freire, 1994, p. 98)
In the arguments of Marx and Freire, a failure to develop critical consciousness
represents more than a moral failure. It represents a failure to achieve our human
potential.
In her book Teaching to transgress. Education as the practice o f freedom, bell 
hooks writes of engaged pedagogy as a way for teachers as well as students to achieve 
personal wholeness.
152 Written after the passage quoted above.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
176
Freire’s work affirmed that education can only be liberatory when everyone 
claims knowledge as a field in which we all labor. That notion of mutual labor 
was affirmed by Thich Nhat Hanh’s philosophy of engaged Buddhism, the focus 
on practice in conjunction with contemplation. His philosophy was similar to 
Freire’s emphasis on “praxis”—action and reflection upon tiie world in order to 
change it... .Thich Nhat Hanh offered a way of thinking about pedagogy which 
emphasized wholeness, a union of mind, body, and sprit, (hooks, 1994, p. 14)
Hooks points out that critical pedagogy, or “engaged pedagogy”, has the well-being of
teachers as well as students at its centre.
Progressive, holistic education, “engaged pedagogy” is more demanding than 
conventional critical or feminist pedagogy. For, unlike these two teaching 
practices, it emphasizes well-being. That means that teachers must be actively 
committed to a process of self-actualization that promotes their own well-being if 
they are to teach in a manner that empowers students, (hooks, 1994, p. 15)
This articulation of the importance of well-being through engagement is important.
Critical studies can be very unsettling for students. Common sense views of the world
(hegemony) are so deeply engrained inside each of us it can be deeply disturbing to find
critiques that challenge our views. Engagement and the development of critical
consciousness, however, also lead us to discover our own place in history as we
recognize our capacity to act as “subjects” and, according to hooks, this is ultimately
empowering and ftilfilling.
Finally, I turn to comments by David Karp, who writes about critical
consciousness as a means of attaining mental health in the midst of social relations that
seem fractured and isolating.
The cultural pull away from others is often too powerftil to resist. A culture that 
prizes individual self-realization above all else becomes a world held together by 
only the barest and most tenuous social connections. More and more Americans, 
identifying individual achievement as the primary medium for personal 
fulfillment, join the “lonely crowd” identified years ago by David Riesman. To
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be part of the lonely crowd means being connected to many in general and 
few in particular. (Karp, 1996, p. 184)’^ *
Karp uses the following passage by C. Wright Mills to connect the need for historical
materialist critiques with personal mental health.
Nowadays men often feel that their lives are a series of traps. They sense that 
within their everyday worlds, they cannot overcome their troubles, and in this 
feeling, they are often correct... Yet men do not usually define the troubles they 
endure in terms of historical change and institutional contradiction... They do 
no t... grasp the interplay of man and society, of biography and history, of self 
and world.... What they need ... is a quality of mind that will help them to ... 
achieve lucid summations of what is going on in the world and of what may be 
happening within themselves. .. .This quality [of mind] ... may be called the 
sociological imagination. (C. Wright Mills in Karp, 1996, p. 165)
Karp, like the critical theorists cited above, argues that the ability to recognize our
relatedness is essential to both our individual and social well-being:
[This is] what I now see as a shared sociological and spiritual message. It is that 
our individual emotional health and the health of society are inseparable. If we do 
not nourish society by realizing our individual responsibilities to it, we pay the 
price in terms of individual illness. In this way, those millions pained by affective 
disorders are part of a dialectical process in which the extent of collective 
suffering eventually creates an urge to change the social structures that have made 
so many of us ill. (Karp, 1996, p. 195)
In summary, my strong argument posits that the development of critical 
consciousness is a necessary feature of what it means to be fiilly human. As individuals, 
conscious of our relatedness to others, we gain the knowledge that we are not alone in our 
struggles to imderstand the conflicts between our material realities and accepted 
ideologies (hegemony)—conflicts that, for many, result in a constant sense of cognitive 
dissonance. Critical consciousness gives us the capacity to engage, with others, in 
“making the world.” Greene’s “freedom”, hooks’s “engaged pedagogy,” Freire’s and
153 Karp, D. S. (1996). Speaking o f Sadness. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Marx’s projects of humanizing the world and Karp’s argument for critical 
engagement all suggest that, as human beings, it is our vocation to engage in the process 
of creating a better world.
Conclusion to Chapter Four
In conclusion, I submit that there are compelling reasons to include the 
development of critical consciousness as part of educational practices. The Aristotelian 
definition of praxis limits our view to the virtue of specific disciplines—a view of those 
disciplines from the “inside.” The historical materialist view of praxis, with its focus on 
relatedness, provides us with a much richer account. This alternate view of praxis, as 
articulated in the discussion of critical theory and critical pedagogy opens many new 
questions and provides us with an approach to learning and to pedagogy that allows us to 
consider the methods, goals and potential outcomes of our education. Critical 
consciousness creates a space to examine our work, our beliefs, and our discourses in 
relation to material relations. Such a consciousness does not come at the expense of the 
joys and rewards of studying different disciplines; rather, we become newly able to look 
at the world as a place we can re-make—with an awareness of the realities that shape our 
subjectivity.
In Chapter Five I re-examine the five roles of professional musicianship: wage 
earners, artists, members of communities, teachers and cultural producers in light of 
critical consciousness. I argue that developing critical consciousness and understanding 
praxis will enhance the capacity of musicians to act as the “critical and creative producers 
of our conditions of existence” (Allman & Wallis, 1990, p. 17).
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CHAPTER FIVE: TEACHING MUSIC AS IF THE WORLD MATTERED^^^
[For Greene] acting, choosing, and deciding are what make a person free: “The 
person choosing breaks the chain of causes and effects, of probabilities, in which 
he normally feels himself to be entangled. He breaks it apart by asking ‘Why?’ 
by perceiving the habitual itself to be an obstacle to his growing, his pursuit of 
meaning, his interpreting and naming his world.”...Freedom, Greene says, “is the 
freedom to decide what sort of person you ought to be” (Greene, 1973, p. 284, in 
Kohli, 1998, p. 18)
Throughout the preceding chapters, I have explored the philosophical analyses of 
four major writers in the field of Philosophy of Music Education. I share many values 
and concerns with these writers, including the belief that music is a unique mode of 
experience that ought to be a part of school curricula. Nonetheless, my focus in this 
thesis has been on a gap between the issues that can be examined within their frames of 
reference and my own concerns. I have examined their views on music education in 
light of questions about the intersection of music and politics that have come out of my 
own experiences as a music student and professional musician. It is my hypothesis that 
the kinds of analysis, insights and tools found in the literatures of critical theory and 
critical pedagogy address this gap and provide a way to address important issues in music 
education that are not adequately visible within the limits of current philosophy of music
I would like to thank Peggy Tripp for contributing the title of my last chapter. 
We had a wonderful conversation in which we exchanged ideas about the need for 
educational practices to engage students, through their fields of inquiry, with the 
problems of the world. At the time, she was co-editing a collection of essays on science 
and education, with the working title of “Teaching Science as if the World Mattered.” 
The work has since been completed and published as Tripp, P., & Muzzin, L. (Eds.) 
(2004). Teaching as activism: equity meets environmentalism. Montreal: McGill-Queen's 
University Press.
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education thinking. Specifically, my hypothesis is that developing critical 
consciousness is important to the education of professional musicians.
Praxis as a point of entry
The moment of illumination for me comes with the recognition of two very 
different uses of the term praxis. The exploration of approaches to praxis set up a 
watershed recognition of two contrasting orientations, first toward musical praxis viewed 
“from the inside,” as a unique form of thinking-doing excellence and, second, toward 
musical praxis viewed “from the outside,” as a form of thinking-doing oriented to critique 
and engaged reflections on how music is lived in contexts of historical socio-political 
relations. I then draw upon the literatures of critical pedagogy and critical theory to 
generate an accoimt of the forms of critical consciousness that will address the 
problematic intersection of music and politics. The key elements of this critical 
consciousness, I argue, enable people to take into account the workings of materiality, 
ideology, and power.
My discussion in Chapter Four highlights a historical materialist analysis of “the 
political,” yet I think it is important to underscore that the weak, moderate, and strong 
arguments in favour of including critical consciousness in the education of professional 
musicians do not depend necessarily on a historical materialist rendering of the political 
issues facing musicians. Alternative forms of political analysis, such as might be based 
on the work of pragmatists like John Dewey, for instance, might also be used to generate 
an account of critical consciousness that would satisfy the need I have identified. To 
qualify under my analysis, such alternative accounts would need to address the three key 
political elements: materiality, ideology, and power. I do not attempt to discuss all of
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these alternatives here; rather, it is sufficient for my purposes to show that critical 
consciousness, in this case, generated through the discourse of historical materialism, 
addresses the gaps between current philosophy of music education thinking and my 
questions.
Philosophers of Music Education
Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen do not agree precisely on the nature of 
music although they do agree that understanding its nature is important to how we 
approach music education. My sense is that the gulf identified between Elliott and 
Reimer is not as substantive as Elliott has argued. In common with the other writers, 
both Elliott and Reimer see the mental processes of perceiving music as representing a 
particular kind of cognition, whether it is called “perceptual structuring” or the “thinking- 
doing” that Elliott calls “praxial thinking.” All four writers begin with a love of music 
and a concern that those studying music think about what they are doing in light of the 
value of music to the larger social fabric.
Elliott and Regelski open up the range of consideration to challenge Reimer’s 
notion that music should be understood as an expressive form, detached from social, 
political and historical meaning. They argue that social and political meanings are 
embedded in musical practices and contribute to aspects of the “nature” of music; 
however, they limit their view to cultural expressions of music without noticing the 
effects of materiality, that is, the historical location of different musics — effects that 
have significant implications for music education. Thus, although Elliott and Regelski 
use the words ‘social’ and ‘political’ to refer to aspects of the nature of music, the limits
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of their analyses of praxis effectively mask political relations in a way likely to 
perpetuate relations of dominance and privilege.
Jorgensen broadens the range of consideration fiirther by analyzing different 
pedagogical practices highlighting the respective limits and accomplishments of each.
She develops a process that she calls a dialectical dialogic approach, the point of which is 
to embrace the tensions and conflicts between competing needs, discourses and interests. 
Rather than set up mutually exclusive justifications that polarize the debates between 
competing discourses, she advocates treating these tensions as a challenge to be enjoyed 
as one looks forward to creating music education opportunities appropriate to different 
constituencies. Jorgensen identifies a Freirean goal of freedom as a guide to her dialogic 
practice; however, she does not articulate the need for a critical analysis of materiality 
and historical location — a crucial step if the conditions necessary for achieving the goal 
of freedom are to be created.
The limitation of the analyses of these authors, made particularly apparent 
through the different uses of the term “praxis,” is that, in the main, they do not identify 
the influences of (historical) materiality, ideology, and power. As a result, their frames of 
reference tend to be situated within the world of music and music education, looking 
outward, missing the beneficial perspectives to be gained by looking from the outside in. 
We need a means to recognize the ideologies, the social structures, and the past 
conditions that have led to our present historical location in order to act as subjects, 
conscious of the conditions to which, and by which, we have been “subjected.”^^ ^
The awkward syntax here has been chosen to emphasize the distinction 
between being a ‘subject’ and being ‘subject to’ external factors.
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Tools of critical consciousness
The concept of praxis serves as an entry point to an analysis of critical 
consciousness represented as a means to step back from the world -  paradoxically, by 
becoming more actively engaged with differently situated people — in order to re-enter it, 
remaking the world according to values consciously held and consciously striven for. 
Tools for developing critical consciousness that are suggested by critical theory and 
critical pedagogy include problematization and a dialogical method. Problematization 
helps us to look at the assumptions that underpin the social relationships and common 
sense beliefs that shape our historical, geographical, and social present. Problematization 
allows us look within -  to contest ideologies that we might, otherwise, fail to recognize 
because they have been accepted as part of the natural order: for example, the 
assumptions that competition is essential to achieving high standards and that having 
winners and losers is necessary. Problematization allows us to look without at the 
political/material conditions that are shaping our relationships with one another.
A Freirean dialogical approach to pedagogy suggests that we need to come to 
knowledge as a place in which we all labour. Bell hooks writes about the importance of 
acknowledging that the power dynamic between teachers and students is unequal; 
however, her conviction is that it is crucial for teachers and students alike to see 
themselves as active participants (rather than passive consumers of fixed bodies of 
knowledge) in the shared project of developing critical consciousness (hooks, 1994, p. 14). 
In this sense, though teachers and students are situated differently with respect to their 
material locations, they both enter the dialogic process as co-participants. They engage 
with the learning and with each other, and they share the goal of striving for critical
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consciousness, wholeness and for transformation (hooks, 1994, p. 138, 157). In 
hooks’s understanding of a dialogical approach, “students and professors regard each 
other as ‘whole’ human beings, striving not just for knowledge in books, but knowledge 
about how to live in the world” (hooks, 1994, pp. 14).
In the context of music education, teachers and students might explore the values 
and beliefs that each brings to the professional music enterprise. These beliefs are looked 
at as “assumptions” worthy of critical analysis within a learning project to imderstand the 
relationships between our assumptions and manifestations of materiality, ideology and 
power. The work of contesting entrenched hierarchies is difficult. We are almost always 
personally invested in our systems of belief. Challenging these beliefs can be threatening. 
Employing the concept of “praxis;” we need to consider what work can be done in an 
effort to mediate the difference and difficulties amongst differently situated people. We 
might consider attending anti-racist workshops for example, or caucusing or engaging in 
common actions. There is risk-taking on all sides in such pedagogical enterprises; 
however, the rewards come through learning to distance ourselves from habitual ways of 
thinking, gaining, in the process, a clearer understanding of how we might choose to live 
in the world.
In the context of this thesis I have limited my exploration of the concept of 
dialogical method to pedagogical contexts. In Teaching to Transgress, bell hooks writes 
about teaching/learning situations that take place in public forums and movement- 
building situations where engagement is rife with the tensions arising from the efforts of 
differently situated people trying to imveil ideologies and material manifestations of 
power within the coalitions they are trying to build. Although such formal and informal
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Teaming’ situations are challenging, the level of engagement inherent in such 
situations is what defines a dialogical approach to teaching and learning. For the person 
in the role of educator, this means an anti-dogmatic approach to knowledge‘s^ .
Facilitating equal participation means creating room for people to start from where they 
are and to respect and integrate the knowledge and experience that is brought by 
participants ’s®. For hooks, the goal of education is to create critical thinkers. Thus, 
education as the practice of freedom is about liberating knowledge and liberatory practice 
in the classroom. The challenge is to go beyond traditional teaching practices and create 
pedagogical practices that subvert hierarchical values and create the groimd where critical 
thinking can be developed.
Critical consciousness and the intersection of music and politics
I turn now to the questions that have driven this project from the beginning: what 
does critical consciousness bring to the study of music at the professional level? I 
address this question in light of four categories: materiality, ideology, power and 
insider/outsider relations. These categories are not intended to represent all possible 
applications of critical consciousness; rather, they represent a range of possibilities and 
potential areas of inquiry that can be associated with tiiat umbrella term.
Recall Freire’s concept of knowledge as contestable and as the result of 
dialectical tensions.
See Freire’s example of working together with peasants on learning projects. 
Reference is in Chapter Four.
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Materiality
With respect to ‘materiality,’ critical consciousness allows us to examine our 
historical location as musicians working in particular economic and geographic zones 
which, in turn, are affected by a global economy dominated by capitalism. Such an 
analysis would allow us to see what factors contribute to the amount and quality of work 
available for musicians and the financial sources that support that work‘d*. It would also 
allow us to resist personalization by helping us to separate our images of self-worth from 
the realities of our historical location.
Examining materiality would also let us explore the questions surrounding our 
locations as cultural producers. We might ask what groups of people are represented in 
professional music schools’ ®^, amongst our professional colleagues, amongst our 
audiences and, perhaps more interestingly, which are not. A material analysis would 
allow us to consider the lived consequences of such representations and to consider how 
different forms of cultural expression serve the interests of various communities. I am 
thinking, here, in particular, of those occasions when we are called upon to consider how 
arts council funding is to be distributed. A materialist analysis of such decisions enables 
us to notice the differing patterns of benefits and burdens associated with the awarding of 
grants to members of dominant and non-dominant groups. We are encouraged by such
In my experience, the principal sources of funding are government and 
corporate grants with wealthy individuals occasionally purchasing services and, far less 
often, modest-income individuals purchasing musical services for special occasions such 
as weddings and funerals.
’ ®^ Since there are a variety of professional music schools available including 
colleges that sometimes specialize in jazz or commercial music, it would be interesting, 
also, to compare different types of institutions and observe who is there and who is not.
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analyses to pay attention to the work we must do to put ourselves in a position to 
encounter varied traditions, to recognize the need for caucusing when we are at risk of 
marginalization, or to recognize the need to educate ourselves if we are at risk of cultural 
appropriation or assimilation. Such analyses show us that simply entering an unfamiliar 
culture as a ‘tourist” is not sufficient if we wish to interact respectfully and meaningfully. 
Critical music theorist Susan McClary (McClary, 1991, p. 26) suggests a materialist 
approach that imearths taken-for-granted practices and ideologies by envisioning one’s 
own art form as visitors (performers, audiences, anthropologists, or ethnomusicologists) 
from another time and place.
Materialist analyses include examinations of large-scale historical forces that 
shape not only our working lives but our lives as members of communities. The changes 
in local economic conditions that occur as a function of the processes of globalization, for 
instance, determine who can afford to attend cultural events, and what kinds of resources 
(government and corporate) are available for funding cultural activities. Globalization 
processes affect us at another level as well. As money and jobs move out of the country, 
economic control is moved out of the hands of government and further out of the range of 
democratic processes.
Our relationships are shaped by the structural forces at play. Unlike some 
versions of liberal pluralism, analyses of materiality reveal (rather than obscure) the 
difficulty of working together when people occupy different social locations. An 
example of such structural forces shaping relationships is evident in work I have been 
doing as an artist/educator at a First Nations High School in Thunder Bay. The students 
at this school come from remote communities. In this situation I am necessarily a
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member of the white colonizing class. I receive the possibility that the students will 
gain by interacting with me with a great deal of skepticism. Regardless of whatever good 
intentions I bring to this situation, there is a need to understand how our different material 
locations shape our relationships. Such a materialist analysis will not necessarily offer 
immediate solutions. In fact, solutions may require changes to social conditions that are 
not yet apparent; however, these analyses can show us where the struggles are. Learning 
how to work in this environment has required a process of trying out strategies and 
recognizing failures based on long discussions with First Nations elders, the students’ 
classroom teacher (First Nations, but from a different background than the students), a 
First Nations colleague teaching at Lakehead University’s Faculty of Education, and non­
native friends and colleagues who have worked as ‘outsiders’ with young people in 
native communities.
In the midst of this question-asking, I discovered that I first had to learn how to 
approach an elder. I was not automatically entitled, by virtue of my good intentions, to 
seek out and receive information on terms with which I was familiar. I was told stories 
and sent away to consider how these stories might inform my work in the school. In the 
classroom, I found that I would try strategies that had been successful in mainstream high 
schools only to discover that I had crossed over into cultural meanings that caused 
offense and alienated the students. Working in this setting continues to be an on-going 
process of discovering what the students bring, what kinds of musical experience might 
be useful to them and how I can adapt the knowledge and experience that I bring to 
address their needs. Their classroom teacher and I continue to tread carefully as we 
attempt, together, to construct a program that lets us find ways of offering a rewarding
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program for the students, in spite of but also through our different social and material 
locations.
Another situation that has made me aware of our situatedness is the different ways 
that publicity might affect our lives and our relationships with each other. CBC Radio 
has a program called “Out Front” that, on the surface, seems like a potentially useful 
vehicle for talking about this work in a public setting. We could construct the show 
ourselves and it would be broadcast all over the country telling, in our own words, how 
we are learning to work together. For me, as a free-lance musician and artist/educator, 
the benefits of producing such a show are obvious: my profile would be enhanced along 
with my credibility and I might get new work as a result of people hearing the broadcast. 
For the students and their classroom teacher, however, the benefits are not so obvious or 
tangible. Because of our different social locations, it would be next to impossible to 
portray our work together as something that is evolving amongst equals’^ **. My fear, and 
the reason this idea is not acceptable under current material and social realities, is that, no 
matter how we were to construct such a radio piece, I would appear in the role of the 
“white expert” bringing music to this group of “at-risk”’^ ’ students. We might be able to 
turn these conditions to our own purposes if we worked together with a produeer to 
portray everyone’s roles in a nuanced way, but the reality is that the only person who 
would really stand to gain from such a program is me.
Portraying it as an equal partnership in no way would guarantee its reception 
by listeners as such.
“At risk” seems to be the term of choice for describing young people who have 
experienced a great deal of hardship due to their social locations. Here again, the term 
serves to mask a relationship of oppression by describing the problem in terms of the 
individual and their family.
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At this time, under current conditions, such a program risks exposing the 
students and their lives to a scrutiny that would be more exploitative than beneficial, thus 
potentially breaking whatever trust we might have built between us. The social 
conditions are not yet such that we could successfully portray our work as a project 
amongst social equals. The situation I have described is an example of how critical 
consciousness, through developing an analysis of materiality, has made it possible for me 
to participate in a project that has change and growth as a goal, conscious of the way that 
our relationship will continue to be defined by our current social locations.
Ideology
I move now to examining the possibilities of a critical analysis of ideology: How 
could such an analysis serve us as musicians? When discussing the role of musicians as 
artists, I introduced the tension between conventional, individualist, representations of 
musicians’ success or failure as artists and larger-frame accounts of economic forces such 
as labour market dynamics and competition for scarce resources. I would argue that 
challenging the ideology of meritocracy (that assumes every talented musician who 
dedicates herself to her art will succeed) might make it possible for more of us to resist 
the tendency to personalize consequences that have systemic origins.
In Chapter Four, I drew connections between the study of ideology and the 
phenomenon of hegemony. Dominant groups reinforce their dominance by representing, 
as universal, values that actually pertain to their own vested interests. Within societies 
such as ours, dominated by capitalism, the virtues of competition are almost unassailable. 
Although some people have qualms about the value of competition in education, or where
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they advocate a wider range of more inclusive values, the association of excellence 
with competitive success and mediocrity with competitive failure largely remains intact.
When I read literature aimed at school music educators, for example, I see a 
strong commitment to focusing on the joys and rewards of music-making for what it 
provides to us in spiritual, social, personal, physiological and intellectual nourishment. 
Teaching practices are designed to bring out the best in students, regardless of what skills, 
talents or experiences they bring to the classroom. These practices are based on an 
understanding of the nature of music, the nature of music education and the value of both 
to our quality of life. These life-affirming priorities are articulated clearly by each of the 
four authors considered in this thesis.
Nonetheless, in professional music schools, arguably the pinnacle of music 
education, competition trumps these broader virtues. Those who are not good 
competitors (sometimes despite being very fine musicians) soon discover that they have 
little value as musicians and their chances of surviving as a professional are portrayed as 
negligible’ ’^. Teachers encourage their students to succeed in a very particular 
marketplace; however, the teachers appear to be as imaware as the students about the 
connection between the ideology of competition and the terms set by economic 
conditions. What we don’t see is the way we have allowed a scarcity model to determine
Teachers are not unsympathetic to the problem of stage fright. Seminars with 
advice and strategies for coping with stage fright are common and more than one 
supportive teacher has recommended the use of Beta Blockers as a coping strategy. What 
is not common, however, is questioning a system that limits the view of professional 
music making to high stakes competitive enterprises.
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how we perceive music and its value to society. The value of music per se comes to 
be identified with the particular values embodied in successful competitors’^ ’.
I draw particular attention to these expressions of ideology because I believe they 
are the source of enormous psychic pain amongst musicians — students, performers, and 
teachers alike. In music circles, the assumption is that competition is central to producing 
quality. This assumption, and the general economic conditions that we somehow see as 
not applying to us individually, pit us against one another. We are forced to compete 
again and again for scarce jobs. The stakes are not just symbolic; they are quite tangible. 
They represent life and death issues, including, for example, whether a musician will be 
able to work at all or whether they will be able to work in the same city as their spouse.
At stake in an audition can be whether a player will have access to a modicum of job 
security or will remain in the free-lance market subject to the constant vulnerability of 
losing one’s place in the pecking order (for health or other reasons often outside of one’s 
control). This economic reality is hard on musicians in part because they identify their 
‘sense of self so strongly with their ability to continue being a musician. “Quitting” 
music to take up another form of work that might be more stable and lucrative’^ "* has far 
more significance to a musician than finding a new job or even changing careers.
Regelski’s concept of phronesis challenges the notion that perfection in 
performance constitutes some kind of “absolute” value in music. In other words, 
perfection is appropriate to some kinds of musical practices, but perfection, in itself, is 
not an absolute standard that determines value in music; rather, value is considered in 
terms of the “right results” achieved in particular settings. “The practiced perfection of 
productive techniques are necessary to any musical praxis, but they are not sufficient to 
understanding, realizing or accounting for its “goods” (Regelski, 1997, p. 44).
Alternative kinds of work are not always so easy to find since musicians, as 
bright and entrepreneurial as many of us are, don’t have a skill set that immediately 
qualifies us for other kinds of work.
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“Quitting” almost always represents the belief that we will lose who we are — we 
will lose access to the place where our body, mind and souls are one’®’. Consequently, 
for musicians, analyses of ideology have the potential to give us perspective that is 
important to our psyches as well as to our material survival.
Power
Power represents an area of analysis that is not far removed from the function of 
ideology. Power is what we discover when we act in accordance with what we believe to 
be the best interests of ourselves and our communities only to discover that we are 
subject to outside interests (control) that we didn’t know existed. In a footnote in Chapter 
Two, I related a story about the members of an orchestra who were reprimanded publicly 
-  at the insistence of a corporate sponsor -  for taking a stand for peace’®®. Until the 
musicians stepped out of their approved roles as instrumentalists, they were unaware of 
the conflict between their self-understanding as conscientious and engaged members of 
their communities and the meanings, values and material resources (of the corporate 
sector) that made their orchestral careers possible. The public face of corporate 
sponsorship, good corporate citizens supporting good people (the artists) doing good 
things (playing great music), obscures the material reality represented by the 
corporation’s power to control the operation not only of an arts organization, but, also, 
the lives and citizenship of the members of that organization. Here is an example where
’®’ Rather than belabour these points here, I return to the question of the harsh 
material conditions faced by far too many musicians (and other artists) as they relate to 
ideology, materiality, power and authority and self-image in a Post-Script that follows the 
body of this thesis.
166 I don’t remember which particular act of aggression was being protested at the 
time.
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the workings of power are revealed through an act of resistance, resulting in the 
unveiling of some of the structural elements of society to which we are subject. Power 
was expressed through the threat of the withdrawal of funds. Power was exercised 
through the public vilification of the peace protesters.
How does power play out specifically in the lives of musicians? One way is 
through our belief that people who are better players or have higher status jobs are 
assumed to be entitled to a respect that carries over to their worth as human beings*^’. 
Problematizing the notions of stardom and “star struck, for example” would make a 
worthwhile study on the intersection commerce, meaning-making and notions of self^^ .^
A senior conductor who was in residence at the National Youth Orchestra of 
Canada told the assembled students during a lecture that we were “slugs on the earth 
compared to the likes of Beethoven.” I wondered then why it was not possible to respect 
a person’s work without denigrating ourselves in the process, but I also had so much 
respect for this conductor, his accomplishments and his wisdom that I gave his comments 
a great deal of credibility.
In fact, these connections do not come to me out of the blue. In Understanding 
Toscanini, author Joseph Horowitz (1987) examines how the public image of Toscanini 
was imbued with particular qualities that served the commercial interests of the time. 
Horowitz also looks at the social history of the period and the creation of the body of 
work now thoroughly commodified as “The Great Musical Masterpieces.” These 
masterpieces represent the mainstay of the classical repertoire today and are part of the 
reason that audiences have come to expect they will hear pieces by composers who are 
long since dead. The commercial forces that worked to create a market for classical 
music were also supported by musical ‘evangelists’ who wanted to bring culture to the 
“masses”— as part of an effort to ‘civilize’ the population of the New World. Hence, 
Horowitz provides a window on a time period in which ideologies were created which, 
today, are taken for granted by many musicians and non-musicians alike. Another 
connection worthy of notice is how much this process of ‘civilizing’ a population soimds 
like the process of colonization. In the latter context, missionaries are sent to “new” 
lands to plant the seeds of a new ideology (thus saving the souls of the ‘spiritually 
impoverished’ natives) while preparing the ground for propertied interests to assume 
ownership of lands with a minimum of resistance. Colonization has been such a 
powerful historical influence. It is not surprising that it is manifested, not only in the 
long-held belief in the superiority of all things Western, but in the way our own choices 
as musicians are circumscribed by its ideological and material force.
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As I described in Chapter Three, relationships between students and teachers 
are fraught with power dynamics that do not always serve the best interests of the 
students. Every musician has stories about emotional abuse that has been inflicted on 
students by their teachers. Sometimes the emotional abuse extends into sexual 
relationships in which the student becomes completely vulnerable to the opinions and 
wants of their teacher*® .^ The dangers of power relations are compounded by the 
presence of the systemic effects of ideology and materiality. Routinely, students 
perceived to be performing below whatever has been deemed to be the standard, are 
ridiculed by their teachers and told that they have no business pursuing music as a 
career^’'’. The difficulty of calling them to account has a great deal to do with the 
confluence of power, materiality, and ideology. Frequently situated in positions of 
material marginality (class, apprenticeship, educational legitimacy), the only way that 
students can challenge the power exercised by abusive teachers is to prove them wrong. 
Yet, given teachers’ institutional responsibility for assigning students to ensembles, their 
role as adjudicators and their influence on job opportunities, students who would 
challenge their abusive instructors’ belittling assertions face an uphill battle. Resistance 
thus plays directly into the influence of ideologies that equate personal value with 
competitive success. Looking at power dynamics from a critical framework would allow 
teachers and students to examine these dynamics in ways that depersonalize the issues.
Not every teacher-student relationship that becomes sexual is abusive or 
exploitative, but many are. It is difficult for anyone in a position of authority to cross 
over into an intimate relationship with a student, even an adult student, without confusing 
the boundaries between power and intimacy.
Conducting classes with “Master Conduùtors” are notorious sites for 
demagoguery coupled with the derision of those deemed unfit to lead.
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Critical consciousness in such instances allows all parties to step back and consider 
the purpose and goals of being part of an institution intended to nurture musical 
development. I believe that there are alternatives to the assumptions and material 
pressures that encourage the development of relationships shaped by power and 
vulnerability. In order to develop such alternatives, however, it is necessary first to 
unpack the interweaving influences of ideology, power, and materiality.
Inside/Outside Viewpoints
The development of critical consciousness offers us the capacity to see our work 
from both the inside and the outside. By problematizing our different roles as artists we 
are able to consider the paradigms expressed through our musical practices, our public 
presentations and the meanings embedded in musical discourses. We gain the capacity to 
step back from our work and our world and inquire about how we might be related to 
others in society. Likewise, we gain the capacity to consider how others might see us. A  
repercussion of limiting ourselves to narrow frames of reference is that we see ourselves 
as separate from issues that don’t appear to affect us directly; in fact, we may simply not 
“notice” that factors outside our own immediate concerns are shaping our possibilities.
In its worst form, a viewpoint focused on the inside can spawn the normalization of 
hierarchical categories: winners and losers, special people versus ordinary people, people 
we simply don’t notice or even people we can totally discount. Mostly, though, what we 
gain by developing critical consciousness is to recognize our relatedness, our historical 
and social locatedness, and, thereby, to gain the capacity to work together with others on 
the conditions that shape our material realities.
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Summary of moderate and strong arguments in favor of including critical 
consciousness in professional music studies
In Chapter Four I presented weak, moderate and strong arguments in favor of 
developing critical consciousness as part of an advanced level of education. A weak 
argument is one that requires the least amoimt of proof. In this case, my argument is 
based purely on self-interest in terms of one’s basic capacity to survive. This argument 
does not need any further elaboration here — the same conditions apply whether one is a 
musician, home worker or engineer. A moderate argument requires a greater level of 
proof. In this case, I have based my argument on the assertion that we live in a 
democracy and, arguably, ought to be invested in maintaining and furthering this form of 
political organization. A strong argument requires a proof involving ‘necessity.’ Proving 
‘necessity’ in philosophical terms is extremely difficult as it requires an agreement on 
what constitutes value in life. Therefore, my general argument in Chapter Four and the 
argument I make here directed towards musicians, will hold for those people who agree 
with my version of what constitutes a “good life.”
Moderate Argument
We live in a country that considers democracy to be a defining characteristic. 
Democracy is not an objective state that will exist into perpetuity. Democracy, as 
articulated by such divergent writers as John Dewey, Paulo Freire and bell hooks, 
requires the constant efforts of its citizenry. Such efforts are also articulated as necessary 
by music education philosophers Reimer, Elliott, Regelski and Jorgensen, each of whom 
acknowledges the responsibility of music educators to further the goals of this system of 
political organization through their approaches to music education. Musicians are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
198
positioned at an interesting site within our current democratic system. At this time in 
history we are particularly vulnerable to the effects of large economic forces and 
changing notions of what kinds of “services” should be paid for with public funds. At the 
same time, the availability of corporate funding is also being influenced by global forces. 
No particular group of working people in Canada is likely to have the capacity to strongly 
influence these structural conditions; however, in recognizing the conditions we share 
with others, that is, in recognizing our relatedness, we gain the capacity to work together 
with others to respond to these conditions and to work towards creating new conditions.
As cultural producers, we have the unique opportunity to generate meaning 
through our public activities. While this role suggests a responsibility to understand the 
meanings that we might be generating through our presentations, more than that, it 
suggests powerful opportunities to engage in public spaces as creators of public meaning. 
To me, this is a vision of our roles as ‘artists,’ and ‘cultural producers’ that inspires an 
unearthing of taken-for-granted meanings — an unearthing that could lead to broadening 
the scope of our artistic, cultural and personal engagements. Developing critical 
consciousness not only allows us to consider how our social and material locations 
intersect with ideological constructions, it gives us the opportunity to consider how we 
might generate cultural meanings that we have consciously chosen.
As potential arts council jury members, developing critical consciousness allows 
us to gain the capacity to consider what might be at stake in decisions around the 
distribution of funds — decisions that, in themselves, create and continue to create public 
meaning through the works produced by those who receive funding.
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As teachers, we gain the capacity to look beyond the goals and expectations 
that seem to belong to our roles within music education institutions, and consider what 
projects we might share with our students. Further, we can consider, within a broad 
context of social, personal, and economic factors, how to work together with students in a 
way that acknowledges external forces while honouring what each person, teacher or 
student, brings to the learning process. Critical consciousness can allow us to step back 
from the pressures to achieve or maintain one’s status as a performer, composer, 
conductor, music educator or musicologist and consider our work in light of the 
economic conditions that have such a bearing on how we experience ourselves in these 
roles.
Strong Argument
It is my conviction that understanding how we are situated empowers us to act as 
subjects, aware of what factors we are “subject to” but also empowered to choose what 
kinds of people we want to be. Musicians are tremendously committed to living their 
lives through music. I believe that we are attracted to this profession out of a desire to 
keep the passion, challenge, focus and enormous satisfaction that we experience as 
musicians, at the centre of our lives. I believe also that for many, choosing music as a 
career is a form of resistance to accepting a life in which the fruits of one’s labour are 
used to serve purposes other than our own. Being a musician, at least before one 
discovers the perils of surviving on a musician’s income, offers the opportunity to “own” 
in a physical, intellectual and spiritual sense, the musical energy we generate — an 
energy that represents a union of our minds, bodies and spirits. We have trouble 
conceiving of ourselves as ‘workers’ because, on good days, we get tremendous
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enjoyment out of what we do and this enjoyment is not an assumed part of “working 
for a living.”.
The passion that we bring to being musicians, however, is also part of our
particular vulnerability in a world that doesn’t reward our passion with material structures
to support wage-earning opportunities. Through the journey I have taken while writing
this thesis, I have learned that, while I am still passionate about playing music, I am even
more passionate about the possibilities of collaborating with others to create structures
that support our material and spiritual survival as human beings. Developing critical
consciousness has allowed me to step back from the particulars of my own struggle to
survive as a musician and to recognize the systemic factors that shape and will continue
to shape that experience. From this new vantage point, I am able to consider what I
bring to life and consider how I might bring my skills, energy and passion to a world I
can contribute to making.
In the following passage I believe the term ‘philosophy’ is interchangeable with
the term ‘critical consciousness:’
Maxine Greene invites us to "do philosophy," to struggle with ideas, with the arts, 
with the events of the world, with the daily newspapers and our idiosyncratic 
chance encounters—all in order to become more aware of ourselves and our world, 
more aware of our inter-subjective predicaments, and then, importantly, to act on 
our awarenesses. To act on what we find; to act, even with partial consciousness; 
to act, even with contingent understanding; to act, to be a participant in the world. 
(Ayers, 1998, p.ix)*’*
How this awareness has changed my conception of myself as a musician has allowed me 
to explore other means of musical expression not dependent on the performance
*’*Ayers, W. C., & Miller Janet L. (. (1998). A light in dark times. New York: 
Teachers College Press, Columbia University.
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standards of a professional symphony orchestra. This includes working with children 
and young people to put together creative music projects in which musical skills are built, 
but the artistic products we strive for are based on contributions from everyone involved 
with the project. Much like Regelski’s notion ofphronesis and consonant with 
Jorgensen’s dialectical and dialogical approach, we create the value amongst ourselves 
through learning to focus our energies towards shared musical and personal goals. This 
work is not something I do to ‘fill in time’ between my more ‘important’ work as a 
member of a professional ensemble; it is an alternative expression of my musical and 
personal goals of significant meaning and value
Paul Freire, bell hooks, David Karp and Maxine Greene argue that there is a 
necessity to develop critical consciousness in order to fulfill ourselves as human beings 
and to achieve mental health in a world that assaults and assails us with seemingly 
irresolvable problems. For these writers, as for me, developing critical consciousness 
addresses our fundamental human need to be fully engaged, conscious of our material 
locations, conscious of our relatedness to others and conscious of our capacities to act 
and thus able to participate, fully, in making the world.
Looking to the Future
The approach I am suggesting for the educational of professional musicians does 
not exist at this time — at least not to my knowledge. Nevertheless, there are resources 
available that we can use to develop such an educational framework. The field of
I would like to note here the enormous amount I learned about working with 
nonprofessionals on musical projects through my work with members of the Performance 
and Communication Skills program at the Guildhall School of Music and Drama in 
London, England.
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philosophy of music education provides us with an excellent starting place to explore 
the nature and meaning of music. Each of the writers, though with different sets of 
priorities, poses challenges to our assumptions about music and what roles it can have in 
our lives. Bennett Reimer’s (2003) substantially revised book addresses many of the 
insights and critiques of a younger generation of writers and integrates many new ideas 
into his approach to music education.
There are also numerous works from within critical music theory that illuminate 
aspects of materiality, ideology and power as manifested in the field of music. For 
example, the work of Susan McClary (1991), Lucy Green (1997; 1998), Philip Brett 
(1994) and others explore music as discourse from the point of view of gender 
representations in music. Charlene Morton writes on the “Feminization of Music 
Education” (Morton, 1994 & 1996) and how this affects the status of the field and argues 
elsewhere for the importance of looking beyond the field of music for understanding our 
educational priorities (Morton, 2004). Morton, O’Dea (1993) and Bogdan write from a 
feminist perspective on the politics of music education and informed engagement. 
Christopher Small (1998) examines internal musical structures as they are reflected in 
external social expressions and provides a biting analysis of ideologies that continue to 
shape the world of the orchestral musician. Paul Woodford explores the relationship 
between democracy and music education in his forthcoming book (Indiana University 
Press). Ajay Heble (2000; 2003) and Daniel Fischlin (2003) of Guelph University have 
published an edited collection of papers that study music as a form of resistance and 
political expression. Gillian Siddall and Ajay Heble (2000) have written on issues 
surrounding the presence of women in jazz and the way that producers of music festivals
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also create culture and generate meanings through their choices of programming and 
performers. Roberta Lamb at Queens University offers a course on Women, Gender and 
Music. John Shepherd (1991; 1997) and Peter Wicke (1997) write extensively about the 
sociology of music. Included in the work of these writers are critical analyses of 
discourses and practices within popular, jazz and classical music genres. In addition, 
there is a growing body of literature that explores meaning-making in the world of Hip 
Hop and the music of youth cultures.
Each of these writers approaches their areas of interest with a concept of critical 
engagement similar to the concept of critical consciousness I have portrayed in this thesis. 
Thus, while the model of a program that challenges all professional music students to 
examine the influences of materiality, ideology and power as they are reflected in musical 
practices and the ways our lives as musicians are shaped does not yet exist, the resources 
are available to structure such a program. There is also a vast body of literature in fields 
outside of music: for example, cultural criticism, literature, art, women’s studies, race and 
gender studies and sociology, where critical approaches to knowledge have been present 
for some time.
Following the principles of praxis as articulated within the framework of 
historical materialism, a music program based on developing critical consciousness 
would include the various kinds of musical skill-building with which we are already 
familiar, framed within opportunities to study the ways that ideology, materiality and 
power are reflected in musical practices. For example, instead of studying music history 
as a progression of significant composers and the development of different musical styles, 
we might look carefully at the material conditions in which certain works were created
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and explore how these conditions are reflected within these works. Here the insights 
of Susan McClary, Lucy Green and Christopher Small could provide a starting place for 
critical analysis. We might also study who is represented and who is not represented in 
such cultural expressions and how this lack of representation continues to shape the 
content and expression of these cultural forms. When studying form and analysis, along 
with learning to understand the various ways composers have constructed their pieces, we 
might explore how these structures reflect the belief systems of the times in which they 
were produced. To some extent this is done now; however, fi-om a critical perspective, it 
would be important to cormect such belief systems with those we take for granted today, 
challenging those beliefs rather than simply accepting them as “normal.”
Ethnomusicology has a great deal to offer all music students. Here, we might 
explore the way music functions within unfamiliar cultures at the same time as applying 
the investigative strategies of this field to the ways musical culture is manifested in our 
own culture. Proceeding in this way might also break the pattern of seeing all cultures 
different from our own as “exotic” or “other” rather than seeing them as living 
expressions of culture every bit as valid as our own.
In music theory we might move beyond attempting to reproduce theoretical 
constructs belonging to previous generations of composers to seeing ourselves as 
potential creators of music, learning theoretical systems in order to develop the capacity 
to create music ourselves. Changing the focus of music theory from reproduction to 
creation would, in itself, challenge the notion that only composers, musicians purported 
to have inordinate musical capacities, had the right and the capacity to be musical 
creators. Perhaps composers, musicologists, conductors and music educators might also
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be accorded the assumption that they too, might have the means to contribute 
meaningfully in other capacities as musicians’’ .^ Such an approach would immediately 
challenge the hierarchy of values ascribed to different branches of the profession” '’. 
Another possibility would be to develop an additional course that looks critically at 
various kinds of contemporary cultural expression, looking at the material locations, 
stated purposes and the larger social forces that shape how these expressions move 
through the world. All performers and educators could explore the different ways that 
musicians can function within communities and work together with musical learners with 
different skill levels” .^ Students could also be encouraged to pursue their own cultural 
explorations outside of their course work, for example, by organizing improvisation 
sessions for students from different musical genres (not just jazz players) or encouraging 
students to pursue their own re-mix or tumtabling interests.
There are, of course, numerous examples of musicians who have moved 
beyond the fields in which they received their principal musical education. What I am 
challenging are the structures and ideologies that tend to limit our thinking and 
development during the educational process itself.
Conductors are better than soloists who are better than instrumentalists who 
are better than music educators who are better than amateurs -  though not by much. 
Musicologists and theoreticians are smarter than everyone but they can’t play so they 
don’t count; composers are now seen as possibly human, but they are still suspect 
because they sometimes write things that can’t be played (so they’re not as smart as they 
think they are), and, standing above us all, are great composers. None of us will ever be 
able to achieve the worth of these composers because they are already deemed to be great, 
and, because they are already dead, so their ascendancy is a given.
Such a program, modeled in part on the Performance and Communication 
skills program of the Guildhall School, was developed and in use for a time at the Royal 
Conservatory of Music. The program was run by Ezra Schabas, a former Dean at the 
Faculty of Music at the University of Toronto.
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Through modifying existing music programs, we could start a process of 
unearthing the meanings that currently shape the priorities of professional music 
institutions and begin a process of freeing ourselves from the assumptions that determine 
the priorities of professional music education. Entering into such a process would enable, 
not only the few rebels who challenge the system on their own, but all of us to engage in 
a continual process of engagement and reflection as we move beyond replicating values 
to creating culture on terms we have considered and have chosen.
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